Journal of Global Mass Communication

Interim Editor
David Demers

Editorial Board Members

Rosental Alves, University of Texas (Austin), USA
Ralph D Berenger, American University (Cairo), Egypt
Oliver Boyd-Barrett, Bowling Green State University, USA
Joseph Man Chan, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Clifford Christians, University of Illinois (Urbana-Champaign), USA
Anne Cooper-Chen, Ohio University (Athens), USA
James Curran, Goldsmiths College, UK
Mark Deuze, Indiana University (Bloomington), USA
Sharon Dunwoody, University of Wisconsin, USA
Peter Gross, University of Tennessee, USA
Cees Hamelink, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Yahya Kamalipour, Purdue University Calumet, USA
Jeffery Klaehn, Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada
Paolo Mancini, Perugia University, Italy
Srinivas Melkote, Bowling Green State University, USA
John C. Merrill, University of Missouri (Columbia), USA
Luiz Motta, University of Brasilia, Brazil
Erik Neuveu, Institut'Etudes Politiques de Rennes, France
Hillel Nossek, College of Management Academic Studies, Tel Aviv, Israel
Francis Nyamnjoh, Council for the Development of Social Science Research, Senegal
Paul Parsons, Elon University, USA
Barbara Plesch, Hohenheim University, Germany
Tomasz Pludowski, Stanford University, USA
Gertrude Robinson, McGill University, Canada
Holli A. Semelko, Emory University, USA
Jan Servaes, University of Massachusetts at Amherst
Raka Shome, London School of Economics, UK
Krishnamurthy Sriramesh, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
Nancy Snow, California State University, USA
Majid Tehranian, University of Hawaii, USA
Leo van Audenhove, Free University Brussels, Belgium
Elena Vartanova, State University of Moscow, Russia
Karin Wahl-Jorgensen, Cardiff University, UK
Silvio Waisbord, Academy for Educational Development, USA
Wayne Wanta, University of Missouri (Columbia), USA
Gabriela Warkentin, Iberoamericana University, Mexico
Denis Wu, Boston University, USA
Barbie Zelizer, University of Pennsylvania, USA
Copyright © 2011. The authors of each of the articles published in this issue own the copyrights to their works. For permission to reprint, please contact them (see title page for contact information).

Journal of Global Mass Communication (ISSN 1933-3218 print; 1940-9281 online) is a peer-reviewed scientific journal that seeks theoretical and empirical manuscripts and book reviews that examine the way in which similarities and differences articulate mass communication relations on a global scale. It also explores the way in which similarities and differences open up spaces for discourse, research and application in the field of mass communication praxis. JGMC seeks innovative articles that utilize critical and empirical approaches regarding global mass communication, including, but not limited to, systems, structures, processes, practices and culture. These articles could deal with content, as well as its production, consumption and effects, all of which are situated within inter- and trans-national, cross-cultural, inter-disciplinary and especially comparative perspectives. All theoretical and methodological perspectives are welcomed. All manuscripts undergo blind peer review. JGMC is published online and in hard copy form. The online version is open access, which means it is available at no charge to the public. Visit www.MarquetteBooks.com to view the contents of this journal and others. Softcover and hardcover versions are published once a year.
ARTICLES

5 Richard J. Peltz-Steele
"Fourth World" Values in a Spanish-Language Newspaper Serving an Immigrant Community

39 Eunjung Sung, Won Yong Jang and Edward Frederick

55 Justin D. Martin
Do Advances in Press Freedom Precede Human Development Progress? A Cross-Lagged Analysis of Global Press Ratings and UN Development Indices

74 Fan-Bin Zeng
Impact Factors Model of Internet Adoption and Use: Taking the College Students as an Example

88 Jack Kang Jie Liu
Diasporic Chinese Newspapers Not for Diasporic Chinese? A Case Study on Sing Tao Daily Australian Edition

110 Vanessa de Macedo Higgins Joyce
Transnational News Media Role in Building Consensus about Communities

133 Slavka Antonova, Richard Shafer and Eric Freedman
Journalism Education in Russia: Contemporary Trends in a Historical Context

152 Yejin Hong and Tsan-Kuo Chang
Culture and International Flow of Movies: Proximity, Discount or Globalization?

Note: The order of the articles in this issue is random.
“FOURTH WORLD” VALUES IN A SPANISH-LANGUAGE NEWSPAPER SERVING AN IMMIGRANT COMMUNITY

RICHARD J. PELTZ-STEELE

This study operationalized the Four Worlds model for mass media values in a new context — that of a foreign-language newspaper serving a recent-immigrant community within a First World society, namely a Hispanic community in central Arkansas, in the United States. The study established baseline representations of previously described “First World” and “Fourth World” values in a mainstream central Arkansas newspaper, and in Cherokee and Koori newspapers. The study speculated that the central Arkansas Hispanic community exists with a measure of physical and cultural separation from mainstream society — arising from informal barriers such as socioeconomic status, residential neighborhoods, language, and racism—and that this separation is analogous to the separation of a Fourth World society from its mainstream society. Accordingly, the study predicted that El Latino content would bear greater similarity with the Fourth World baseline than with the First World baseline. The hypothesis was substantially but not wholly born out. El Latino tracked the Fourth World baselines on six of the thirteen values surveyed, First and Fourth World, and results were inconclusive on six more values, two because El Latino fell between the baselines. El Latino tracked the First World baseline on only one value: First World “oddity.” It was hoped that this study will stimulate further research into similarities between immigrant groups and Fourth World communities, that they might share in the development of innovative strategies in their common pursuit of socioeconomic development for their peoples while preserving their cultural integrity and ethnic identity.

Richard J. Peltz-Steele is a professor of law at the University of Massachusetts Law School (rpeltzsteele@umassd.edu).
Keywords: acculturation, content analysis, ethnic media, Fourth World, immigration, newspaper

The concept of a “Fourth World,” complementing the traditional Three Worlds model, contemplates a society within a society, usually an indigenous people living in the aftermath of a colonial occupation. The Fourth World is still surrounded, geographically, politically, and culturally, by the former colonial power, yet the Fourth World people do not enjoy the same standard of living as their “First World” counterparts. Moreover, the political, cultural, and economic independence of the Fourth World people may be in a state of development and ambiguity in relation to the former colonial power. This condition describes, for example, the Koori of Australia, and the First Nations of North America.

Globalization, cross-border migration, and economic insecurity bring another population, one as yet unrepresented in the Four Worlds model, to the fore of political debate and cultural awareness: communities of immigrants from developing countries to First World countries. This community has much in common with the Fourth World, as especially recent immigrants might live in social and economic conditions that are, on average, substandard in relation to their First World counterparts. The immigrant community might be isolated by barriers such as language and culture, by the political boundaries of neighborhoods, and by the social alienation of prejudice. Like the people of the Fourth World, the immigrant community has an ambiguous relationship with its First World society. The immigrant community desires at once to preserve its social independence and ethnic identity, while also participating in the First World community to enjoy the political, social, and economic benefits of citizenship.

The Four Worlds model has been adapted to the context of mass media to study the value systems that are reflected and perpetuated in the “Third World” and, researched to a lesser extent, in the Fourth World. These studies have served to shed light on these communities and the role of the media in serving or hindering social and economic development, while reinforcing or disintegrating ethnic identity, as well as the role of media in performing traditional functions in those communities, such as government accountability and public communication.

No research yet, however, has examined immigrant communities in the First World according to the Four Worlds model. Finding a place in the Four Worlds model for immigrant-oriented media might help Fourth World and immigrant communities to share their common experiences in mapping their own courses toward social and economic development, while resolving the tension between acculturation and ethnic identity.

To these ends, this study conducted a comparison of the content of four newspapers, one a Spanish-language weekly newspaper serving an immigrant community within the First World United States; one a traditional, English-language daily serving the same U.S.
geographic market as the weekly; and two principally English-language newspapers, a fortnightly serving the Koori in Australia, and a monthly serving the Cherokee Nation in the United States. The study anticipated that the newspapers serving First and Fourth World populations would reflect the respective “news values” outlined by Robie (2001, p. 13). However, the study predicted that the Spanish-language U.S. newspaper would bear greater resemblance to the Fourth World models than to the First, even though it serves the same First World geographic market as the latter. This prediction arose from the observations that the immigrant community served by the Spanish-language newspaper occupies a discrete space within the host society, both figuratively, in dimensions such as language and socioeconomic attainment, and literally, in dimensions such as neighborhoods; and that this separation from the host society is strikingly reminiscent of the relationship between a Fourth World community and its First World counterpart. Accordingly, the foreign-language newspaper may merit recognition as reflective of a unique class of content values, perhaps a reflection of the community’s evolving relationship with the host society.

FOURTH WORLD

George Manuel, of the Shuswap Nation in present-day British Columbia, Canada, described “the Fourth World” (Manuel & Posluns, 1974). Manuel generalized the plight of the Shuswap to describe indigenous people around the world. “Aboriginal World” societies bear a “common bond” in two respects: first, in political, religious, economic, and cultural experiences distinct from those of the Third World, which adapts and imitates Western models; and second, in their interdependence of culture and land, as distinct from First World concepts such as kingdom, freehold, and alienation.

Russell (1996) defined the “Fourth World” as “the indigenous peoples with third world living conditions residing within first world countries” (p. 59). The Fourth World “cannot separate from imperial power because of their location within the boundaries of the imperialist nation” (Robie, 2008, p. 104), but Russell (1996) posited that a constructive sort of “decolonization” (pp. 57, 65-67)—not actually resulting in the physical departure of the colonizers, but resulting in a reconceptualized balance of integrated power and mutual autonomy—would allow Fourth World people in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States to realize their national identities and achieve Manuel’s ultimate vision. Meanwhile, though, Fourth World societies find themselves torn between the competing objectives of “political autonomy,” on the one hand, and “equal access to the political and economic opportunities of the democratic society,” on the other hand (Robie, 2008, p. 104).

Robie (2008) cited the Koori Mail as a prototype of Fourth World newspapers. Application of the Four Worlds model to media is important because the First World ‘objectivity’ paradigm, which dominates materials in journalism education, does not truly reflect how journalism is practiced in most of the world, which is developing (Robie 2008). Third and Fourth World value systems offer an alternative model for journalism that acknowledges the developing social and economic conditions in which journalists work in different countries and regions of the world. This alternative model challenges the traditional First World paradigm of objective detachment in a manner akin to the challenge public journalism poses to the traditional model within the First World. Accordingly, development journalism and public journalism are discussed below.

The further alternative of a Fourth World media model has been important to acknowledge the conflicting pressures and hybrid socioeconomic circumstances of journalists serving Fourth World societies. Robie (2008) asserted “an important role” (p. 104) for Fourth World media in expressing and resolving the indigenous struggle between political and cultural autonomy, on the one hand, and political and economic participation in the dominant society, on the other hand. If immigrant communities exist in a space similarly discrete from their host societies, and struggle with conflicting priorities in a manner similar to Fourth World peoples, as this paper posits, then a formulation of the unique values of the media serving the immigrant community will aid in understanding how immigrating peoples relate to their host societies, and perhaps how they can better develop socioeconomically while preserving their ethnic identity.

While naturally there is a danger of generalization in employing the Four Worlds model to analyze journalism across nations and cultures, it offers at least one mode of inquiry superior to the generalization of the idealistic First World paradigm to all the world, which was the norm in media research for much of the 20th century.

In Robie’s formulation, First World media are expected to reflect First World values
to the exclusion of Fourth World values, but Fourth World media are expected to incorporate both classical First World values and the special-interest values of the Fourth World model (Chung, 1984). Aside from Robie’s work, however, there is a dearth of empirical research on Fourth World journalism.

**Third World and Development Journalism**

A considerable body of research has examined journalism as it is practiced in developing countries, i.e., “development journalism” and “Third World” journalism. These close cousins of Fourth World journalism merit attention because, as Russell (1996) and Robie (2008) observed, it is Third World conditions and Third World values that exert pressure on Fourth World cultures, in tension with First World values.

The Third World paradigm has usefully acknowledged the circumstances in which most of the world’s journalists live and work. In contrast with the detached objectivity of the First World ideal, development journalists “share the sentiments of the people in social situations and are changed to some degree as well as changing the situation as reporters. They have a moral obligation to their readership and audience” (Robie, 2008, p. 102). Understanding how this role differs from the First World paradigm is essential to define the rights and responsibilities of the journalist in relation to “good governance, freedom of speech, human rights and executive power” within the particular dynamics of a developing nation (Robie, 2008, p. 104).

Soola (2003a) explicated the post-colonial world history of social and economic development from the 1960s to the 1990s. In 1970, Chalkley published the *Manual of Development Journalism*, which urged reporters to recognize the cycle of poverty in the developing world, and to “promot[e]” to readers, “to open their eyes to the possible solutions” (pp. 1-2).

Hester (1987) explained that Third World journalists cannot depend on consistency in political regimes, stability in infrastructure, or literacy in readers. Third World journalists thus bear particular responsibilities, such as educating readers, holding a mirror up to leaders, role modeling for youth, and amplifying the “needs, hopes, and fears” of the pedestrian community (pp. 6-9). Bhattacharjea (2005) emphasized the focus of development journalism on ordinary people and accountability for social services. Localization and rural reach are key to this focus, which rejects “elitist, urban-orient[ation]” and does not depend on the “traditional five-W format,” rather is licensed to “evoke interest and sympathy” with the subjects of stories (pp. 3, 8).

Some Third World advocates have argued that a government-media alliance is desirable or necessary for Third World societies to achieve economic development, while others worry over the implications of government power for the freedom and independence...
of the press. This tension was examined by Soola (2003c) and exhaustively by Chung (1984). Chung concluded that while there is merit in the contributions of journalism to development through government-allied values such as education and inspiration, the surveillance and inspection functions of the news media, independent and critical of government, remain essential to national development. Another noteworthy study is Lee’s (1986), in which he compared newspaper history and content across four former British colonies and identified an unexpected “negative correlation between development journalism and economic growth” (p. 126). At the same time, however, he found “no systematic relationship between authoritarianism/totalitarianism and the practice of development journalism” (p. 261), a finding bolstered by Romano (1998) studying Indonesian journalists.

Researchers have conducted numerous other case and country studies of development journalism, focusing on developing Asia (McKay, 1993), the South Pacific (Robie, 2008), Indonesia (Tamin, 1992; Tobing, 1991), Nigeria (Soola, 2003b; Edeani, 1993), the African Yoruba (Salawu, 2003), and various African countries (Spencer-Walters, 1987).

PUBLIC JOURNALISM

The additional paradigm of “public journalism” also merits mention. Public journalism (also “civic journalism” or “communitarian journalism”) represents a socially conscious model of journalism that elevates social responsibility over classical First World objectivity. A distinctively First World, post-industrial movement, public journalism traces its recent recognition substantially to 1990s media criticism in North America (Rosen, 1992; Charity, 1995; Merritt, 1995), but can be traced to roots in the 1920s (Haas, 2007). Public journalism has been treated thoroughly (Black, Ed., 1997; Glasser, Ed., 1999a; Haas, 2007) and is the raison d’etre of non-governmental organizations such as the Public Journalism Network (Witt, Ed., 2009) and the Center for Community Journalism and Development (2009).

Both public and Third World journalism emphasize the social mission of the journalist, the former eschewing the classic First World theory of self-expression in favor of community self-governance (Glasser, 1999a), and the latter positing values in community integration and social responsibility (Robie, 2008). Yin (1996) observed that despite juxtaposed ties to authoritarianism and democracy, both development and public journalism emerged from dissatisfaction with conventional journalism, and both aim to effect social change through journalistic involvement rather than detachment. Hoskins (1997) suggested that public journalism might provide a needed avenue for Mexican journalism to progress from a state of development-model subordination to authoritarian government controls, to a state of independence in fostering civic participation in the democratic tradition.

Public journalism initiatives have been identified in Australia, Japan, and New Zealand, as well as developing countries, Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, Malawi, Senegal,
and Swaziland (Haas, 2007), but commonality between public and Fourth World journalism in particular has not been investigated in the literature.

**ETHNIC AND IMMIGRANT MEDIA**

The 2008 Editor and Publisher *International Yearbook* listed more than 100 ethnic newspapers, besides Hispanic media, serving communities from Afghan to Vietnamese. The penetration of ethnic media in the U.S. media marketplace has been noted for some time, from 1732 (Kanellos with Martell, 2000; Kelly, 1985), to the 1900s (Paul, 2001a), to present, and ethnic-media business dynamics have been studied and tracked (New California Media 2005; Pew Project for Excellence in Journalism 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009). Marketing in the United States in the 1980s “discovered” Spanish-language media as a means to access a vast audience, then-as-yet under-tapped (Rodriguez, 1999, p. 41).

Ethnic media should not be confused with immigrant media, as Kanellos and Martells (2000) observed that First Nations media, always, and African-American media, for generations, have been the former and not the latter. But a fine line divides the two, so some obfuscation is unavoidable (Miller, 1987). Even if immigrant communities transformed in linear fashion into ethnic minority groups, and perhaps then into dominant culture—they do not, as the next section explains—community is difficult to define amid ongoing immigration, and there are no defining moments of transformation. Accordingly, media play an evolving role throughout the life of the community, whatever its course relative to the dominant culture (Johnson, 2000; Kanellos with Martells, 2000; Viswanath and Arora, 2000). In light of vibrant Latino immigration at present, a distinction between Latino immigrant and ethnic media in recent decades is not highly salient here.

Research on Latino media in the United States has consistently recognized a tension between preservation of immigrant culture vis-à-vis host culture, and integration between immigrant and host culture (Kanellos with Martells, 2000; Rodriguez, 1999). This tension plays out in news values. Born of the U.S. marketplace, U.S. Latino media generally reflect the dominant First World ideal of objectivity (Rodriguez, 1999). But that ideal is mitigated by a powerful allegiance to the immigrant community. The result can be compared with public journalism: “Latino journalism absorbs the objectivity ideal into a public service orientation” (Rodriguez, 1999, p. 88). This community focus fosters intense reader loyalty (Kelly, 1985; Paul, 2001b). A number of studies have examined the consequent impact of ethnic media on political affairs (Donelle, Hoffman-Goetz & Clarke, 2004; Hoffman-Goetz, Shannon & Clarke, 2003; Félix, González & Ramírez, 2008; Friedman & Hoffman-Goetz, 2006; Jeffres, 1999; Lindaman, 2004; Olzak & Westbrook, 1991).

Content analyses have revealed differences between U.S. Latino and host-culture media that accord with “Latino objectivity” (Rodriguez, 1999, p. 84) and are suggestive of
Fourth World values. Latino media emphasize news from Latin America, with or without a local peg (Kelly, 1985; Miller, 1987; Rodriguez, 1999), sometimes to filter information back into repressive regimes (Kanellos with Martell, 2000). Spanish-language media obviously perpetuate identity as expressed through language, and sometimes simultaneously perpetuate culture with the publication of Spanish-language literary and entertainment products, such as poetry (Kanellos with Martell, 2000). Where Latino and mainstream media cover the same stories, the former tends to a culturally independent and critical perspective, demonstrated by peg, such as the immigration proposals of political candidates, and by sourcing, which emphasizes Latino commentators but may de-emphasize the voices of other cultural minorities (Kanellos with Martell, 2000; Kelly, 1985; Rodriguez, 1999). Latino media content furthermore emphasizes education, civil rights, and sociopolitical advocacy (Kanellos with Martell, 2000; Kelly, 1985; Miller, 1987; Rodriguez, 1999). Media publish practical information, from holiday schedules to job boards, to aid recent immigrants in adjusting to daily life in a new place (Miller, 1987; Paul, 2001b; Walker, 1999). Members of the community successful in labor, education, and athletics are held up as role models (Kelly, 1985; Rodriguez, 1999). Latino media furthermore perpetuate culture by reinforcing values related to family, religion, and gender roles (Kanellos with Martell, 2000; Paul, 2001b).

The particular culture perpetuated by Latino media is unique. Aside from highly local media serving readers homogenous in national origin, Latino media downplay national and cultural differences between readers and reinforce instead a pan-ethnic Latino identity (Rodriguez, 1999). Consciously constructed even through language choices, pan-ethnic identity empowers the community through internal solidarity, and cultivates the media audience by transcending the diverse immigrant experiences of, for example, Cubans, Salvadorians, and Chileans. The result is a “renationalized” cultural identity that is distinctly of the United States, but apart from the dominant culture (Rodriguez, 1999, pp. 75-81).

Researchers have previously recognized the importance of studying immigrant communities through their media, and in so doing described immigrant communities in terms strikingly reminiscent of Fourth World cultural study. Kanellos and Martells (2000) described the mission of Latino media as “pursuit of self-expression and self-definition as a people within the cultural and geographic borders of a multicultural nation” (p. 119). Miller (1987) explained that “[t]he press is the best single source for an understanding of the world of non-English-speaking groups in the United States, their expectations and concerns, their background and evolution as individual communities” (p. xii). Miller furthermore emphasized the need for further content analysis of ethnic and immigrant media “to trace historical and sociological developments, examine social structure, and analyze groups’ mores as they are distinguished from mainstream society” (p. xx).
ASSIMILATION, ACCULTURATION, AND THE ARKANSAS HISPANIC COMMUNITY

Considerable research has examined the relationship between immigrant communities and their host societies. Initially this relationship was perceived in terms of a linear and progressive development of the immigrant community toward a state of complete assimilation in the host society. While assimilation continues to be an important part of the immigrant-host relationship, substantially more complex models emerged amid research into 20th-century migrations (Alba & Nee, 2001).

Most importantly, the immigrant-host relationship is a two-way street of acculturation. This acculturative transformation has been described as a convergence, in which the immigrant and host cultures both change, converging in a new society (Alba & Nee, 2001; Rumbaut, 1999; Suárez-Orozco, 2001a). Elements of the immigrant culture—whether food (tortillas in the United States), language ("Spanglish"), or even abstract values (family, marriage)—can lose their ethnic associations and become characteristic of the converged society.

Moreover, the transformation of the immigrant-host society is not necessarily linear, nor necessarily progressive (Rumbaut, 1999). The path of the immigrant community has been described as “bumpy,” changes occurring in fits and starts (Alba & Nee, 2001, p. 9; Rumbaut, 1999, p. 188). Indeed, the problem may be examined in multiple dimensions, such as language, culture, and political participation (Alba & Nee, 2001; Foner, 1999; Rumbaut, 1999). Researchers have identified language as the most reliably linear and progressive dimension, manifesting a generational pattern of abandonment of the origin language in favor of the host language (Rumbaut, 1999). Transformation may be mapped in different patterns for the same population, depending on the dimension analyzed.

It is not inevitable that an immigrant culture will move forward, insofar as its transformation is linear, nor that the condition of the immigrant community, in dimensions such as education, economic attainment, and public health, will progress to a better state, even after emigration from the developing world. Factors such as language barriers, racism, and economic adversity in the host country can yield socioeconomic regression and alienation, whether as a temporary setback or a longer-term condition (Alba & Nee, 2001; Bean, Chapa, Berg, & Sowards, 1994; Rumbaut, 1999; Suárez-Orozco, 2001a; Zhou, 1999).

In fact, there is an open question as to whether patterns of assimilation or acculturation witnessed in the 20th century will persist at all (Gans, 1999; López, 1999). The 1960s civil rights era is passed. Migrating persons today more often appear as persons of color, thus are more conspicuous than their European predecessors (Perlman & Waldinger, 1999). Migration today is not confined to discrete waves, but is an ongoing process. And the world is in the grip of an economic crisis. Perhaps most saliently, globalization and communication...
technology have created a world in which immigrant persons maintain vibrant ties with societies of origin. While acculturation never required that a minority group utterly shed its ethnic identity, the tech-savvy descendants of immigrants today are capable of forming compound identities: “transnationals” easily sliding between worlds (Suárez-Orozco, 2001a, pp. 60-63; Suárez-Orozco, 2001b, p. 220; Trueba, 2004, pp. 37-43, 71-85).

Hispanic immigration in the United States offers ripe ground for migration research, because several factors indicate that these immigrant communities will relate to the host society in an unprecedented fashion. Hispanic immigration is marked by its ongoing stream and high volume, which prompt more than usual movement by the host culture toward convergence. For example, even language might not follow its usual assimilative, linear, and progressive pattern (López, 1999; Trueba, 2004). Large immigrant communities and increasing bilingualism in host communities mitigate the predominance of English, while globalization and technology perpetuate bilingualism among youth. Meanwhile Hispanic immigrants tend to appear as persons of color, thus remain conspicuous in many parts of the country. Amid economic stresses, real problems arising from illegal immigration, and the civil rights era dated by generations, cultural convergence might be slowed by alienation and racism.

Arkansas, in the United States, is an apt locality for this study. Using data from the 2000 U.S. Census, 2005 American Community Survey, and 2005 Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement, Capps, Henderson, Hernandez, & Fix (2007) determined that Arkansas had the fastest growing Hispanic population, per capita, of any U.S. state between 2000 and 2005. More than half of the foreign-born Arkansas population in 2005 immigrated in 1995 or later, a more recently immigrated population than the U.S. national average (Capps et al., 2007). Also exceeding the national average in 2005, two-thirds of Arkansas immigrants came from Latin America, almost half from Mexico (Capps et al., 2007). Using Urban Institute analysis of data from the 2004 and 2005 U.S. Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplements, and relying on Passel (2005) to classify the legal status of survey respondents, Capps et al. (2007) determined that more than half of Arkansas immigrants were undocumented, an excess over the national average. Undocumented status reinforces social isolation by depriving persons of full participation in the political and economic community of the host society. In 2005, four Arkansas counties—including Pulaski, which includes the capital city of Little Rock, in central Arkansas—were home to almost two-thirds of immigrants (Capps et al., 2007). Supplementing their data with information from the Arkansas Department of Education, Capps et al. demonstrated that Arkansas immigrants share low levels of educational and economic attainment relative to the U.S.-born population.

These circumstances suggest comparison with the Four Worlds model. Hispanic-immigrant communities in Arkansas are not part of the First World, nor part of the Third. Immigrant communities have coalesced around pan-ethnic commonalities such as language,
religion, and food (López, 1999). Their isolation from mainstream Arkansas culture is reinforced by barriers such as language, economic attainment, and racism (Zhou, 1999). Predominantly Hispanic neighborhoods have come into being, complete with ethnic food and Spanish-language business signs. Their borders are not fixed on any map, but they are well known locally. While these neighborhoods resemble the ethnic enclaves of 20th-century European immigrants in U.S. cities, the changed circumstances of contemporary migration mean that these Hispanic enclaves might not yield to cultural convergence as readily or rapidly as their predecessors (Bean et al., 1994).

These communities might instead represent a new form of Fourth World society: an ethnically minority, socioeconomically disadvantaged “world” contained within a host, First World society. Using the Four Worlds model, study of the media that serve this world might bolster the comparison. The role of mass media in acculturation has been studied little (Rumbaut, 1999). Moreover, recognition of similarities between contemporary immigrant communities and long established Fourth World societies might foster recognition of common interests. Research has demonstrated that immigration and acculturation are highly stressful experiences, threatening social stability and family integrity (Smart & Smart, 2001; Suárez-Orozco, 2001b). Problems such as petrol abuse in Koori townships are indicative of the socioeconomic stresses on alienated Fourth World peoples. Perhaps media strategies—such as the perpetuation of social networks and cultural customs (Smart & Smart, 2001)—shared between immigrant and Fourth World communities, have a mutual capacity to relieve suffering and work toward a constructive model of cultural convergence.

**METHOD**

**Sampled Newspapers**

This research analyzed and compared content from four newspapers published from the start of February 2008 to near the end of January 2009. The newspapers were *El Latino (Arkansas)*, the *Koori Mail*, the *Cherokee Phoenix*, and the *Arkansas Democrat-Gazette*. The *Koori Mail* was chosen as a Fourth World model, because Robie (2005, 2008), who adapted the Four Worlds model to media studies, has repeatedly cited the fortnightly *Mail* as a prototype of Fourth World media. However, considering the transoceanic and cultural distance between Australia and Arkansas, the *Cherokee Phoenix* was adopted as a second Fourth World model. The Four Worlds concept originated with the First Nations of North America, and the monthly *Phoenix*, which focuses its coverage on the Cherokee heartland of Oklahoma, is geographically the closest First Nations publication to central Arkansas. Moreover, while the *Koori Mail* endeavors to cover Australia from coast to coast, the *Phoenix’s* focus on the sub-state region of eastern Oklahoma is more akin to *El Latino’s*
focus on central Arkansas. The *Arkansas Democrat-Gazette* was chosen because it is the principal news daily in central Arkansas, serving the same geographic market as *El Latino*, and operates in the traditional journalistic paradigm.

*El Latino* was chosen as the focus of this study in part because the rapid growth of the Hispanic population in Arkansas, a largely rural state, has created a substantial minority population that lives, geographically and socioeconomically, quite apart from the host society. The weekly *El Latino* is exclusively a Spanish-language publication, so on its face aims to serve a readership discrete from the overwhelmingly monolingual native-born population served by the *Democrat-Gazette*. *El Latino* and the central Arkansas market were chosen as the focus of this study in part because the author has substantial experience as an advocate for both the media and Hispanic communities in central Arkansas, and thus was well positioned to analyze the *Democrat-Gazette* and *El Latino* in the contexts of their home communities.

Of 52 issues of *El Latino* published from February 2008 through January 2009, 24 were selected for analysis according to a stratified sampling by which two issues were selected at random from each calendar month (Lacy, Robinson, & Riffe, 1995). Of 26 issues of the *Koori Mail* published from February 2008 through January 2009, 12 were selected for analysis according to a systematic sampling of alternating issues. All 12 print issues of the *Cherokee Phoenix* from February 2008 through January 2009 were analyzed. The *Democrat-Gazette* published 371 issues from February 1, 2008, to February 5, 2009, and 14 were selected for content analysis according to a stratified sample of two composite weeks, each from a random selection of one day per week from each six-month period (Riffe, Aust, & Lacy, 1993; Stempel, 1952).

**Content Values**

The content in each newspaper was coded first for its pertinence to Robie’s First World values, the “objectivity” series, and second to Robie’s Fourth World values, the “self-determination” series. (Definitions for each value were articulated and appear in Appendix A.) Because the author acted as a single coder, ten percent of the selected publications were re-coded to ensure reliability (Stempel, 1989). Counting every affirmative code as a single item, whether identified initially or upon re-coding, reliability was assessed at 98.6%, with a lowest reliability by publication at 97.8% for the *Cherokee Phoenix*, indicating adequate reliability.

**Analytical Methodology**

After coding and measurement of the samples according to the content values, three assessments were conducted of the data. For ease, these assessments will be referred to as
comparisons of proportions in (1) “frequency,” (2) “area average,” and (3) “area sum.”

First and principally, items responsive to each value field, in each series, were counted for each newspaper and divided by the sum of coded items for that newspaper. These frequency proportions were compared, newspaper to newspaper, using a two-sample proportion test.

The latter two assessments were conducted to ensure that the frequency proportions were not unreliable because of variations in story length. Thus second, an average was calculated of the per-item area devoted to each value field by each newspaper, relative to the sum area of coded content in that newspaper. These area-average proportions were compared using a two-sample t-test (assuming unequal variances). Area was measured in inches, rounding to the quarter-inch. For the content analyzed in this study, area (or content hole) was regarded as a superior measurement to word count, because textual and graphic content varied greatly among the newspapers. For example, the Koori Mail routinely covered significant Koori cultural events through photographic “essays,” while the Democrat-Gazette was more text-intensive.

Third, the proportion of the sum area in each newspaper that was coded affirmatively in each value field, relative to the sum area of coded content in that newspaper, was calculated. These area-sum proportions were not analyzed statistically because the quarter-square-inch was not a sufficiently fixed unit of measurement of population size to render a reliable estimation of significance.

D. Limitations. With its focus on El Latino and central Arkansas, this study is quite limited in its capacity to derive generalized conclusions. Short of generalizations, it was the author’s hope that the study at least would yield results of sufficiently compelling interest as to generate discussion and perhaps further research on the relevance of the Four Worlds model to immigrant media, especially amid the changing dynamics of global human migration. If the Four Worlds model is relevant to immigrant media and the migration experience, then media studies might lead to the formulation of a content selection and values strategy that works better than the First World paradigm to resolve the conflicts and work through the issues that confront immigrant communities within First World societies.

RESULTS

First and Fourth World Baselines

Consistently with the design of this study (see Table 2), it was expected that as Fourth World models, the Koori Mail and Cherokee Phoenix, would reflect Fourth World values as well as or better than the First World model would. Considering the frequency results (Tables 3 and 4), this expectation came substantially, but not entirely, to pass. The Fourth
Table 2. Overall Volume of Data Collection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EL</th>
<th>KM</th>
<th>CP</th>
<th>DG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>no. items</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>1580</td>
<td>772</td>
<td>1815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sum area (in.^2)</td>
<td>25455.0</td>
<td>104376.0</td>
<td>40232.2</td>
<td>92893.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>avg. area (in.^2)</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>51.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sum area (cm.^2)</td>
<td>164225.5</td>
<td>673392.2</td>
<td>259562.1</td>
<td>599312.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>avg. area (cm.^2)</td>
<td>305.8</td>
<td>426.2</td>
<td>336.2</td>
<td>330.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

World models both exceeded the Democrat-Gazette in representations of (1) independent voice, (2) language, (3) culture, and (6) Fourth World conflict. The Cherokee Phoenix, but not the Koori Mail, outperformed the Democrat-Gazette on (4) education, and the Mail but not the Phoenix outperformed the Democrat-Gazette on (5) inter-group solidarity. Within the Fourth World value series, the Democrat-Gazette significantly outperformed only the Koori Mail, only as to education.

Statistical comparison of area data (Table 5 and 6) in the Fourth World value series was usually not possible because of the low representation of Fourth World values in the Democrat-Gazette, a fact that bolstered the expected frequency results. Among the area statistics (Tables 6 and 7) that could be derived, average story size on independent voice in the Koori Mail was not significantly distinguishable from that in the Democrat-Gazette, a result that neither bolstered nor contradicted the frequency result. Average story size on education in the Koori Mail was not significantly distinguishable from that in the Democrat-Gazette, a result that undermined the only frequency result reflecting favorable Democrat-Gazette performance on a Fourth World value. The low representations of education in the Mail and inter-group solidarity in the Phoenix suggested that perhaps Fourth World media do not uniformly model those values, or those newspapers uncharacteristically underrepresented those values. However, those possibilities are cast into doubt by the area data, which showed, on average, shorter education items in the Koori Mail than in the Democrat-Gazette, putting the two on par, and too few solidarity items in the Democrat-Gazette to compare statistically to the Cherokee Phoenix. Only in those respects did the area data contradict the frequency results, and that contradiction only added credibility to the Mail and Phoenix as Fourth World models.

It was further expected that as a First World model, the Democrat-Gazette would reflect First World values as well as or better than both Fourth World models would. This expectation came to pass as to (4) oddity, (6) First World conflict, and (7) disaster. The Democrat-Gazette significantly surpassed only the Cherokee Phoenix Fourth World model.
on (3) personality. Unexpectedly, both Fourth World models better than the Democrat-Gazette reflected the First World values of (2) proximity and (5) human interest, and the Cherokee Phoenix better than the Democrat-Gazette reflected the First World value of (1) timeliness.

Area data on the First World value series tell a different story from the frequency results, thus casting the frequency results into some doubt. Likely owing to its abundance of section-front briefs, and despite its broadsheet format, the Democrat-Gazette tended to run shorter stories, on average, than all three other newspapers. Thus the area data in general point to a higher representation of nearly all values, including First World values, in the other three newspapers, when measured by average story size. Where the First World results were inverted from expectation, the shorter stories in the Democrat-Gazette of course yielded area data that bolstered the frequency lead of the Koori Mail and Cherokee Phoenix. But where frequency results were consistent with expectations, the shorter stories in the Democrat-Gazette yielded area data that contradicted the frequency lead of the Mail and Phoenix. Exceptional in this regard, where statistical analysis was possible, was the average story size in the Koori Mail–Democrat-Gazette comparison on human interest, where the Democrat-Gazette led, and in the Koori Mail–Democrat-Gazette comparison on personality, where the two were not significantly distinguishable.

Whether the area statistics are sufficiently powerful to overcome the frequency results in any respect is a subjective question. Importantly, statistical comparison was not possible on (4) oddity because of the low representation in all newspapers. Statistical comparison was not possible on (7) disaster because of low representation in all but the Democrat-Gazette, thus bolstering the frequency result. These two values were two of the three First World

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>EL</th>
<th>KM</th>
<th>CP</th>
<th>DG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.TIMELY</td>
<td>84.2</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>86.1</td>
<td>78.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.NEAR</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.PERSON</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.ODD</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.HUMAN</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.CNFLCT</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.DSASTR</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.VOICE</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.LANGE</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.CULTUR</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.EDUC</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.SOLID</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.CNFLCT</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
strongholds, the third being First World conflict, in that only on those First World values did frequency results point to the Democrat-Gazette as an exemplar to the exclusion of the Fourth World models. Thus the scope of uncertainty generated by the disparity in average story size between the Democrat-Gazette and the other newspapers is limited.

El Latino

On the First World values of (1) timeliness and (5) human interest, El Latino amplified the Fourth World models’ tendency to outpace the Democrat-Gazette, results bolstered by area data. El Latino tended weakly to the Fourth World baseline on (6) First World conflict, with inconclusive area data. El Latino performance was inconclusive on (2) proximity, where the four newspapers were difficult to distinguish, on (3) personality, where the Fourth World models diverged, and on (7) disaster, where El Latino fell between the First and Fourth World baselines. El Latino exhibited a First World performance on (4) oddity.

In the Fourth World value series, El Latino more consistently tracked its Fourth World counterparts, joining leads over the Democrat-Gazette in (1) independent voice, (2) language, and (3) culture. El Latino performance on frequency data was inconclusive on (4) education and (5) inter-group solidarity, where the First and Fourth World baselines were difficult to distinguish, and on (6) Fourth World conflict, where El Latino fell between the
First and Fourth World baselines. On none of the Fourth World values did El Latino track Democrat-Gazette performance.

On balance, then, El Latino bears greater resemblance to the Fourth World models than to the First World model, tracking the former on three of seven First World values—timeliness, human interest, and First World conflict—and on at least three of six Fourth World values—独立 voice, language, and culture—and tracking the Democrat-Gazette on only one value: First World oddity. El Latino comparisons were inconclusive on First World proximity, personality, and disaster, and on Fourth World education, solidarity, and conflict. On no value did the area data push the frequency results back against the hypothesis, though t-tests were not always possible for lack of sufficient responsive items.

**DISCUSSION**

This paper advanced the hypothesis that El Latino would bear a greater resemblance to the Koori Mail and Cherokee Phoenix than to the Democrat-Gazette when analyzed according to First and Fourth World news values. Unexpectedly, the Fourth World models exemplified some First World values better than the First World model; nevertheless, baselines were established in accordance with the models. In analysis of El Latino, the hypothesis was partially borne out by the data. In the seven-part First World value series, the hypothesis was born out on three values; three values proved inconclusive; and one value contradicted the hypothesis. In the six-part Fourth World value series, the hypothesis was born out on three values, and three values proved inconclusive. Some distortion in the results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EL</th>
<th>KM</th>
<th>CP</th>
<th>DG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TIMELY</td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>80.2</td>
<td>84.3</td>
<td>77.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEAR</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERSON</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODD</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUMAN</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNFLCT</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSASTR</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

First and Fourth World baselines. On none of the Fourth World values did *El Latino* track Democrat-Gazette performance.

On balance, then, *El Latino* bears greater resemblance to the Fourth World models than to the First World model, tracking the former on three of seven First World values—timeliness, human interest, and First World conflict—and on at least three of six Fourth World values—独立 voice, language, and culture—and tracking the *Democrat-Gazette* on only one value: First World oddity. *El Latino* comparisons were inconclusive on First World proximity, personality, and disaster, and on Fourth World education, solidarity, and conflict. On no value did the area data push the frequency results back against the hypothesis, though t-tests were not always possible for lack of sufficient responsive items.

**DISCUSSION**

This paper advanced the hypothesis that *El Latino* would bear a greater resemblance to the *Koori Mail* and *Cherokee Phoenix* than to the *Democrat-Gazette* when analyzed according to First and Fourth World news values. Unexpectedly, the Fourth World models exemplified some First World values better than the First World model; nevertheless, baselines were established in accordance with the models. In analysis of *El Latino*, the hypothesis was partially borne out by the data. In the seven-part First World value series, the hypothesis was born out on three values; three values proved inconclusive; and one value contradicted the hypothesis. In the six-part Fourth World value series, the hypothesis was born out on three values, and three values proved inconclusive. Some distortion in the results...
might be explained by the greater reliance of the Democrat-Gazette and El Latino, than the Mail and Phoenix, on commercial advertising, and by the shorter publication intervals of the former two newspapers. Still, in sum, El Latino demonstrated substantial Fourth World character. That resemblance, as well as the points of divergence, raises implications for further study of media oriented toward immigrant populations.

First World Values Supporting the Hypothesis:
Timeliness, Human Interest, and Conflict

On these three values, El Latino looked more like a Fourth World newspaper than a First World newspaper.

As to timeliness, this result signifies a higher representation of the value in El Latino and the Fourth World baseline than in the Democrat-Gazette. That result is in part a function of publication interval and points to lack of uniformity in that respect as a limitation of this study. As a fortnightly and a monthly respectively, the Koori Mail and Cherokee Phoenix cover much more time in a given issue than the daily Democrat-Gazette. Because timeliness was assessed relative to the interval of publication, a story in a newspaper with a longer interval was more likely to be responsive, whereas the Democrat-Gazette has the luxury, or
the pressure, to produce more time-independent feature content to fill its pages. As a weekly, El Latino publishes more frequently than the Fourth World models, but not as frequently as the Democrat-Gazette. At the same time, an issue of El Latino fills a much smaller content hole than a week’s Democrat-Gazettes, exaggerating timeliness. It would be useful in subsequent research to identify and study periodicals with common intervals. Still, to the extent that Fourth World newspapers in general tend to longer publication intervals than traditional dailies, the result is meaningful.

As to human interest, again, this result signifies a higher representation of the value in El Latino and the Fourth World baseline than in the Democrat-Gazette. The Koori Mail routinely profiled ethnic high school and professional athletes, as well as ethnic persons assuming offices in mainstream bureaucratic and political affairs. Cherokee Phoenix human interest coverage also emphasized ethnic persons successful in mainstream affairs, especially in U.S. military service. Human interest is emphasized as a value in both public journalism and development journalism, and the holding up of role models seemed to serve the same function in the Fourth World models. El Latino was not devoid of such items, but its human interest coverage, akin to the recurring “My Family” feature in the Koori Mail, more often depicted ordinary individuals, especially in recurring person-on-the-street features and society pages. Whatever their differences, human interest coverage in these three newspapers routinely depicted ethnic subjects in a positive light. In contrast, more scarce Democrat-Gazette human interest content sometimes highlighted achievement or daily life, but included too a generous measure of contemplative first-person columns and second-person advice columns. El Latino therefore reflected the Fourth World take on human interest thematically, as well as numerically.

As to First World conflict, this result signifies a lower representation of the value in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EL</th>
<th>KM</th>
<th>CP</th>
<th>DG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.TIMELY</td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>80.2</td>
<td>84.3</td>
<td>77.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.NEAR</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.PERSON</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.ODD</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.HUMAN</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.CNFLCT</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.DSASTR</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.VOICE</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.LANGE</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.CULTUR</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.EDUC</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.SOLID</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.CNFLCT</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7. Area-Sum Data (%)

El Latino and the Fourth World baseline than in the Democrat-Gazette, though not overwhelmingly so. Conflict coverage in the Democrat-Gazette arose principally in connection with international news, especially U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In contrast, traditional conflict coverage in the Cherokee Phoenix and Koori Mail overlapped almost entirely with Fourth World cultural conflicts, involving disputes with mainstream authorities over civil rights and land use. Conflict coverage in El Latino exhibited a mix of these priorities. Traditional conflict in El Latino sometimes emphasized clashes between Latino and mainstream U.S. interests over immigration. But much of El Latino’s conflict coverage drew on international news, usually focusing on Latin America, especially concerning drug trafficking-related violence. Thus El Latino tended to the Fourth World example quantitatively, but conflict content did not exclusively overlap with intercultural conflict.

Here it merits mention that the Democrat-Gazette and El Latino are both purely commercial enterprises, in contrast with the Cherokee Phoenix and Koori Mail, which are owned by indigenous organizations. The partial qualitative similarity then between El Latino and the Democrat-Gazette conflict coverage might be a function of market demand. That El Latino nevertheless tracked more closely quantitatively with the Fourth World baseline is therefore indicative of only a stronger-than-appears similarity with Fourth World values. In contrast, this difference became salient on the Fourth World conflict value, discussed below.

First World Values Inconclusive: Proximity, Personality, and Disaster

On these three values, El Latino did not clearly better track the First World or Fourth World baseline.

Little can be said of proximity, because the four newspapers were difficult to distinguish on that score. Proximity was more frequent in the Fourth World baseline than in the Democrat-Gazette, likely owing to the related emphasis on human interest, explained above, in parallel with the public and development journalism models. But the difference between the baselines was not so great that El Latino can be said to have gravitated one way or the other.

As to personality, the Koori Mail and Cherokee Phoenix diverged too greatly to establish a useful Fourth World baseline. The Cherokee Phoenix departed from the example of the three other newspapers in underemphasizing personality. Both the Koori Mail and Cherokee Phoenix emphasized ethnic personalities in the news, but the Mail also heeded the interactions of mainstream personalities, especially politicians such as the Australian prime minister, with ethnic persons and issues. That the Cherokee Phoenix did not do so might be a value choice, or might reflect the fact that indigenous issues are more central to Australian than to American politics. Either way, if the Koori Mail set the standard for personality coverage, then it is difficult to distinguish El Latino from the Mail or Democrat-Gazette. If
the Cherokee Phoenix set the standard, then El Latino adhered more closely to the example of the Democrat-Gazette. Because much of El Latino’s personality-driven coverage arose from the 2008 U.S. presidential election, focusing on candidates and ethnic issues, the Koori Mail standard is the better one.

As to disaster, El Latino fell between the baselines. Qualitatively, disaster coverage in El Latino followed a pattern similar to conflict coverage, favoring news from Latin America, but not otherwise expressing any cultural perspective. Disastrous events reported in El Latino included disease and crime-related deaths in Mexico, Argentina, and India; plane crashes in Spain and New York; and natural disasters in Mexico, Chile, and China. In large part, this disaster coverage was a function of El Latino’s constructed, pan-ethnic readership, with its wide geographic interest in origin-country news. In this manner, El Latino truly differed from the Fourth World example, which was typified by the concentrated geographic interests of the Cherokee Nation, or the focused if dispersed interests of indigenous Australians. But El Latino’s gravitation toward the Democrat-Gazette example might also, again, reflect the commercial imperative that those newspapers share, as discussed above in connection with conflict. The Democrat-Gazette eagerly reported on earthquakes in the Caribbean, Chechnya, and Pakistan, and snowstorms and fires on the U.S. coasts, even though no disaster was reported proximate to central Arkansas. The commercial imperative likely exaggerated El Latino’s relative inclination to report disaster unrelated to Latin America.

First World Value Contradicting the Hypothesis: Oddity

On this value, El Latino looked more like a First World newspaper than a Fourth World newspaper. Along with First World conflict and disaster, oddity may be regarded as a stronghold First World value; it characterizes the conventional image, at least, of powerfully commercially motivated, sensationalist First World media, to the exclusion of values shared with the more idealistic models of public and development journalism. Even from a less skeptical perspective, oddity reporting is entertainment, devoid of practical value, thus an extravagance more likely to fill the ample content hole of a First World newspaper; oddity reporting is not as likely to appear in the survival-minded development medium. Oddity-responsive items demonstrate this value disparity. The Democrat-Gazette tended to report oddity for its own sake, for example featuring offbeat items in a regular column, uninspired by any other unifying value. Meanwhile, rare oddity in the Koori Mail tended to be responsive simultaneously to human interest, and to showcase the achievements of indigenous persons: “amputee golfer,” “crime-fighting nan,” “hero husband fights off croc.” The sole odd item in the Cherokee Phoenix similarly profiled a 106-year-old Cherokee national. Odd items in El Latino decidedly followed the Democrat-Gazette example, drawing on news from around the world, if with a favoritism for Mexico, but not casting subjects in
the role of protagonist—e.g., stories about an overweight groom and overweight police. The commercial imperative again must be considered as an incentive for this value expression in *El Latino*. It seems likely too, though, that *El Latino* and its readership, even while socioeconomically disadvantaged, are figuratively more distant than the Fourth World communities from the desperate circumstances of life in much of the developing world, and are thus more inclined to value information purely for entertainment value.

**Fourth World Values Supporting the Hypothesis:**
**Independent Voice, Language, and Culture**

On these three values, *El Latino* looked more like a Fourth World newspaper than a First World newspaper. These three values represent the Fourth World stronghold, as they directly reflect ethnic identity in Fourth World life. Thus *El Latino*’s expression of these values is powerfully probative of the hypothesis.

As to independent voice and culture, the values were reflected heavily in *El Latino* content, presenting Latino perspectives on current events, and highlighting Latino identity. *El Latino*, the *Koori Mail*, and the *Cherokee Phoenix* all highlighted the ethnic identity of achievers in politics, athletics, and the arts, as well as ordinary individuals role-modeling studying, job hunting, child-rearing, and voting. All three publications devoted considerable space to culturally significant events such as Cinco de Mayo, National Sorry Day, and the Cherokee National Holiday. In contrast, these values were expressed only rarely in the *Democrat-Gazette*. Independent voice appeared in occasional stories specifically about organizations advocating for African-American civil rights, and periodically in news stories involving intercultural conflict over issues such as immigration and criminal justice. *Democrat-Gazette* cultural coverage was thin, turning up in news, food, and travel—and making no mention of Cinco de Mayo in the voluminous Sunday edition closest (4 May) to the day. Though independent voice and culture in *El Latino* were diminished by roughly 20% and 30-50% respectively (both frequency and area) from their representations in the *Koori Mail* and *Cherokee Phoenix*, the values still played a powerful role in *El Latino* content.

The publications varied in their use of language, *El Latino* publishing in Spanish, the *Democrat-Gazette* and *Koori Mail* in English, and the *Cherokee Phoenix* principally in English but with some content side-by-side with translation into the Cherokee syllabary. In this literal sense, *El Latino* exemplified the Fourth World value better than the other publications. But that measure is not a wholly fair assessment of the *Mail* and *Phoenix*, as there is too little fluency today in indigenous languages, in Australia or the Cherokee Nation, to render an indigenous-language publication practical. Accordingly, the definition of language for this study (Appendix A) was broadened and adapted to account for content favorable toward indigenous language. The Cherokee translations were included, because
the purpose of the modern (1819) syllabary is to preserve the formerly unwritten language. Under this modified standard, language stories did not abound, but appeared occasionally. *El Latino* referred readers to Spanish-language television programming and carried two stories on civic participation for Spanish-speakers. The *Koori Mail* and *Cherokee Phoenix*, besides the latter’s translations, carried a smattering of stories on indigenous language revival and preservation, and both newspapers reported skeptically on efforts to further the dominance of English. The sole language-responsive story in the *Democrat-Gazette* highlighted the decidedly different perspective of Arkansan evangelists translating the Bible into indigenous African languages.

**Fourth World Values Inconclusive:**

*Education, Inter-Group Solidarity, and Fourth World Conflict*

On these three values, *El Latino* did not clearly better track the First World or Fourth World baseline.

The difficulty with education arose in that only one of the Fourth World models, the *Cherokee Phoenix*, outpaced the *Democrat-Gazette*. The *Koori Mail* devoted few items to education with sparse public-health coverage. The *Phoenix* also covered public health, but added cultural education and civic participation to its priorities, advising readers on Cherokee history and customs, as well as smart shopping and tax law. *El Latino* emulated *Phoenix* coverage with attention to public health and civic issues such as politics and taxes. But *El Latino* devoted vastly more space to reader education. In addition to periodic stories on events such as Valentine’s Day and Daylight Savings Time, surveyed editions of *El Latino* included special editions on schools, small business, and employment. An annual special edition devoted entirely to orient new immigrants covered U.S. holidays, banking, healthcare, recreation, libraries, criminal procedure, local history, and even metric conversion. The education value manifested in *Democrat-Gazette* coverage with a frequency akin to the *Phoenix*, but with shorter stories of a lighter character. Education content included homemaking tips on cleaning, food, gardening, and gadgetry; and advice on exercise and travel. Only rare items—social security advice, storm recovery information, and car repair instructions—regarded weightier matters or life essentials. While the Mail and *Phoenix* cannot uniformly be distinguished from the *Democrat-Gazette* in statistical terms, the runaway education content of *El Latino* is irrefutably in sync with both Fourth World models thematically.

A similar difficulty pertained to inter-group solidarity in that of the Fourth World models, only the *Koori Mail* outpaced the *Democrat-Gazette*. The *Cherokee Phoenix* devoted few more items to solidarity than did the *Democrat-Gazette*. *Koori Mail* coverage reflected indigenous Australians’ common struggles with other ethnic minorities in Oceania and Southeast Asia, and recognized the significance for minority civil rights of the U.S.
election of an African-American president. Those angles had no parallel in the Phoenix, which expressed solidarity in only two stories, one relating violence against Cherokee and native Alaskan women, the other comparing the socioeconomic struggles of Cherokee and Hispanic communities. The inter-group solidarity value was modified for the native-oriented Democrat-Gazette to detect any expression of solidarity with or among cultural minority groups, but still the newspaper produced only a single responsive story, covering the multiethnic turnout for a vigil honoring Martin Luther King. El Latino manifested the solidarity value more frequently than the Phoenix and Democrat-Gazette, but not as frequently as the Mail, and that coverage was driven by solidarity with African-American political interests, especially the Obama candidacy. Thus amid divergent Fourth World models, one in accord with the Democrat-Gazette, El Latino fell in between.

It merits mention as well that El Latino expressed solidarity in a manner not recognized in the design of this study. As is characteristic of Hispanic and Latino publications in the United States, El Latino brought news and culture from throughout Latin America to the common umbrella of a Spanish-speaking readership. This study defined solidarity as external to the readership, so for this purpose, the pan-ethnic Latino construct was regarded as non-responsive intra-group solidarity. Nevertheless, the pan-ethnic construct inclined El Latino toward the Koori Mail. “Koori” is conventionally understood to refer to southeastern Australia, namely peoples indigenous to present-day New South Wales, Victoria, and Tasmania. And while the Mail exhibited an editorial focus on that region, home to the indigenous ownership, the newspaper reported indigenous news nationwide, recognizing tribal distinctions only in a positive light and purporting to unite all indigenous persons under the Koori banner. In contrast, the Cherokee Phoenix dedicated itself to the Cherokee Nation identity, even to the exclusion of the Eastern Band Cherokee; again, Fourth World models diverged. But El Latino’s construction of a pan-ethnic identity was decidedly analogous to the Koori Mail conception.

As to Fourth World conflict, the Koori Mail and Cherokee Phoenix adequately exemplified a Fourth World baseline apart from the Democrat-Gazette, and El Latino fell comfortably between the baselines. As explained above in connection with First World conflict, the Mail and Phoenix reported conflicts almost exclusively of a cultural nature, such as civil rights and land disputes, while most conflicts reported by the Democrat-Gazette were of an international political or military nature, without express cultural dimension. The only two exceptional Democrat-Gazette stories concerned the civil rights of persons involved in criminal matters, one an African-American defendant and one a Mexican national in U.S. custody. El Latino covered less conflict overall than the other three publications, aligning it on First World conflict with the Fourth World models. However, as to cultural conflict, El Latino fell in between the baselines: a significant number of conflicts over culturally loaded issues such as immigration, but most conflict coverage without express cultural dimension.
CONCLUSION

This study operationalized the Four Worlds model for mass media values in a new context, that of a foreign-language newspaper serving a recent-immigrant community within a First World society, namely a Hispanic community in central Arkansas, in the United States. The study established baseline representations of previously described First World and Fourth World values in a First World newspaper, the Democrat-Gazette, and in two Fourth World newspapers, the Koori Mail and Cherokee Phoenix. The First World model served the mainstream, host society in the same geographic area, central Arkansas, as the immigrant-oriented newspaper, El Latino. The Fourth World models served paradigmatic Fourth World communities of indigenous persons in Australia and the United States.

The study speculated that the central Arkansas Hispanic community exists with a measure of physical and cultural separation from the mainstream, host society—arising from informal barriers such as socioeconomic status, residential neighborhoods, language, and racism—and that that separation is analogous to the separation of a Fourth World society from its surrounding, mainstream society. Accordingly, the study predicted that El Latino content would bear greater similarity with the Fourth World baseline than with the First World baseline. It was hoped that this result would stimulate further research into similarities between immigrant groups and Fourth World communities, that they might share in the development of innovative strategies in their common pursuit of socioeconomic development for their peoples while preserving their cultural integrity and ethnic identity.

When the Spanish-language El Latino was compared with First World and Fourth World models, the hypothesis was substantially but not wholly born out. El Latino tracked the Fourth World baselines on six of the thirteen values surveyed, First and Fourth World. Results were inconclusive on six more values, four because the Fourth World models diverged, and two because El Latino fell in between the baselines. And El Latino tracked the First World baseline on only one value: First World “oddity.”

The study is extremely limited in its capacity to found generalizations. The central Arkansas publications were chosen in part because of the author’s familiarity with the Hispanic community and media market there; there is no evidence to indicate whether that market is representative of others. Moreover, this study did not account for all factors that would ensure the comparability of the publications. Notably, the daily Democrat-Gazette and weekly El Latino work with shorter publication intervals than the fortnightly Koori Mail and monthly Cherokee Phoenix. All of the publications purport to operate with editorial independence, but while El Latino and the Democrat-Gazette depend on advertising for commercial viability, the Mail and Phoenix are owned by indigenous leadership and therefore enjoy some insulation from commercial imperatives.

Nevertheless, points on which the hypothesis was supported, unsupported, or
contradicted may be informative in beginning to articulate the position of the immigrant
top may be informative in beginning to articulate the position of the immigrant
newspaper in the constellation of the Four Worlds model. *El Latino* bore characteristics of
both First and Fourth World. In the First World value series, *El Latino*’s divergence from the
Fourth Worlds on oddity, and in part on disaster, probably reflects the commercial
imperative that *El Latino* shares with the Democrat-Gazette. Readers must be enticed to pick
*El Latino*, and oddity and disaster are hallmarks of the stereotypical Western
cultural communities desirous of media that focus on development priorities, to the exclusion
of First World commercialism, must be prepared to support their publications with
indigenous ownership. Further research is warranted into the media ownership and editorial
control in ethnic, immigrant, and Fourth World media.

In the Fourth World value series, *El Latino* bore a striking resemblance to the Fourth
World baseline in reflecting those models in the three defining Fourth World values, those
that reflect ethnic identity, and moreover in publishing in the Spanish language. Importantly
too, and characteristically of Latino and Hispanic media, *El Latino* and the Koori Mail
created a form of solidarity in the construction and reinforcement of a pan-ethnic identity,
though solidarity of that nature was not measured in the study. *El Latino* straddled the First
World-Fourth World fence on the expression of intercultural conflict, indicating some
alignment with First World values in carrying conflict news without a cultural dimension.
That mild divergence might again be explained by the commercial imperative, which would
support the exaggeration of conflict without impact specific to the readership. Further
research is warranted into the common interests and variable media market dynamics of
Fourth World and immigrant communities.

In sum, then, *El Latino* does point to substantial similarity between the disposition of
the Hispanic community within First World central Arkansas, and the disposition of Koori
and Cherokee communities within U.S. and Australian societies. The divergences, where *El
Latino* seems to share the commercial imperative of First World media, may be explained
in terms of *El Latino*’s commercial ownership and business model. However, the extent to
which *El Latino* takes on characteristics of mainstream media might also be a reflection of
the acculturation process. That is, on one side of the coin, *El Latino* embellishes its
substantial independent voice, cultural, and education content with a dose of oddity, disaster,
and extra-cultural conflict to appeal to readers. But on the flip side of the same coin, *El
Latino* readers must desire those First World-style stories in a manner to which Koori and
Cherokee readers are not accustomed. Possibly that desire is a reflection of the extent to
which immigrant Latino values are converging with the First World norms of the mainstream
society. Further research is warranted into the extent to which immigrant-oriented media
reflect the variable states of acculturation inherent in different immigrant communities, as
well as the extent to which traditional First World media might reflect the subtle impact of
acculturation on the host society.
Furthermore, if indeed the plight of immigrant communities today is changing to represent new norms, perhaps transnational identity or stalled convergence, representations of these communities might model new roles and relationships for older Fourth World communities still struggling to find their unique places in the worlds that envelope them.

REFERENCES


Editor and Publisher. (2008). Editor and Publisher international yearbook.


---

**Appendix A**

**Definition of Content Values**

**First-World Value Series**

(1) *Timeliness*. Timeliness is coded affirmatively when the story appears in the newspaper because the story reports an event that was breaking news relative to the interval of the publication. A merely timely peg in a feature story that would be of general interest at any time is not sufficient to trigger responsiveness; rather, current events must have centrally animated the story.

(2) *Proximity*. Proximity is coded affirmatively when the story appears in the newspaper because the story reports an event of particular relevance to people living within a geographic locality smaller than the coverage scope of the publication. A merely localizing lead, for example, the impact of a national health initiative on a local family, does not trigger responsiveness unless the local angle is pervasive or predominant in the story. For a newspaper with national readership, such as the *Koori Mail*, stories are responsive on this value only when the locally affected population was predominantly indigenous. Thus, a story about the opening in a Sydney gallery of an exhibition of islander art is not responsive, because the location of the event was unrelated to the indigenous community within Sydney. Similarly, coverage of an indigenous festival in Adelaide drawing participants from indigenous communities throughout South Australia is not responsive, because the location of the event was not related specifically to indigenous persons living in Adelaide, or any other locality. In contrast, a story that describes negotiations over the specific location of a natural gas facility on the predominantly indigenous Kimberley coastline was responsive, even though the story simultaneously implicated local and national interests.

(3) *Personality*. Personality is coded affirmatively when the story appears in the newspaper because it reports events involving public figures generally known to the contemplated reader. A public official may be a public
figure, but is not a public figure merely by virtue of holding public office; rather, the person’s name must be likely recognizable to the audience, even absent context. The mere involvement of a public figure or public figures in events reported does not trigger responsiveness; rather, the story must be substantially devoted to the role of the public figure in, or relationship to, the events reported. Thus for example a story about a new policy of U.S. President George W. Bush toward Iraq is not responsive if it broadly reflects White House strategy, but is responsive if it focuses on the involvement of Bush himself in developing the policy or in presenting it to the public.

(4) Oddity. Oddity is coded affirmatively when the story is characterized by heightened exceptionalism, exceeding the exceptionalism that ordinarily characterizes news. The responsive oddity is a highly unusual occurrence that propels the otherwise mundane onto the pages of the newspaper. For example, a record number of indigenous athletes competing in the Olympics for Australia is newsworthy, but not odd; a grandmother winning a boxing competition is odd.

(5) Human interest. Human interest is coded affirmatively when the story recites the personal experiences of discrete persons, usually of persons who are not public figures, or who were not public figures prior to the events that rendered them newsworthy, or who are public figures, but the story examined parts of their lives not ordinarily in the public light, for example, the private family life of a political campaigner. The mere presentation of professional biographical information, for example as background in a story about a previously little-known person’s appointment to public office, does not trigger responsiveness; rather, the presentation of human detail must be integral to the story.

(6) Conflict. Conflict is coded affirmatively when the story is animated by an intense clash of people, organizations, nations, or cultures that exceeds mere disagreement. Even spirited disagreement over matters of public policy is not sufficient to trigger responsiveness. Thus protests and rallies are not responsive per se, but protests where violence erupted, or where strong sentiments manifested in notoriously provocative expression such as flag-burning, are responsive. Disagreements between policymakers on a public board are not responsive per se, but vituperative charges of racism arising out of those disagreements are responsive. Reports of a family’s dissatisfaction with, and anger over, a coroner’s investigation into the cause of death of a loved one is not responsive, but a lawsuit alleging wrongful death is responsive. Criminal justice process and native land title claims are not responsive per se, because those are routine functions of governments. But claims and disputes that are elevated to appellate contention are responsive to the conflict value. Stories that commemorate conflict, or that describe the immediate aftermath of conflict, including settlement and reconciliation, also are coded as responsive.

(7) Disaster. Disaster is coded affirmatively when the story centers on a disaster, whether tangible, such as a tsunami, or intangible, such as an economic collapse. The mere fact that tragic events result in ill effects for some people, such as a fatal car accident, does not indicate disaster, and successive and incremental bad events, such as a gradually worsening economic recession, do not indicate a disaster. Rather, a disaster, such as the crash of a commercial jetliner, is characterized by severity and suddenness from the perspectives of both persons involved and unrelated observers. A disaster can occur even when few people are injured, but the risk jeopardized many, as in the case of a criminal sniper attacking and injuring random civilians. Stories that commemorate disaster, or that describe the immediate aftermath of disaster, also are coded as responsive.
distinctive perspective of a cultural minority community. Presumably any publication with a discrete readership presents events with a gloss that favors the perspective of the readership. But in these stories, the minority perspective balances the rendition of events or distinctively animates the story. It is not presumed that only a member of a minority community can advance an independent perspective, as indigenous perspectives are commonly advanced by interest groups and government officials charged with indigenous advocacy. For example, a *Koori Mail* report of government grants espousing the intended benefits for indigenous persons is not responsive per se. But a report of government grants to indigenous communities is responsive when additional indigenous needs are noted by a public interest source, or by a government official who purports to represent indigenous interests. The challenge to mainstream perspective is essential for responsiveness to independent voice. Thus a *Koori Mail* editorial on healthcare by an indigenous representative, challenging the efficacy of government plans, is responsive. A *Koori Mail* man-on-the-street interview with an indigenous person is responsive to human interest, but not independent voice, when the subject matter of the interview is merely biographical, but is responsive also to independent voice when the subject matter of the interview breaches current political affairs. In the *Democrat-Gazette*, independent voice is coded affirmatively when the independent voice of any distinct cultural minority is asserted.

(2) Language. In Robie’s model (2001:13), the language value is indicated by the first language of the cultural minority; in this study, however, this definition is modified and expanded to be meaningful for both the *Arkansas Democrat-Gazette*, which represents no minority culture, and *El Latino*, which is entirely in Spanish. Language is coded affirmatively when: (a) a story positively reflects the perpetuation of a minority language, for example, a story that reports that school notices to Spanish-speaking Arkansas parents will be translated into Spanish; (b) a story challenges an affront to a minority language, for example, a story about the controversy over the reduction of bilingualism in Northern Territory schools; or (c) an item is geared to educate readers in a minority language, for example, a Cherokee-language vocabulary tutorial geared to Cherokee children. The principal language of the publication or of its readership is immaterial, except that in the *Cherokee Phoenix*, the only paper that carries the same content in two languages, a story appearing in the Cherokee syllabary that appears alongside the same story in English is coded affirmatively.

(3) Culture. Culture is coded affirmatively when the story portrays a cultural practice distinctively related to a minority cultural community. For example, *El Latino* coverage of the Cinco de Mayo celebration and *Koori Mail* coverage of the National Sorry Day commemoration are responsive. A *Koori Mail* story on the appearance of Santa Claus at a Christmas event for indigenous and non-indigenous children alike is not responsive, but a story focusing on the appearance of Santa Claus specifically for the children of a local indigenous community is responsive. The *Koori Mail* and *Cherokee News* extensively cover athletes and sporting leagues either presumably or widely associated with indigenous cultural identity, but a story is marked responsive only when the indigenous connection is explicit. Stories concerning cultural products, such as the artwork of indigenous persons, are responsive, as are cultural products themselves, such as indigenous-themed reader poetry printed by the *Koori Mail*.

(4) Education. Education is coded affirmatively when the story has as a substantial purpose the education of the readership. All stories in a newspaper may be said to “educate” the readership in some manner, often about current events, but stories that merely inform the reader of events or studies are not coded as responsive. Similarly, a story that in some part educates a reader—such as a story about pending legislation that briefly explains a procedural rule of the assembly—is not coded as responsive. In contrast, a *Koori Mail* story that leads with news of a study on kidney disease, but then devotes itself in substantial part to explaining what kidney disease is and what its warning signs are, is responsive.

(5) Inter-group solidarity. Solidarity is coded affirmatively when the story favorably represents a racial or cultural
community wholly distinct from the readership of the publication, and does so in implicit or explicit comparison with the readership. Thus Koori Mail coverage of the 2008 U.S. presidential election is not responsive per se, but is responsive when the coverage portrays the election of an African-American candidate as indicative of the potential for racial harmony in Australia. Cherokee Phoenix coverage of the Eastern Band Cherokee is not responsive, because the Eastern Band is politically but not racially or culturally a community wholly distinct from the Oklahoma Cherokee Nation. In the Democrat-Gazette, a story is coded affirmatively for solidarity when it portrays any cultural minority communities cooperating upon common interests.

(6) Conflict. Conflict is coded affirmatively when the story fits the First World definition of conflict, and the conflict aspect of the story also meet the “independent voice” value of the Fourth World series.

Excluded from coding: Paid and house advertising; mastheads; non-editorial cartoons, games, and puzzles; information for readers such as letter and contest guidelines; teasers that consisted of no more than headlines, photos, and page references; and all recurring listings of mere data.

Included in coding: Text, headlines, and graphic elements together comprise each discrete item.
The purpose of the study investigates how Western and alternative media present the concept and process of globalization to their respective audiences and whether this is an adequate representation of the issues surrounding globalization. Specifically, within the framework of world system, this study identifies the themes and nations associated with globalization. This study confirms that the Associated Press (AP) reporting focuses the attention of elite nations to globalization and global. In addition, the finding demonstrate the ‘narrow’ definition given to globalization in the news (i.e., global economy) and the different elements found in the Inter Press Service (IPS) presentation of globalization, such as, human rights and poverty.

**Keywords:** globalization, news coverage, world-systems theory, news agency

Since the 1990s, both the end of the Cold War and the development of communication technologies have had a great impact on globalization. The world public’s concerns about the concept and process of globalization increased greatly around 1990s. This rise in concern was reinforced by an amount of globalization news coverage at the same time.
Many studies examine the definition and debates regarding globalization presented by the media. These scholars have defined globalization as the process of intensifying the multifaceted social linkages and interconnections among the states and societies of the world in such a way that events, issues and problems in one part of the world have significant ramifications for individuals and communities in far distant parts of the world (Giddens, 1990; McGrew, 1992). They would also address news tendencies, such as simplification, focus on elite nations, domestication, etc. These results have already been demonstrated in many investigations of international news patterns. Of course, past and current studies show the complexity of the issue.

This study suggests that the overarching problem is whether news agencies adequately inform audiences about globalization that is dramatically affecting all our lives. Both the mass media in general and global news agencies in particular have a significant contribution by setting the agenda for public discussion and influence elite and public opinion toward the process of globalization. They will determine what issues will be covered worldwide, and whose agenda or opinion will be heard (Giffard & Leuven 2008).

This study investigates how Western and alternative media construct or present the concept and process of globalization to their respective audiences and whether their reporting provides an adequate representation of the issues surrounding globalization within the framework of world-system perspectives. The analysis focuses on articles on globalization published in the AP and IPS from 1995-2000. The year 1995 was chosen as a starting point because of the dramatic proliferation of the concept in media coverage at that time.

**WORLD-SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AND GLOBALIZATION**

Robertson (1992) proposes that as a consequence of globalization, the world is becoming a more unified or systematic place. Globalization means that information, as well as material goods, are freely and frequently exchanged between different groups across national and cultural boundaries. This type argument, however, has brought into question the exploration of the concept and process of globalization. The process of globalization may be understood in the context of World-systems analysis (e.g., Chase-Dunn, 1989; Chase-Dunn & Grimes, 1995; Chirot & Hall, 1982; Frank & Gills, 1993; Sklair, 1999; Wallerstein, 1974). Wallerstein (1974, 1979, 1996) views the world as a global system in which countries are interdependently linked within the capitalist system.

World-systems analysis describes the global structure in terms of three structural equivalent notions: the core, the periphery, and the semi-periphery. Studies using this approach as a framework classify countries as core, semiperipheral, or peripheral based upon a larger network of material and capital flowing at a global capitalistic economic system level (e.g., Shannon, 1996; Smith & White, 1992; Snyder & Kick, 1979). In addition, world-
systems analysis argues that the global economy is characterized by an unequal exchange between powerful information-rich and information-poor countries (Barnett, Jacobson, Choi & Sun-Miller, 1996; Frank & Gills, 1993; Gunaratne, 2002, 2007 for a discussion of this new theoretical framework for global communication research).

Core countries include the United States, the major Western European countries (e.g., the United Kingdom, Germany, and France), Japan, and Canada. A country is classified as semiperipheral when its relative position in the information flow network places it between the core countries and the peripheral nations on the edge of the network (Kim & Barnett, 1996). The semiperipheral countries consist of minor Western European countries (e.g., Sweden) and relatively advanced economies such as Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and Malaysia in Asia, and Argentina and Mexico in Latin America. China and Russia are also considered semiperipheral. The peripheral countries refer to the less developed countries (Chang, 1998). However, according to a longitudinal study of the international telecommunication network (Barnett & Salisbury, 1996; Barnett, 1999), some would consider the former socialist countries in Eastern Europe, beginning in the late 1980s, as having slowly moved from the periphery towards the semiperiphery.

Thus, from the world-systems perspectives, both communication and information are an integral part of globalization (Monge, 1998). International communication can be defined as the process by which information is exchanged among two or more countries. These definitions show that globalization has a communication dimension that increases transborder communication, and leads to a diffusion of values, ideas, opinions, and technologies (Barnett, 1999). In the process of globalization, global news agencies, as major providers of news and information to member newspapers and television and radio stations around the globe, play important roles in shaping the audiences’ knowledge and attitudes about global events and issues.

According to World Systems Theory, one should be able to undertake an analysis of world news that will show the positions of nations in the world.

Chang (1998) examined Reuters news service’s coverage of a major world event to find out the structure and process of international news flow and coverage in the global setting from the World-Systems perspective. Chang (1998) concluded that countries in the core zone of the World-Systems had higher chances of appearing in news services stories or in the stories used by newspapers, TV and radio stations than those in the semiperipheral and peripheral strata. Nations in the other two zones will have to go through several filters before they make it to the news. In other words, any event or issue from and about countries in semiperiphery and periphery has to navigate through more screening before it is selected by news service subscribers for their publications.

In a same vein, Boyd-Barrett (1980) argued that the overwhelming majority of world news flows from the West to the East and North to South. News media of the more-developed West (including wire services) have a tendency to report conflict and crisis news
How Did AP and IPS Construct the Concept and Process of Globalization? Eunjung Sung et al.

from less-developed countries (Riffe & Shaw, 1982; Wilhoit & Weaver, 1983). Developing countries in African and Latin America remain invisible unless they are the focus of some spectacular event or crisis (Giffard & Rivenburgh, 2000; Richstadt & Anderson, 1981).

MEDIA FRAMING

Based on the discussion presented above, this study offers a comparative analysis of AP and IPS coverage of global news to determine if wire services stories offer differing coverage of core nations that is different from semipheiral or peripheral nations. This study examine's one particular component of news coverage, the framing of an issue by the news. News discourse and frame analysis scholars define a frame for an issue as the central organizing idea or principle that provides a framework for organizing information about the issue into a coherent, meaningful whole representation of that issues (Entman, 1993; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Gamson & Lasch, 1983).

Frame scholars take a social constructionist view of issues. Issues are seen as social events which have no inherent meaning in and of themselves (Entman, 1993; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Gamson & Lasch, 1983). The meaning society ascribes to an issue is an outcome of a social process whereby the meaning is constructed. The news media is viewed as an important social institution that is involved in this construction of meaning, along with other social institutions such as government, the court system, religious organizations, schools, etc. The framing is described as a communication process by which each of these social institutions engage in a continual interchange of possible frames for social events. Each institution struggles to foster an advantageous frame for the event. Those who are most effective at communicating a viable frame, easily adoptable frame to the news media will be most likely to see it adopted by the journalists. Through the act of adopting frames from sources and incorporating them in news stories about issues, the news media helps construct the meaning of an issue. It should also be said that the news media create their own, original frames for social events as well through the act of information gathering, reporting and preparation of news texts. The frame for an issue is than an essential component of the news text that provides the framework for the meaning for an issue presented by the story (Durham, 1998; Gamson, 1989; Gamson and Modigliani, 1989; Gitlin, 1980; Norris, 1995; Pan and Kosicki, 1993; Tuchman, 1978).

Audience members adopt the meanings presented by the media-and other social institutions-subject them to their own cognitive processes and produce their own mental representations of the issue which are also founded on a frame as a central organizing principle (Pan and Kosicki, 1993).

Whether a text frame or an audience member's cognitive frame, an issue's frame provides several important functions. It provides a central principle for organizing the
information available about the issue. It determines which information will be included in the interpretation of the social event at the heart of the issue. It also determines which information will be excluded. Entman (1993) states, "to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them salient...to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, [and/or] moral evaluation" (p. 52). Entman indicated that apply frames to a social issue may define a problem by indicating the root causes of the situation and identifying solutions. And such frames also may interpret the same events and issues in different ways and then have important consequences for government's policy options and public's belief and opinions (Brewer, 2006). In addition, some frames have an advantage over other frames because their framing resonates with a dominant ideological factor. Massey (2000) as well has pointed out that ideology is a main variable in explaining the difference in news framing among cultures.

Thus, this study uses framing as principle component of news media's interpretations and presentations of issue. From the World-systems perspectives, this study views media framing as a process of communicating dominant ideology to society through application of frames in the preparation of news texts. Source institutions, such as government use their sophisticated diplomacy and propaganda mechanisms to develop and communicate advantageous frames to the media institution. This study does explain whether and how messages from global news agencies activate and spread through other public and society (Entman, 2008).

Based on the foregoing discussion, this demonstrated the complexity of the issue. This study proposes two research questions: 1) how is globalization presented differently in western and alternative media? and 2) what issues are most prominent?

**METHOD**

**Sample**

A computer-assisted content analysis of globalization coverage appearing in AP and IPS between 1995 and 2000 was conducted. This particular period of analysis is relevant because globalization concept did not become popular until 1990s, which is primarily influenced on the current debate on the concept and process of globalization. The period covered by the analysis is 1995, when the issue started rising to public attention. We chose to analyze 5 years of coverage and end the analysis with the year 2000.

The news agencies selected for this study represent two different perspectives: mainstream and alternative. They are the Associated Press (AP) and Inter Press Services (IPS). AP usually serves as the primary sources of constructing the concept of globalization, but it does not adequately represent the issues surrounding globalization concerning the
South, information-poor countries. It initiated the creation of the Inter Press Service (IPS) in 1964 to provide content from an alternative perspective (Giffard, 1985; Giffard & Leuven, 2008; Rauch, 2003). It is assumed that the Associated Press (AP) has a U.S. centered perspective, and IPS provides the developing countries’ perspective (Alleyne & Wagner, 1993; Boyd-Barrett, 2003, 2008; Giffard, 1985).

Full texts of all the stories were downloaded from the online full-texts databases. Because this study used a census of news stories, it allowed the researcher to examine mediated reality of globalization over the time periods. The unit of analysis was any articles that contained the word “globalization”, “globalisation”, “globalize”, “globalise”, or “global” in headlines during this period. There are certain words that appear during a certain time period or begin to appear often after a certain period. These words can be interpreted as characterizing important elements of globalization.

As shown in Table 1, AP produced 66 news articles related to globalization during period 1 followed by 53, 151, 138 and 99 respectively. IPS created 50 news articles during period 1 followed by 63, 116, 79 and 104 respectively in the other years. Thus, the total number of articles on globalization was: AP (507) and IPS (412). This analysis also provides useful interpretation from a historical perspective. This study is focused on economic, political, organizational, social, and cultural elements of globalization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date Range</th>
<th>Associated Press</th>
<th>Inter Press Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>05/01/1995-04/30/1996 (Period 1)</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/01/1996-04/30/1997 (Period 2)</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/01/1997-04/30/1998 (Period 3)</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/01/1998-04/30/1999 (Period 4)</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05/01/1999-04/30/2000 (Period 5)</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>412</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Data analysis procedures

The textual data in the coverage of two news agencies are analyzed using computer-assisted content analysis. Most international news analysis has used the methods of traditional content analysis that deals with the nature, type, and amount of international news disseminated across national boundaries (Hur, 1984). However, news coverage can be considered as a continuing stream of symbols that discuss the controversial issue (Pan & Kosicki, 1993). Traditional content analysis just identifies the frequencies of main words in texts. Semantic network analysis, however, focuses on the structure of a system based on shared meaning. Thus, the relational approach does explain how the words as symbols are interconnected with other concepts (Tian & Stewart, 2005; Yang, 2008). More researchers use computer analysis in the advancement of content analysis as a tool in the study of communication messages (Conway, 2006; Neuendorf, 2002).

The computer-assisted software used in this study was Catpac program (Popping, 2000; Woelffe, 1998). According to Woelfel (1998), Catpac is "a self-organizing artificial neural network that has been optimized for reading text, identifying the most important words in a text and determining patterns of similarity" (p.11). Catpac uses the clustering method in identifying the relational structure among most frequent words in text-based news stories (Doerfel & Barnett, 1999; Mohr, 1998; Sares, 1998)). Cluster analysis identifies those grouping or clusters of nodes that best represent their measured relations. At this point, frequencies of words and clusters indicate various issues, elements, and factors related to news articles on globalization because news themes and frames usually emphasize the semantic structure of particular shared meanings (Tuchman, 1978; Entman, 1991, 1993).

This study also adopted the inductive approach, which doesn't need for preconceived coding categories and frames. According to Semetko and Valkenburg (2000), this method will begin with loosely defined themes and frames and identify the most important news frames. This study did not use any predetermined coding frames. There is no need for test of inter-coder reliability.

RESULTS

Period 1 (1995 to 1996)

Associated Press. Tables 2 and 3 present the results of CATPAC analysis of AP and IPS copy. The results of AP during period 1 show that the word US (United States) occurred 250 times on 15.8 % of the total words in the text. The ten most frequent words were U.S., dollar, company, world, and economy followed by global, market, Africa, Japan, trade, and U.N. Economy was the most important issue based on the fact that dollar, company,
economy, market, trade, the U.S. and Japan were within the top ten words. Africa, drug, warming and environment also emerged frequently at this time. Africa is often mentioned related to global issues because the United Nations conference was held in Africa in 1995. Furthermore, drug, human rights, against global warming and environment were salient issues during this period. The U.S., Africa, Japan, China, and the UN are again the most frequently appearing nations, continent or organization.

A cluster analysis shows the associations between the most frequently occurring symbols in the text. This procedure formed two main associations: economy and warming. The two main concepts were significantly related to globalization during this period.

Inter Press Service. The ten most frequently occurring words were world, economy, dollar, U.N., and global followed by U.S. women, development, trade, and developing. The global economy is the most significant issue during this period. The second theme that IPS news articles contained was Human Rights. Women, against, labor, and violence occurred frequently. IPS reported national development issues related to Southern Africa, South Asia, South America, and Latin America frequently. Unlike the AP, the U.S., Europe, Burma and Latin America are the nations and continents appearing most in the top ten words, and the UN was again the most frequently occurring organization. Specifically, Burma was mentioned often in relation to its economy. In other words, IPS provided not only as same topic as AP but also provided a different topic more reflected an issue about less-developed or non-core countries.

Period 2 (1996 to 1997)

Associated Press. The ten frequently appearing words were dollar, U.S., world, economy, and global followed by company, Europe, Japan, China, and trade. The U.S., Europe, Japan, China, Britain, India, Canada, and Asia were the most frequent regional locations on the list of twenty unique words. Again, the UN was the only organization on the list. China and India were related to the global issue of nuclear test ban treaties during this period. Children was one of main clusters, which reflects issues related human rights were treated importantly by AP during this period. The U.S. government on August 27-31, 1996, participated in the World Congress Against the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children, the first global meeting on that topic. The meeting was being held in Stockholm, Sweden. More than 100 countries and more than 200 NGOs were represented at the congress. The aim was to combat the commercial exploitation of children, focusing on child prostitution, the trafficking and sale of children for sexual purposes, and child pornography. It is noteworthy that nuclear weapons and human rights were the main issues on the global agenda during this period.

Inter Press Service. The ten most frequently occurring words in IPS were world, economy, development trade, and UN followed by global, U.S., developing, globalization,
and Africa. The global economy was an important issue at this time. Among the twenty words on the unique words list, the U.S., Africa, South America, South Asia, and Southern Africa, and Latin America were the most frequent regional locations. The main clusters were economy and human rights. South American and Latin American countries were reported on in relation to issues of food, health, labor, and poverty. Again, IPS reported human rights issues considerably.

**Period 3 (1997 to 1998)**

Associated Press. The ten most frequently occurring words were U.S., global, dollar, economy and world followed by warming, Japan, emissions, gas, and climate. During this period, warming, emissions, gas, climate, and greenhouse were the most significant words because of the global climate conference, which was held in Kyoto in 1997 supporting the idea of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, such as, carbon dioxide. It was also an important theme all over the world because of the preparations for a major climate conference in Buenos Aires in November. Therefore, Japan, carbon dioxide, environmental, and conference were included among the twenty most frequent words during this period. In addition, the global economy was still the main issue followed by warming on the agenda.

Inter Press Service. The ten most frequent words were warming, world, global, economy, and U.S. followed by developing, Japan, environment, climate, and greenhouse were among the twenty unique words during period 3. The most frequently appearing nations and continents were the U.S., Japan, and South Africa. The UN was the most frequently occurring organization followed by the EU. Just like in the AP news coverage, it is significant that warming, climate, environment, and greenhouse were included on the twenty unique words list. The two main clusters were warming and economy. Thus, these two concepts were discussed in both AP and IPS significantly related to globalization during this period.

**Period 4 (1998 to 1999)**

Associated Press. The ten most frequently occurring words were U.S., economy, world, global and dollar followed by Japan, warming, climate, trade, and company. Crisis and Russia appeared on the twenty unique words list during this period for the first time. This phenomenon can be explained by the fact that developing countries, such as, Russia along with countries in Asia, and Latin America had a financial crisis during this period. The regional locations that appeared on the list were the U.S., Japan, Europe and Russia. The UN was the most frequently occurring organization. Economy and warming were the two main clusters during this period. In brief, global economy and global environmental issues were
Table 2. Top five words in AP and IPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>AP</th>
<th>IPS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>U.S./dollar/company/world/economy</td>
<td>World/economy/dollar/U.N./global</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Dollar/U.S./world/economy/global</td>
<td>World/economy/development/trade/U.N.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>U.S./global/dollar/economy/world</td>
<td>Warming/world/global/economy/U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>U.S./economy/world/global/dollar</td>
<td>Economy/global/U.S./dollar/developing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Economy/dollar/U.S./world/company</td>
<td>Global/economy/environment/poverty/U.S.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

still prominent on the agenda, and the global financial crisis was the new issue during this period.

Inter Press Service. The ten most frequent words were economy, global, U.S., dollar, and developing followed by against, U.S., crisis, drug, and rights. Appearing for the first time were crisis, IMF, and drug. IMF (International Momentary Fund) was the most frequently appearing word related to the global economic crisis. This situation can be explained more clearly by looking at subclusters under the cluster 1. Subclusters were dollar, crisis and IMF, which reflect that financial crisis was a big concern related to the world economic globalization situation. Issues about drugs, children, human rights, and labor were frequently reported. The U.S., U.N., South American, Southern Africa, and South Asia, Latin America, Japan, Europe, Africa, and the E.U. were the most frequently appearing nations, continents and organizations during this period.

Period 5 (1999 to 2000)

Associated Press. The ten most frequent occurring words were economy, dollar, U.S., world, and company followed by global, global crossing, technology, Europe, and warming. The new words were crossing, Internet, technology, and communications. There were three main clusters: economy, technology, and warming. Under the technology cluster, global “crossing”, which was one of the subclusters, refers to ‘Global Crossing Ltd.’. This company is a fiber optic network provider for telecommunications globally. This means that global telecommunications had a big role in global communication. Additionally, technology, such as the Internet, was involved with the process of globalization. Global warming and economic crisis issues were still very important during this period. The U.S., Europe, the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>AP</th>
<th>IPS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Cluster 1: <strong>Economy</strong> dollar/industry</td>
<td>Cluster 1: <strong>Economy</strong> dollar/trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cluster 2: <strong>Warming</strong> environment</td>
<td>Cluster 2: <strong>Human Rights</strong> against</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>women/labor/violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Cluster 1: <strong>Economy</strong> dollar/trade</td>
<td>Cluster 1: <strong>Economy</strong> trade/dollar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cluster 2: <strong>Children</strong></td>
<td>Cluster 2: <strong>Human Rights</strong> against</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>food/labor/poor/health/South/Latin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Cluster 1: <strong>Economy</strong> dollar/industry</td>
<td>Cluster 1: <strong>Warming</strong> climate/greenhouse/gas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cluster 2: <strong>Warming</strong> emissions/gas</td>
<td>Cluster 2: <strong>Economy</strong> dollar/trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>greenhouse/energy/environment/carbondioxide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Cluster 1: <strong>Economy</strong> dollar/trade/</td>
<td>Cluster 1: <strong>Economy</strong> dollar/crisis/IMF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>crisis/IMF</td>
<td>Cluster 2: <strong>Human Rights</strong> against</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cluster 2: <strong>Warming</strong> climate/greenhouse/</td>
<td>drug/South/Latin/children/labor/Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>environment/energy/renewable/gases</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Cluster 1: <strong>Economy</strong> dollar/trade/IMF</td>
<td>Cluster 1: <strong>Economy</strong> dollar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>crisis/IMF</td>
<td>Cluster 2: <strong>Human Rights</strong> against</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cluster 2: <strong>Technology</strong> Global/Crossing/Internet/</td>
<td>environment/poverty/health/WTO/women/Africa/labor/South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communications</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cluster 3: <strong>Warming</strong> climate/</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>greenhouse</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IMF, U.N., and Asia are the most frequently appearing regions, continents or organizations.

Inter Press Service. The ten most frequently occurring words were global, economy, environment, poverty, and U.S. followed by developing, health, U.N., dollar, and women on the twenty unique words list. Human rights, poverty, health, women, and labor issues were some of the main themes along with global economy and warming. The new words were poverty and WTO. The U.S., U.N., Africa, Europe, World Trade Organization, Japan, South America, Southern Africa, and South Asian countries are the most frequently appearing nations, continents or organizations related to globalization. The two main clusters were economy and human rights. Again, IPS focused on human rights considerably during this period.

CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

Both wire services were similar in their focus on the global economy and economic factors as a strong relationship with globalization over time. But the study has demonstrated that subtle but unique differences exist in how globalization story has been told in the world. This study indicates that news stories of globalization from an alternative news agency include a range of voices and perspectives.

This study confirms that AP mostly pays attention to elite nations in news regarding globalization and global. IPS news stories covered Southern Africa, South America, South Asia, and Latin American whereas AP coverage more likely included the U.S., Japan, and Europe. In other words, although the U.S. is the most frequently appearing nation over time in both wire services, AP focused mainly on the developed countries in comparison to IPS, which focused on mainly the less-developed countries. Thus, AP coverage focused more on core nations, but IPS focused on the culturally diverse and critical.

The more interesting finding has to do with the ‘narrow’ definition given to globalization in the news (i.e., global economy) and the additional elements found in the IPS presentation of globalization, such as, human rights. For example, whereas the main themes of AP news coverage were the global economy and warming, these of IPS were the global economy and human rights, including poverty, women, health, children, labor, and food issues.

More specifically, both AP and the IPS share a similar issue, an environmental issue (i.e., global warming), which is salient to the globalization over time. Later, in the AP coverage, the main themes moved from global warming to new technologies. In other words, AP highlighted economic and global warming issues formed later by communication technology, such as the Internet and telecommunication. On the other hand, the main themes of IPS were global economy and human rights remained steady over time. Moreover, global economic issues have a stable relationship with globalization over time.
The results of this study, while limited in generalizability, nevertheless have some implications in the fields of the analysis of international news coverage. Theoretically, these findings are consistent with the studies of international news coverage (Boyd-Barrett, 2003; Golan & Baker, 2003; Giffard, 1985; Rauch, 2003; Wu, 2000), that international news coverage is strongly related to the country’s status occupied in the world news system (Wallerstein, 1974, 1979, 1996). Also, this study supports the idea that issues from and about semiperipheral countries or peripheral countries have less chance of being in the news than those from core countries (Chang, 1998). In sum, a hierarchical world system was the salient phenomenon in the globalization during this period. Practically, these findings confirm that publics are not well informed about the process of globalization when they are exposed to only one news agency. In other words, this is not an adequate representation, but a biased representation of the issues surrounding globalization. Generally, one can say that news coverage regarding globalization can set the context for public understanding as well as set up the issues for public debate. Therefore, this study indicates that using two different news agencies, and comparing them, provides more general ideas, and prevents biases that could arise when using only one news agency or only mainstream news agencies.

Although this research illustrates the status of globalization through time, it has some limitations regarding validity. It is questionable that news represents all factors related to globalization. In addition, the analysis here is limited in that only two news agencies were used to explore news coverage. However, studying the AP as mainstream news coverage, and the IPS as alternative news coverage, over time does provide a general idea of the concept and process related to globalization. Second, these findings need more explanations of historical contexts that have the most salience for them. Such explanations require more data or various events or issues that would determine whether the same patterns recur. For example, analysis of the content of news articles is another variable that indicates the structure of countries, factors of globalization, and the degree of globalization of each country over time. Some other factors that might influence globalization are the political, economic, trade, regional relationships among countries, national interests, and cultural convergence (Lee & Yang, 1995; Novais, 2007). Finally, although Catpac allows for the researcher to analyze news presentation using words frequencies and clustering methods, this analysis does offer some limitations. Both the repetition of certain words and the frequency of countries mentioned in the news stories do not always show their influence in how the story is represented (Crawley, 2007).

These results would then be compared to the more scholarly concerns regarding globalization to show what kind of meaning gap exists. It has important implications for public understanding of a host of international issues and conflicts. Here, the specific communication processes can be investigated are: 1) the tendency of news agencies to conceptually simplify complex processes in their reporting; 2) how two different types of media outlets define international issues and events differently and in ways that are most
relevant to specific audiences. These patterns of news reporting are especially relevant in the case of globalization because, as we can already see, it is a controversial and conflictive process as it is perceived worldwide. In addition, future research may closely examine media effects of globalization news on local audience or public opinion. Local audiences might respond differently to various news agenda provided from more than two wire services regarding globalization.

REFERENCES


How Did AP and IPS Construct the Concept and Process of Globalization? Eunjung Sung et al.


DO ADVANCES IN PRESS FREEDOM PRECEDE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS? A CROSS-LAGGED ANALYSIS OF GLOBAL PRESS RATINGS AND UN DEVELOPMENT INDICES

JUSTIN D. MARTIN

This study is a cross-lagged analysis of Reporters Without Borders’ press freedom scores for 130 countries and UN Human Development scores for the same nations between 2002 and 2007. The purpose of the study is to test the causal priority of improvements in press freedom in influencing human development over a period of five years. Findings indicate that, for most nations included in the study, changes in press freedom precede variance in human development. Regional differences were observed; press freedom change was predictive of human development in the Middle East and North Africa, for example, but not in Western Europe, where both press freedom and human development scores did not vary substantially between 2002 and 2007.

Keywords: press freedom, human development, UN, Reporters Without Borders, free speech

[Just as a fundamental project of the twentieth century was to create a national system of a free press in the United States, a central challenge of the twenty-first century will be to create a global system of a free press for the emerging global society.


Justin D. Martin is the CLAS-Honors Preceptor of Journalism at the University of Main (justin.d.martin@maine.edu).
When a savage earthquake decimated much of Haiti in January 2010, few if any humanitarians around the world responded by stating, “We need to get some newspapers down to the Caribbean as fast as we can,” or “Make sure journalists can freely report news on the island.” Justifiably, aid workers, humanitarians, traveling doctors and governments instantly focused on the basic needs of injured and displaced Haitians: Water, food, antibiotics, and medical attention. But even in the minutes and hours after the earthquake struck, mass media were an integral and essential part of the recovery process. It was journalists, tweeters, bloggers, texters and Facebookers who told the world of Haiti’s unprecedented plight, and communicated to Haitians on the ground which water was still potable, the location of medical tents, and information on how to treat one’s own injuries in the absence of trained physicians. Much of the relief effort in Haiti was, and still is, dependent upon the ability of mass communicators on the island to make their way around Port-au-Prince, interview experts and survivors, and send dispatches to both Haitians and the world.

It is assumed by many journalists and mass communication scholars that press freedom is an important agent of social change and human development. Still, communication researchers often do not base their scholarship on the agreed upon assumption that human communication is among the most basic human entitlement, often as necessary and consequential as the right to live physically un-abused or underneath a clean carpet of air. Fraser and Restrepo-Estrada wrote the following in 1996, something that remains largely true today: “Even though communication for development came into being in the 1960s, and has clearly shown its usefulness and impact in change and development actions, its role is still not understood and appreciated to the point that it is routinely included in development planning.” Melkote wrote in 1991 that, although development communication showed considerable promise in the 1960s, the movement “seems to have petered out.” While interests in media literacy and transparency have been the focus of a number of large granting bodies in the digital age, such as the U.S. State Department's Middle East

---

Partnership Initiatives and the like, the two decades following Melkote’s observation have not changed the fundamental thrust of her claim.

Other researchers, notably early political socialization scholars but also contemporary researchers of aid and human development, at times treat the press as somewhat of an afterthought—or, occasionally, an outcome variable as opposed to an antecedent—in models examining socialization, development, and pro-social change. In Nicholas Kristof and Sheryl WuDunn’s 2009 book Half the Sky, which focuses on women’s rights and development around the world, the author’s make nary a mention of how the press has the potential to greatly contribute to overall human development by exposing violence against women, communicating information about prenatal and maternal health, and reporting employment and financial opportunities to spur female upward mobility. That Kristof and WuDunn overlook what the press can do for women around the world is especially disappointing because the authors are themselves journalists! (And WuDunn is a journalist from a developing country—China).

Many governments and aid workers also often assume that press development is secondary to the immediate needs of rural education, microfinance, and health care initiatives and, in their view, only after these priorities are set in motion is it necessary to strengthen the press and journalistic freedoms. In Jordan, for example, where King Abdullah II has ruled since 1999, the young monarch has focused on strengthening domestic economic policies and increasing foreign direct investment, reasoning that press development is not entirely necessary to enliven these arenas. Vladimir Putin in Russia, likewise, came to power early in the 21st Century and brought phenomenal economic change to the country, while neglecting to nurture press freedoms, which rendered his country less well-positioned to tackle societal ills like widespread overconsumption of alcohol and official corruption. This paper argues, though, that enhancing journalistic freedom and allowing watchdog reporters to do their jobs is an important antecedent of overall human development.

This article presents cross-lagged analysis of Reporters Without Borders’ (RSF) global press ratings and UN Human Development indices for 130 countries for the years 2002 and 2007, in order to determine whether press development over a period of five years may contribute to nations’ overall human development progress and, therefore, should be more actively considered in models of international development. Cross-lagged analyses

---

9 J.D. Martin, “News Consumption and Political Socialization among Young, Urban Jordanians” (PhD diss., The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2009), 8.
11 RSF is the acronym used by Reporters Without Borders, a French organization whose title in that language is “Reporters Sans Frontières.” This acronym is used in this paper.
have not yet been employed to isolate changes in press freedom as a precursor of human development improvements. Some prior research has argued that press freedom significantly predicts governmental fraud or corruption reduction, but little if any scholarship has addressed whether press freedom helps explain human development, and in doing so attempted to isolate causal order. It is this author’s contention that based on global press ratings and human development data, directional evidence exists suggesting that humanitarians might do well to include press enhancement directives as initial components of development models. Daniel Lerner wrote more than fifty years ago that “millions of people…now are learning to imagine how life is organized in different lands,” something which “signifies a net increase in human imaginativeness,” and it just may be that countries that do not repress the imagination of their press systems may net larger human gains.

LITERATURE REVIEW

When we lend the issue thought, it is curious that press development should be omitted or tardily considered in efforts to spur pro-social development around the world, because it has long been documented that, when asked, most people, acknowledge the ability of the press to contribute to pro-social change and believe it is harmful to society when governments restrict free expression or censor news content. John Hartley goes as far as to claim that, “journalism should not be seen as a professional practice at all but as a human right.” So seemingly accepted is the notion that an open press system strengthens human development that virtually the entire disciplines of health communication and financial reporting are based on the respective premises that mass media can improve both public health and spur economic growth. This is why health communication is one of the fastest growing disciplines in mass communication, particularly research opportunities in e-health communication initiatives. Likewise, the ability of economic reporting to drive investing and overall economic growth is why business news draws the highest advertising rates of any area of online journalism.

17Ken Doctor, Newsonomics: Twelve New Trends that Will Shape the News You Get (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2010), Kindle location 833.
Surely, anecdotal examples exist of both nations demonstrating human development progress without expanding press freedoms, as well as countries in which the press is contributing to health, literacy, and economic growth. In China, Qatar, Singapore and Saudi Arabia, for example, advances in a number of human development variables\(^\text{18}\) have occurred in the absence of any meaningful improvements in press freedom. But in other than non-communist states and rentier economies—countries in which wealth from foreign “rents” is distributed to citizens who cannot then demand reforms of their government benefactors\(^\text{19}\)—the press may be directly contributing to overall social advancement. In Kenya, for example, considered to be a leader in Sub-Saharan Africa in terms of free expression, press freedoms appear to be preceding and potentially contributing to pro-social development.\(^\text{20}\) India is also a country in which a de-shackled press seems to be contributing not only to democratic reforms but the overall defense of human rights.\(^\text{12}\)

### JOURNALISM, EDUCATION & PUBLIC HEALTH

Human development campaigns often focus primarily on education and public health initiatives, such as literacy programs, maternal and prenatal health campaigns, food sanitation awareness, alcohol consumption reduction, and microsavings and microfinance education, with recent efforts focusing on women in developing countries, as is clear in Kristof & WuDunn’s book. In discussing factors that lead to behavior changes in preventing diarrhea and dehydration in the developing world, Isely declared that “[mass media] alone have certainly no proven efficacy in bringing about [direct] behavioral change.”\(^\text{22}\) (Research on drunk driving awareness campaigns of the 1980s and onward\(^\text{23}\) seems to refute Isely’s categorical statement). But which one of the aforementioned initiatives—maternal health, food sanitation, etc.—is not strengthened by a freer press reporting in the public interest? Mass communication research has demonstrated the ability of sincere media to improve indicators in every one of these areas. Rice et al. demonstrated twenty years ago that long-term viewing of the literacy-related programming *Sesame Street* was a substantial predictor


\(^{19}\)Curtis R. Ryan, Jordan in Transition: From Hussein to Abdullah (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner), 50.


Likewise, health communication literature convincingly demonstrates that mass media often affect consumers’ health practices.\textsuperscript{25} If you are over the age of thirty, think back to when you were between the ages 15 and about 27, and think about where the majority of information on sound health practices originated. Most likely it came from journalists or candid entertainment programming. Even individuals living in developed countries where education is well-funded and organized receive substantial knowledge about best health practices from media external to family or educators. Do we not base any of our wiser health-related decisions on such information?

Megan MacDonald and Laurie Hoffman-Goetz argue that print news is one of the most meaningful ways that the public receives information about Cancer risks, prevention, and treatment.\textsuperscript{26} Individuals in less developed countries, too, often rely even more on mass media for information about salubrious practices. Yes, as Isely said, mass-mediated information influences educational policy, which in turn partly shapes human health practices, but there is much evidence in the corpus of literature on education, public health decisions and mass media that does not support a no-effects view of a free press.

Mass media messages can quite often effectively encourage audiences to take advantage of available health services,\textsuperscript{27} such as periodic screenings and vaccinations. Westoff and Rodriquez observed in the 1990s a strong association between exposure to family planning messages and adoption of contraceptive practices among women in Kenya.\textsuperscript{28} Mass media messages have been credited with promoting early adoption of breastfeeding among Jordanian mothers giving birth in state-run hospitals.\textsuperscript{29} In Egypt, journalists critical of government inaction regarding sexual harassment and assault have shamed the government into drafting a bill with much harsher penalties for sexual assailants.\textsuperscript{30} Quasi-experimental research has demonstrated that media messages focusing on correcting

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{26} Megan MacDonald and Laurie Hoffman-Goetz, “Cancer Coverage in Newspapers Serving Large and Small Communities in Ontario,” \textit{Revue Canadienne de Sante Publique} 92 (2001): 372.
\bibitem{27} Roberto Grilli, Craig Ramsay and Silvia Minozzi, “Mass Media Interventions: Effects on Health Services Utilization,” \textit{Cochrane Database of Systemic Reviews} 1 (2002).
\end{thebibliography}
misperceptions of drinking norms can reduce recipients’ overconsumption of alcohol.\textsuperscript{31} In scores of studies, mass media have been directly implicated in promoting pro-social progress.

It summons suspicion, then, that greater press freedom may hasten overall societal progress in some nations. Wilbur Schramm, one of the founding sages of communication research, argued nearly fifty years ago in the early age of television that “we have the tools and skills to do something about the old scourges like poverty, ill health, illiteracy and primitive living conditions.”\textsuperscript{32} Such grand goals of supporters of free communication are, of course, not the least bit easy to measure, which is why large scale societal improvement resulting from expanded press freedoms has gone largely unassessed. Schramm’s argument is respected but slightly different than the suspicion communicated in this paper, which is not that aid groups in developed countries have to always solve poverty and education problems in developing nations, but that if press freedoms and journalistic training around the world are bolstered, journalists and other communicators in the areas of concern will promote these ends themselves, and that efforts to strengthen free communication should be considered shortly after an aid organization spots a population in need.

\textit{Global Press Ratings & Development Indices}

In the last ten to fifteen years, NGOs have been more frequently ranking countries around the world on various characteristics other than simply, say, population growth and GDP. Transparency International ranks nations according to their suspected levels of corruption,\textsuperscript{33} Freedom House\textsuperscript{34} and Reporters Sans Frontieres\textsuperscript{35} rate countries according to their press freedoms and overall support of civil liberties, and the UN according to overall human development. In the post-Cold War world, nations, even many autocracies, have been less closed-off to outside observations and metrics, and a number of human rights organizations and multinational bodies have taken up the tasks of measuring human liberties and societal progress.

Additionally, with the accessibility of Internet survey software and the proliferation of English as the world’s un-official language of business, distributing assessment tools has become increasingly feasible. Even fiercely autocratic states like Libya and Belarus are often included as survey units, as organizations recruit (often anonymously) journalists,
researchers, and other observers to complete annual surveys on their country’s human rights records. Some scholars have even advocated attempts to measure less-tangible forces such as “intellectual capital” in developing countries.

Reporters Sans Frontieres and the United Nations are among the most prominent organizations assessing press freedoms and overall human development, respectively. Second only to perhaps Freedom House, RSF is the most widely cited index of press freedoms. (Freedom House data were not used in this study, though, because they didn’t begin calculating scores for nations’ press freedoms until 2003, and the author wished to examine the relationship between press freedom and human development over a period of at least five years). Similarly, the UN Human Development Index is arguably the most comprehensive global index of intellectual, social, and medical progress. The HDI is calculated using, among data from other sources, country-specific information from the World Bank, Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Food and Agriculture Organization, International Monetary Fund, and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. The indices of both organizations are made available to the public online free of charge. News organizations frequently use such indices to report comparative analyses of countries’ progress or stagnation in journalistic or overall development. One scholar recently used Freedom House and RSF data to argue that press freedoms in the Middle East and North Africa remained virtually unchanged over a period of five years, despite the proliferation of U.S.-inspired journalism programs in places like Jordan, Qatar, and the UAE.

Despite the widely available nature of many of the global indices mentioned here, researchers have infrequently used such data to address compelling social science questions, especially with regards to journalism and mass communication research. To be sure, such data are imperfect and measure somewhat amorphous constructs, but they also can represent powerful tools in explaining meaningful progress in and among nations. The simple fact that aid organizations and NGOs are constantly courting the press in order to raise funds and awareness of their causes and to distribute results of their research and interventions should lead to the suspicion that a free press disseminating such PR can have an impact. This study represents a step in testing such a suspicion.

---

HYPOTHESES


H2: Based on scatterplot representations of the relationships discussed in H1, it is likely that a subgroup(s) of the 130 countries considered in this study will depict the relationship described in H1, while others will fall outside this pattern. To use a specific example, for some of the world’s poorest countries, such as Chad, where predominating concerns include malaria and infant mortality, it is unlikely that basic needs have been accommodated to such a degree that journalistic contributions would yet matter.

H3: There will be noticeable regional differences in the ability of press freedom changes to predict overall Human Development scores. For example, for extremely developed nations such as those of North America and Western Europe, the pattern projected in H1 is unlikely to hold, as there will be likely little variance in these nations’ overall development scores across the five-year period. The regional categorizations for this hypothesis were: Americas, Eastern Europe/Central Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Western Europe, Middle East/North Africa.

METHOD

This study examined cross-lagged correlations of Reporters Sans Frontieres global press ratings and UN Human Development Indices for the years 2002 and 2007, in order to determine whether any evidence exists that improvements, or recession, in press freedoms affect overall Human development. Due to the fact that this study is concerned with nations’ change in press freedoms over a period of five years, the two Time One variables for each country were calculated as press freedom score in 2002 minus press freedom score in 2007 and 2002 UN HDI score minus 2007 HDI score, respectively. On one “diagonal” direction in the cross-lagged model, then, 2002-2007 changes in press freedom predict 2007 UN HDI rankings, while the other diagonal uses 2002-2007 UN HDI change to predict 2007 press rankings. Table 2 will illustrate this shortly.

Press ratings and HDI scores from 130 countries were included in this study. Countries were excluded from this analysis at times, for various reasons. The indices of both organizations do not rate every country in the world, for practical or security concerns, so not all countries had all four data points necessary for inclusion. In other circumstances,
countries or territories were excluded for political or governmental reasons. Yugoslavia, for example, was a country in 2002 but not in 2007, and the U.N. treats Taiwan as part of China, not as a sovereign country.

Variables. RSF calculates its score for each country based on questionnaires it distributes to NGOs, journalists, and researchers, with items assessing counts of journalist incarcerations, de-licensing, harassment and beatings, and also included items assessing journalistic laws in each country (whether libel is a criminal offense, as opposed to a civil matter, for example). Each country is assigned a numerical score ranging from .5 (very favorable) to 115 (very unfavorable). Norway and Finland, for example, earned scores of .75 and 1.5 in 2007, respectively, while Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka drew 39.5 and 67.5 for their respective RSF press freedom scores.

Pointing to some external evidence of validity of the RSF ratings, 2007 RSF scores for the 130 countries considered in this study are significantly correlated with 2007 Freedom House ratings for the same countries (.84, \( p < .001 \)). Recall that Freedom House ratings were not used in this study, because the organization did not assign countries with numerical scores in 2002, and the author wished to examine cross-lagged relationships over at least five years. Some external support for the validity of the RSF 2002 ratings can be obtained by correlating scores for the 130 countries with 2003 Freedom House ratings, which registered \( r = .81, p < .001 \).

For its part, the UN Human Development Index is calculated on a scale from 0 to 1, with nations scoring near a 1.0 demonstrating very high human development. The U.S. and Iceland earned .956 and .969, respectively, on the 2007 UN HDI, while Niger registered at .34. While there is no organizational equivalent of the UN undertaking such a comprehensive development assessment with which UN figures can be correlated, we might expect that 2007 UN HDI scores would be correlated with 2007 RSF press ratings, which they are \( r = -.312, p < .001 \). As we might expect, nations with higher RSF scores also tend to have elevated development scores. In addition to UN and RSF scores, each country examined in the study was assigned a regional classification, so that cross-lagged correlations could be evaluated across six different geographical locales, and including the following assignations: Americas, Western Europe, Eastern Europe/Central Asia, Middle East/North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia/Pacific nations.

Cross-Lagged Procedure. Cross-lagged correlations have been used in numerous mass communication studies attempting to isolate potential causal antecedents of attitude or behavioral change, most prominently studies comparing media agendas of salient issues to

\[4] Please recall that RSF scores are counter-numerical, with nations scoring 1 said to have greater press freedom than nations registering 10.
**TABLE 1**
Countries Ranked According to 2007 HDI Score, with Corresponding 2007 RSF Score

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2007 HDI Score</th>
<th>2007 RSF Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>42.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>18.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>31.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>37.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>8.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>41.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>28.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>9.75</td>
<td>26.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>55.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>11.75</td>
<td>53.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>96.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>40.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>57.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>4.25</td>
<td>26.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>10.25</td>
<td>67.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>31.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>11.25</td>
<td>40.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>5.75</td>
<td>44.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>8.25</td>
<td>20.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>66.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>89.00</td>
<td>103.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>9.25</td>
<td>69.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>S. Korea</td>
<td>12.13</td>
<td>30.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>13.25</td>
<td>21.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>6.50</td>
<td>23.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>20.17</td>
<td>79.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>33.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Czech Rep.</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>74.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>38.00</td>
<td>14.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>18.50</td>
<td>33.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>58.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>12.13</td>
<td>37.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>12.50</td>
<td>8.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>24.83</td>
<td>13.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>11.75</td>
<td>33.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>96.71</td>
<td>37.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>6.50</td>
<td>75.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>53.63</td>
<td>39.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>66.50</td>
<td>25.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>33.00</td>
<td>93.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>26.88</td>
<td>28.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>5.75</td>
<td>56.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>30.00</td>
<td>54.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>17.88</td>
<td>64.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>26.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>41.00</td>
<td>53.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>63.63</td>
<td>20.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>56.90</td>
<td>53.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>99.11</td>
<td>23.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Bosnia &amp; Herz.</td>
<td>11.17</td>
<td>55.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Countries in this table are ranked according to their score on the 2007 UN Human Development Index. The corresponding score for each country is its 2007 RSF score. The 85th country in this table is underlined because changes in press freedoms predicted HDI scores for the 85 countries with 2007 HDI figures >.65.
public agendas of critical-issue rankings. The method was developed by Rozelle and Campbell in the 1960s, and made a mainstay of media and public opinion research by McCombs & Shaw’s seminal agenda-setting study in 1972. Rozelle and Campbell also developed a baseline calculation for cross-lagged correlations allowing analysts to calculate a threshold for concluding unidirectional or reciprocal influence.

Dunn provides a useful explanation of the Rozelle-Campbell baseline, noting that it “serves as a point of comparison for correlations between the variables across time. If both of the ‘diagonal’ correlation coefficients (the correlation between Variable One at Time One and Variable Two at Time Two and the correlation between Variable Two at Time One and Variable One at Time Two) are above the baseline, the variables are said to influence each other reciprocally. If, however, one diagonal correlation is above the baseline while the other is below it,” a unidirectional relationship exists. The formula for calculating the baseline value is: $RX1Y1 + RX2Y2 / 2 \times (RX1X2)^2 + (RY1Y2)^2 / 2$, where $RX1Y1$ is the correlation between X and Y at time one.

RESULTS

The 130 nations examined in this study are listed in Table 1, and range from wealthy, developed countries like France and Belgium to some of the world’s poorest outposts of Zimbabwe and Chad. When considered together, the 130 countries examined in this analysis did not appear to demonstrate HDI progress that related to expansion of press freedoms (see the first cross-lagged model in Figure 1). Neither of the diagonal correlations in that model suggests significance. When a scatterplot illustrating nations’ 2002-2007 press freedom change and 2007 HDI score was constructed, however, it appeared that there were two clusters of nations in regards to these two variables, as seen in Figure 2.

This was the purpose of H2, which asked if scatterplot data revealed any sub-trends in the HDI data. The data suggest that press freedom expansion is predictive of development for nations with an HDI score above 0.65, and the second cross-lagged model in Figure 1 bears this out. See also Figure 3, a scatterplot representing HDI score and press freedom

---

FIGURE 1. Results of Cross-Lagged Correlations

A. Cross-Lagged Diagram of Press Ratings & HDI Figures for All 130 Countries

2002-2007 Change in RSF Press Rating
-0.099
2002-2007 Change in HDI Rating
0.153
2007 RSF Press Rating
0.083
2007 HDI Rating
-0.078

*Indicates a Pearson correlation value of p<0.05; **Indicates a p-value of <0.01; ***Connotes a p-value of <0.001
Note: RSF press ratings are indexed on a counter-numerical scale, with 1 more favorable than 10. When press rating change from 2002-2007 is calculated, then, an improvement from say, 10 to 5, is a positive score; Rozelle-Campbell Baseline = N/A; correlations non-significant; N=130

B. Cross-Lagged Diagram of Press Ratings and HDI Figures for Countries Between 0.65-1.00 on the Development Index

2002-2007 Change in RSF Press Rating
-0.051
2002-2007 Change in HDI Rating
0.079
2007 RSF Press Rating
-0.066
2007 HDI Rating
0.330

Rozelle-Campbell Baseline = 0.092; N=85

C. Cross-Lagged Diagram of Press Ratings & HDI Figures for Countries in the Americas

2002-2007 Change in RSF Press Rating
-0.065
2002-2007 Change in HDI Rating
0.448
2007 RSF Press Rating
-0.363
2007 HDI Rating
-0.339

Rozelle-Campbell Baseline = N/A; correlations non-significant; Note: Haiti was an extreme outlier in this model. When excluded, the correlation between HDI change and 2007 RSF rating approaches zero; N=19

D. Cross-Lagged Diagram of Press Ratings & HDI Figures for Countries in Western Europe

2002-2007 Change in RSF Press Rating
0.411
2002-2007 Change in HDI Rating
0.201
2007 RSF Press Rating
0.519
2007 HDI Rating
-0.197

Rozelle-Campbell Baseline = 0.019, correlations non-significant when outlier is excluded; Note: Portugal was an extreme outlier in this model, scoring much lower on 2007 HDI than the other nations of Western Europe. Excluding Portugal, correlations significant in this model approach zero; N=17
Do Advances in Press Freedom Precede Human Development Progress? Justin D. Martin


E. Cross-Lagged Diagram of Press Ratings & HDI Figures for Countries in Eastern Europe & Central Asia

2002-2007 Change in RSF Press Rating

-0.360

2002-2007 Change in HDI Rating

-0.592

2007 RSF Press Rating

-0.629

2007 HDI Rating

-0.649

Rozelle-Campbell Baseline = .056; N=18; *This coefficient approaches significance (p=.09).

F. Cross-Lagged Diagram of Press Ratings & HDI Figures for Countries in the Middle East & North

2002-2007 Change in RSF Press Rating

-0.035

2002-2007 Change in HDI Rating

0.530

2007 HDI Rating

0.439

Rozelle-Campbell Baseline = -0.25; *This correlation approaches significance, and when two outliers with large press freedom declines, Iran & the Palestinian Authority, are removed, the correlation is highly significant: 0.711***; N=17

G. Cross-Lagged Diagram of Press Ratings & HDI Figures for Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa North

2002-2007 Change in RSF Press Rating

-0.030

2002-2007 Change in HDI Rating

-0.036

2007 HDI Rating

-0.062

Rozelle-Campbell Baseline = N/A, correlations non-significant; N=38

H. Cross-Lagged Diagram of Press Ratings & HDI Figures for Asian/Pacific Countries North

2002-2007 Change in RSF Press Rating

-0.729

2002-2007 Change in HDI Rating

0.220

2007 HDI Rating

-0.396

Rozelle-Campbell Baseline = N/A, correlations non-significant; N=19
change for the nations of the upper cluster. When the three apparent outliers (Iran, Sri Lanka, and the Palestinian Territories, which registered cliff falls in press freedom) in the lower range of both variables are excluded, the fundamental conclusions of linearity and causal order do not change.

For 85 countries examined in this study (ranked and demarcated by 2007 HDI score in Table 1), increases in press freedom appear to precede improvements in overall human development. Changes in press freedom explains about 11 percent of the variance in 2007 HDI score. While it may be that the world’s least developed nations, like Eritrea and Nigeria, need to reach a certain bare minimum development level in order for press freedom to spur further progress, it is important perhaps to note that many of the “top” 85 countries considered in this study are nations with massive portions, if not most, of their populations living in abject poverty, such as Vietnam, Guatemala, and Gabon. These countries are by no means considered “developed” by the standards of most international aid organizations. For most countries in this study, press freedom change corresponded with changes in HDI scores.
Hypothesis 2 stated there would be visible differences in the relationship between press freedom ratings and human development among six geographical regions (Americas, Eastern Europe/Central Asia, Western Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East/North Africa, and Asia/Pacific countries). There were not any overwhelming differences, but a few visible contrasts do bear mention. As far as the six regions are concerned, only the Middle East and North Africa had a compelling majority of its nations exhibit changes in press freedom corresponding with increases in HDI scores. The diagonal correlation between HDI score and press freedom change in Figure 1F approaches significance and, when two of the outliers mentioned earlier are removed (Iran and Palestinian Territories), the correlation shoots up to .71. (Iran and the Palestinian Territories recorded staggering decreases in press freedom between 2002-2007 largely due to, respectively, the 2005 election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Tehran and the 2007 Hamas takeover of Gaza). For most nations in the Middle East and North Africa, changes in press freedom corresponded with changes in overall human development. This was true for about 70 other nations around the world, of course, but no other region stood out by having an overwhelming majority of its states.
contribute to the overall conclusion.

In Western European countries, a trend opposite that in the Mideast/North Africa was found: Improvement in overall human development is predictive of changes in 2007 press ratings, changes in RSF ratings are not predictive of 2007 HDI scores (see Figure 1D). Among countries in Eastern Europe/Central Asia, the relationship appears to be reciprocal. While only one of the diagonal correlations in Figure 1E is significant, the other correlation approaches significance, and both are above the Rozelle-Campbell baseline of .056.

**DISCUSSION**

This study examined the causal relationship between changes in press freedom and increases in human development scores, finding that, for most of the 130 countries examined, press freedom increases appear to precede overall human development. These findings should have important implications not only for mass communication researchers and free speech advocates that study journalism and communication around the world, journalists, and governments, but also potentially for humanitarian aid organizations looking for ways to maximize development progress around the world.

While developed countries examined in the current study were among the nations within which press freedom increases seem to contribute to development, countries like Mexico, Panama, Belarus, Ecuador, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, and Tajikistan also contributed to this finding. In order to increase development progress within many of the world’s nations, it may be useful to include efforts to expand press freedoms and strengthen journalistic infrastructure as original components of a development action plan. For a new twist on an old adage, we could say, “give a man the freedom to fish and monitor the pond, and he just may.”

This may not be that difficult for powerful granting agencies to accomplish. As a requisite of humanitarian funding in a developing country, the UN or the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation might, when asked for, say, $25 million for microfinance initiatives for women, stipulate that one million of those dollars must be used to hire female reporters at privately owned newspapers to keep watch over the other $24 million. If, similarly, Belarus wants $15 million from the EU for new educational programs, the multinational body could demand that Belarus must first decriminalize libel and stop incarcerating reporters for criticizing the regime.” If Egypt wants U.S. subsidies for anti-retroviral drugs to help treat HIV-positive citizens, Congress should insist if Egyptian journalists are allowed to candidly report on HIV within Egypt and greater Africa, and eliminate criticism of the president and his regime as an imprisonable “offense.” The buying power of development money is much strengthened when local reporters are allowed to follow it.

Given the often grandiose language applied to freedom of the press and its necessity
in western texts, perhaps we should not be surprised by evidence that greater journalistic freedom leads to a healthier and more developed society. Visibly etched on a wall at the Columbia Graduate School of Journalism is Joseph Pulitzer’s predictive equation that a “Republic and its press will rise or fall together.” These are serious words. Of course, Pulitzer was not a financially disinterested commentator on press liberty, but Americans have typically shared Pulitzer’s sentiment that a freer press contributes to societal progress. The Ethics Code of the American Society of Newspaper Editors asserts that, “the promotion of any private interest contrary to the general welfare, for whatever reasons, is not compatible with honest journalism.” While this may sound Pollyannish, it seems reasonable to argue that when journalists, whether citizen or professional, are allowed freedom to speak, they generally try to get things right and to promote public good, and of this there is some evidence in this paper.

Some discussion needs to be given to the fact that, out of all geographical regions considered in this paper, the Middle East/North Africa was the locale in which press freedom corresponded to human development to the greatest extent. According to a number of human rights organizations, this part of the world is the most deprived of civil liberties, particularly free speech and freedom of information. For most countries in this region, increases in press freedom were associated with HDI increases, and the relationship appears to be unidirectional. This finding should be considered by aid organizations funding development work in the greater Middle East such as the Ford Foundation, Carnegie Corporation, the United Nations, and others. For many countries considered in this study, particularly those in the greater Middle East, there is an argument that developing the press and strengthening freedom of speech should not necessarily be postponed if development formulas are to achieve maximum results.

Governments, too—both those within and without the greater Middle East—may not be any longer able to hide from journalists behind the argument that the press can be sidelined for a while as long as progress on economic indicators is made. In Jordan, for example, a decrease in press freedom from 2002-2007 corresponded with a largely negligible (.02) increase in HDI, while in Kuwait, a substantial increase in press freedom corresponded to a sharp increase in HDI. It is reiterated here that Jordan’s government has operated under the premise that economic reform is necessary now, while press freedom can be addressed in the distant future. While Jordan’s economy has been growing in strong clips, in June 2010

---


46 Immerwahr and Doble, “Public Attitudes toward Freedom of the Press,” 184.


the government installed video cameras in the country’s Internet cafes (not the most inviting gesture for, say, conservative Muslim women needing information on breast cancer or prenatal health). It is the freer press that provides citizens with information on how to make sounder decisions about their future.

Some regional differences, too, were observed among Eastern Europe/Central Asian nations and Western European countries. The relationship between press freedoms and HDI rankings appears to be reciprocal in Eastern Europe and Central Asian states, while in Western Europe the relationship is unidirectional, with human development progress firmly predicting press ratings. Perhaps, in the world’s most developed states, changes in press freedoms, while likely consequential in terms of eradicating corruption, may be less predictive of overall human development. In Eastern Europe and Central Asian states, press freedoms appear to bolster human development which also reinforces the press. This reciprocity again encourages researchers and aid organizations to conceptualize press freedom as an agent of change earlier on in the process of development work.

The problems with cross-lagged data, such as difficulty isolating extraneous variables, have been well-documented. The procedure nonetheless remains one of the more useful ways to examine time-series data to test assumptions of temporal precedence. Just as quasi-experiments do not satisfy the demands of random assignment but are nonetheless valuable for allowing researchers to retrospectively examine the influence of time-bound stimuli, so, too, do cross-lagged models have an important role to play in examining the link between press freedom and human development.

This study, though, is not pen-in-the-sheath conclusive. As both the United Nations and press freedom watchers like Freedom House and Reporters Sans Frontieres continue to measure their respective markers, the relationships between these measures can and should be examined over longer periods of time, and their country-by-country ratings will become more precise. When these three organizations release their 2010 reports, which as of this writing are soon forthcoming, RSF ratings over an eight-year stretch and Freedom House scores over a seven-year period can be examined alongside UN HDI data from the same periods. In the least, this study has argued that press freedom be considered as a Time-One independent variable in formulas of development models, rather than reflexively labeled an outcome variable that will improve once governments and aid organizations address what they claim are more urgent needs. If communicators in developing countries are given freedom to question corruption, report honest medical and economic information, and generally defend the public interest, they can help improve their society’s lot on their own.

---

49 Ahmad F Al-Shagra, “Jordan Goes Big Brother on Internet Cafes,” June 6, 1010, The Next Web-Middle East.
The goal of this study was to explore the impacts of factors model of internet adoption, along with discussing the impact of the variables on internet adoption time, internet use time and internet use related to study and work. This study comes up with the hypothesis based on the theoretical frameworks of diffusion of innovation, uses and gratifications, technology acceptance model. Through taking Jinan university’s students as sample (N = 302), the article reveal that socio-economic status significantly influences the time of internet adoption and use. The adoption time of the internet significantly influences the time of internet use. However, the adoption and time usage of the internet do not significantly influence the internet use related to study and work, as it is significantly affected by the college students’ perception about the usability and ease of use of the internet.

Keywords: adoption of the Internet, Internet use, innovation diffusion, uses and gratification, technology acceptance model

According to the 27th statistical reports of China’s Internet development published by China Internet Network Information Center (2011) on Jan 19th, 2011, the scale of internet users has rapidly exceeded 450 million to reach 457 million by the end of December 2010, with increased 73.3 million. The internet access rates have raised to 34.3%, 5.4 percent

Fan-Bin Zeng is an assistant professor at School of Journalism and Communication in Jinan University of China, He studies media economics and new media in China (zengfanbin@vip.sina.com). This research was supported by the Panmedia Institute (http://panmediainstitute.com).
increased compared with 2009. The increase of Internet access rates reflects the elevated access and adoption of the Internet in China. The government and researchers have been concerned about the access and adoption of the Internet since this increase, such as the American reports named Falling Through the Net from the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA, 2001) in 1995, 1998, 1999 & 2000. The reports illustrate the rapid increase of population who utilizes the Internet. Reports also depict that young, high educated and high-income population will gradually obtain higher income and better employment opportunities through the use of Internet. On the other hand, the aged and the lower income segment will face a more difficult life without the use of Internet. The relevant research displays the impact factors of Internet’s adoption between countries, including the economic development, knowledge, and opening up and communication technology import level. While the internal impact factors include the economic growth, urbanization level and information technologies application on levels; these studies offer a widespread development of theoretic and empirical evidence of this particular topic.

As Internet grows stronger, researchers change their angle from original study to the time, mode and purpose of Internet use. For instance, some researchers analyzed the age difference between different users; the conclusion was that the younger population is likely to use Internet as the tool of communication and interaction as compared with the older generation. Whereas some researchers argued that people in a higher socioeconomic status use Internet more frequently as a recreational tool as well as in advanced vehicles to access information as compared with those of lower socioeconomic status. These studies reflect that different people have different ways of usages of the Internet even if they have the same Internet adoption.

However, the comprehensive understanding about the impact of Internet on different people has not been obtained through the studies of the adoption and use of the Internet respectively. People would use Internet only after they have adopted it, while the same level of Internet adoption does not mean the same level of Internet use. Therefore, a study the adoption of Internet combined with the use of it should be undertaken.

Researchers from other countries have conducted similar researches. For example, Kyung (2004) found that factor such as socioeconomic status, attitude towards Internet and social support (especially family support) have a significant impact on the Internet access of population through the data from South Korea. Such research also noted the way of Internet use in South Korean, such as using search engines, playing online games, communicating with others, shopping online, as well as social networking. However, results from other countries’ research should not be applied or assumed to the ways people use Internet in China. In order to comprehend the impact of Internet on Chinese, a study of the influencing factors of Internet adaption and their relationship should be undertaken. However, the empirical research on the adoption and the use of Internet in China was relatively vague, particularly on the model’s establishment of the influencing factors of
adoption and use of Internet. This particular report illustrates the research that has been undertaken to attempt to comprehend the influencing factors of adoption and use of Internet through empirical methods and the possibility of proposing a complete model by selecting the college students as example. The reason of using college students as the sample population is that relevant research shows that the rate for college students’ users was 97.5% in 2007; seven times of the rate (12.3%) of its overall internet users which shows that the college students are the main adopters and users of the Internet. More importantly, as most college students will be working in the future, the use and impact of Internet on them will directly affect the social development in the long term. Hence they will be selected as the object in this particular study.

From the above analysis, there are two aspects of meaning to this study: (a) Theoretically, organize theoretical models to describe the relationship between adoption and use of the Internet (including the time and the purpose); (b) Practically, the major influencing factors between Internet adoption and use found by the empirical data which can be used to improve the adoption and use of Internet, especially for college students as it is important and practically helpful to facilitate the appropriate use of Internet.

Theoretical model and Hypothesis

Most noticeably diffusion of innovation (Rogers, 1995) or uses and gratifications (Rubin, 1994), While Dutton, Rogers, & Jun (1987) explicitly underscores the causal links among diffusion, use, and social impact of home computing and thus integrates these processes into a unified framework. Figure 1 (see Appendix A) below summarizes the exogenous, intervening, and dependent variables proposed by Dutton, Rogers, and Jun (1987).

Home computing involves a three-stage process: individual socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, perceptions and attitudes towards Internet, socio-cultural setting, and hardware and software features serve. These independent variables have a direct impact on: (a) the adoption of home computers, which in turn determines; (b) the use of home computing, which in turn affects; (c) a wide range of perceptions and behavior including learning and education, family functioning, leisure activities, work from home, household routines, privacy, civil liberties, and property rights. The 11 survey-based investigations reviewed by Dutton, Rogers, and Jun (1987) have provided supporting evidence, in varying degrees, for some portions of the model. They have depicted that social economic status as well as formal education create a remarkable influence on home computers, and that capabilities growth is higher than its entertainments features’ growth.

This chain process model is substantial for the model on the predictors of the adoption and use of the internet as both Internet and home computers are related as an “instrumental tool” (e.g., for work, word processing, education, home budgeting, etc.) However, this model is incomplete and inadequate, as the relations between adoptions with use of home computing and the impact of this model lacks in detailed statistical data, Moreover, though
home computers have predictors on the Internet adoption and use, it cannot be used directly. Therefore, the model of the adoption and use of the Internet should be created.

With regards to the Internet adoption and use, researchers employ innovation diffusion theory and uses and gratifications as main frameworks. A study conducted by Rogers (1995), demonstrates that the diffusion theory addresses the characteristics of innovations and their adopters (Rogers, 1995). According to Rogers (1995, p. 11), “an innovation is an idea, practice, or object that is perceived as new by an individual or other unit of adoption.” He also defines “innovativeness” as “the degree to which an individual or other unit of adoption is relatively earlier in adopting new ideas than the other members of a system” (p. 22). This diffusion theory suggests that adoption of technological innovations is a function of one’s innovativeness, or willingness to try new products (Atkin, et al., 1998; Neuendorf, et al., 1998; Rogers, 1995). Roger’s (1995) research has focused on the socioeconomic characteristics of an individual, the perceived attributes of innovations, technology cluster, situational factors, as well as the characteristics of the innovations which influenced adoption which has allowed him to comprehend the potential predictors of adopters in innovation. Zhu (2004) has further emphasized this particular study by developing a new construct of needs for new media technology, called “Weighted and Calculated Needs for New Media (WCN)”. This allowed the research to fill a gap in the literature on diffusion and uses and gratifications. WCN not only integrates two mentioned theory but also elaborate mechanisms underlying the adoption and use of new media: contrasting between the conventional and the new media, and the weighting among different needs. As such, WCN predicts that individuals continuously adopt and use a different medium when the conventional media cannot satisfy their specific needs. For instance, social network websites are used in order to satisfy the needs of communication. Take the Internet for example, only when people feel the conventional media can’t satisfy certain need (e.g. express personal advice of meet some friends) and Internet is able to satisfy this need, they will use the Internet. Based on this, this study uses WCN to balance people’s use need of Internet.

Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) has been used to further explore impact factors as some researchers believed the innovation diffusion theory and uses and gratifications contains lack of supporting the relations of Internet adoption and use. The Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) was developed to address this key problem surrounding the field of information technology. The primary objective was to assess why performance gains were often inhibited or obstructed by a user’s unwillingness to accept new technology. It has stated that “Because of the persistence and importance of this problem explaining user acceptance has been a long-standing issue in MIS research” (Davis, 1989, p.319). The Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) was an adaptation to the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) developed in 1980 by Fishbein & Ajzen. TRA was an original theory in the sense that the researchers hypothesized that a person’s intention to perform a behavior (BI) was influenced by a person’s attitude (A) and subjective norm (SN). \[ BI = A + SN. \]
The Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) is the information systems theory that illustrates how users accept and adapt a technology (See figure 2 in Appendix A). The model suggests that a number of factors influence their decision about how and when they will use it when presented with a new technology, notably including the following:

Perceived usefulness (PU) - This was defined by Fred Davis as “the degree to which a person believes that using a particular system would enhance his or her job performance”.

Perceived ease-of-use (PEOU) - Davis defined this as “the degree to which a person believes that using a particular system would be free from effort” (Davis 1989).

TAM postulates that compute usage is determined by BI, and BI is determined by the person’s attitude toward using the system, and PV, and the attitude is determined by PV and PEOU. According to the theory above, this study attempt to test figure 3 (see Appendix A) after adjusted the variable of figure 1:

Research depicts that Internet usage by college students are essentially for education and work. However, it does not illustrate other activities of students’ Internet usage. According to figure 3, this study tries to answer the following questions and testing the following hypothesis:

RQ1: How the variable of Personal attributes, Social status, Weighted and Calculated Needs, Perceived usefulness (PU), Perceived ease-of-use (PEOU) predict the Years of Internet use, Internet use time and Internet use about learning and working.

Hypothesis 1: The more years of Internet use, the longer the Internet use time of college students.

Hypothesis 2: The more years of Internet use, the greater the Internet use about learning and working of college students.

Hypothesis 3: The more Internet use time, the greater the Internet use about learning and working of college students.

METHODOLOGY

Sample

This survey was conducted in Jinan universities in Guangzhou during May, 2010. A
total of 335 respondents completed the questionnaires and 302 questionnaires are valid, therefore the survey completion rate was 90.1%. Demographic Characteristics of sample was shown in Table 1.

Inevitably, the key demographic variables of this convenience sample is valid (All the data in this study can be obtained from researchers after authorization) Meanwhile, the data shows that the minimum of the average online time is one hour, while the minimum Internet age of is one year. Combined with the popularity of the University Internet, it can be drawn from the sample of these students who has no difference between Internet access, which leads to be unnecessary to analyze whether they adopted Internet or not.

Dependent Variable

1. Years of Internet adoption: Measurement question is that “How long are you online until now?” Years of Internet use is a continuous variable.

2. Internet use time: Measurement question is that “How much average time do you spend online per day?” Internet use time is a continuous variable.

3. Internet use about learning and working: According to the research needs, the conduct of Internet use was focused to obtain knowledge about learning or working. Therefore, this article uses the following questions measure: As following actions, the frequency is (1 = never use, 2 = rarely used, 3 = sometimes used, 4 = more frequently used, 5 = often used). A, use e-mail to learn and study work-related information; B, participate in online, discussion and learning things about life; C, through a search engine on the Internet for research purposes in learn living-related information; D, visit relevant website, BBS that published professional knowledge and related to learning and living; E, to use blog for posting articles about study and life. For this purpose, Internet access will directly change into online behavior and learning, life, the extent of knowledge related to measurement. All items will add up to a subsidiary of another branch dependent variable, work-related Internet use index which also belongs to a continuous variable.

Independent Variable

1. Social status: (1) Parents’ level of education. Past research has shown that parents’ level of education affects the acquisition of cultural knowledge of young population (Feng, 2005). In order to further explore the influence of parents’ level of education on young population’s Internet skills, categories have been created: any college and above the standard level of education as standard, father or mother received any college education and higher level = 1; not received any college education= 0. (2) Living expenses per months. Living expenses per months represent the ability of consumption per months, and on behalf of the income of their household. It is a continuous variable and recorded according the actual
figure. (3) Birthplace. As the Internet usage between city and non-urban becomes different, we set urban = 1, suburban and rural = 0 for the assignment. (4) Educational level. We set undergraduate=0, graduate students and beyond=1.

2 Weighted and Calculated Needs. According to the measurement by Zhu (2004), this study measures the variables of college students needs: need for news, need for personal information, need for work/study information, need for entertainment, need for expression, and need for relationship. In view of these needs, Measurement questions are: (a) how much the conventional media have satisfied these needs, (b) how much the Internet may satisfy these needs, and (c) how important each of the needs is. The respondents answered the first two questions on a 5-point scale and the last question by ranking the importance of the six needs. (6 is the most important). A composite score for each dimension was then calculated by multiplying the difference between Questions 1 and 2 by Question 3. For example, if a person considers his or her need for news, ranked as the most important (6), is totally unsatisfied by the old media (1) but could be fully met by the Internet (5), then the person will have a score of $24 = (5 - 1) \times 6$ on need for news from the Internet.

3. Perceived usefulness (PU) and Perceived ease-of-use (PEOU). (1) The concept of Perceived usefulness is regarded as the perception of the object which is helpful to the living. This study adopts six items to measure the degree of advantageous of Internet which is helpful to the living. The respondent is required to state clearly their attitude towards the six statements in the Likert Scales, which 1 means “totally disagree”, 5 means “totally agree”. The six statements is as following: A, using Internet can assist in the completion rate of a task; B, using the Internet can improve work (learning) performance; C, using Internet can

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Demographic Characteristics of sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>111 Male (36.8%), Female 191 (63.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>20 years old and less (29, 9.7%); 21-22 (115, 38.1%), 23-24 (.125, 41.4%), 25 years old and beyond (33, 10.9%); Average age 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational level</td>
<td>Freshman and sophomore (29, 9.7%), juniors and beyond (131, 43.4%), graduate students and beyond (142, 47%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political position</td>
<td>Communist (105, 34.8%), Democratic staff (3, 0.99%), Communist Youth League (91, 30.1%), Mass (103, 34.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrollment status</td>
<td>Enrollment in mainland China (199, 65.9%), Hong Kong’s enrollment (66, 21.9%), Macao’s enrollment (26, 8.7%), Taiwan’s enrollment (5, 1.7%), other regional enrollment (6, 1.99%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
strength my work (learning) ability; D, using Internet can improve my work (learning) efficiency, E, Internet allows things to be achieved easier, F, Internet is useful in my daily life. The measurement of Perceived usefulness is summed up by the figure of six statements. (2) The concept of Perceived ease-of-use is the attitude toward the particular system is easy to learn and use by users. This study adopts six 6 items to measure Internet which is helpful to the living and request the respondent to state clearly that the attitude toward six 6 statements in 5-Likert Scales, which 1 means “totally disagree”, 5 means “totally agree”. The six statements is as following: A, learning how to use the Internet is an easy thing for me, B, Doing the things what I want through the Internet to is much easier, C, I understand how to use Internet, D, In my opinion, the use of network system process is very flexible, E, Grasping the skill of using the Internet is not a difficult task to me F, I think Internet is easy to use. The measurement of Perceived ease-of-use is summed up by the figure of 6 statements.

4, Personal attributes. (1) Gender. M = 1, female = 0. (2) Age (continuous variable)

RESULTS

In this study, as the three dependent variables are all continuous variables, independent variable is category variables (dummy variables) or continuous variables, multiple linear regression analysis of the three dependent variables has been used respectively. Years of Internet use is Independent variable when dependent variables are Internet use times and Internet use about learning and working in the model, and years of Internet use is also independent variable when dependent variable is Internet use about learning and working in the model. This can be seen in table 2.

RQ1

Figure 1 shows that the age variable, the living expenses per months, the Place of birth variable, Perceived ease-of-use are significant predictors to the years of Internet use, while the Betas of all independent variable are positive(B>0). It shows that the college students with older, more living expenses per months, bore in urban areas are using more years of Internet use than those contrast. Among these factors, age is easy to understand for older students are more advantageous than younger students, while the conclusion which living expenses per months and place of birth are positive predictors to the years of Internet use is the same as previous study. The variables of gender, father education, mother education, educational level have no influence on the variable of the years of Internet use. The educational level has no influence as the social status of college students does not correlate with the education level nowadays.
Figure 2 shows that the living expenses per months, the Place of birth, the educational level are significant predictors to Internet use time per day, while the Betas of living expenses per months, the Place of birth are positive (B > 0). It shows that college students with
more living expenses per month, bore in urban areas are using more Internet use time per day than those contrast. The Beta of education level is negative (B<0), shows that the undergraduate college students are using more Internet use time per day than graduate students.

Figure 3 shows that gender, place of birth, education level, Internet’s perception of the usefulness and usability are significant predictors to Internet use about learning and working. The Beta of gender is negative (B<0), suggests that the number of male students who use internet for learning and working are higher than female students. The Beta of Internet’s perception of the usefulness and usability is positive (B>0), suggests that college students with more perception of the usefulness and usability are more using internet for learning and working more than those contrast. Compared to model 1 and model 2, Internet’s perception of the usefulness and usability play an important role on Internet use about learning and working other than the years of Internet use and Internet usage time per day.

Hypothesis Testing

According to the model 2, Years of Internet use has significant influence (B = 0.142,
p < .05) on Internet use time per day, and the regression coefficients are positive, therefore, hypothesis 1 is tested, which suggests that the more years of Internet use, the longer Internet use time per day is.

While according to the model 3, the variables of Years of Internet use, Internet use time per day have no significant influence on Internet use about learning and working. Therefore hypothesis 2 and hypothesis 3 are not tested.

**Model on the Predictors of the Adoption and Use of the Internet**

Figure 4 model shows that, in general, social economic status variables have significant influence on the years of Internet use, while the years of Internet use is a significant predictor to Internet use time per day. Therefore the variable of social economic status, the years of Internet use, Internet use time per day compose a chain predicting model.

However, the Internet use about learning and working does not correlate with Years of Internet use and Internet use time per day as it correlates with the variable of Internet’s perception of the usefulness and usability, which suggests that if there is an increase in Internet use about learning and working, the cognition of internet among college and minus the difficulty of internet using by college students should also be increased.

**CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION**

This study proposes a variable of Weighted and Calculated Needs from Figure 3 model, however, it does not significant influence on the three dependent variables, which are not consistent with previous researches (Zhu, 2004, Zhou, 2008) In order to discuss this problem, the comprehensive value of Weighted and Calculated Needs are divided with the following results in Table 3.

According to the analysis of table 3, the average of six demand values is concluded as positive which depicts that the attitude of Internet use by college students is positive. Among
these values, the opinion expression demand value is highest, the following is: the interpersonal relationship needs, recreational needs, personal information needs, working information and news information needs. This indicates among the university student group, the most important is opinion expression but not for working and learning information. Therefore, when the dependent variable is based on Internet use for learning and working, the variable of Weighted and Calculated Needs will have no influence.

From the above findings and discussions, it has been concluded that the following kinds of countermeasures to improve the Internet adoption and use of students include:

(1) To reduce the cost of using the Internet. According to the above research, socioeconomic status has a positive impact on the time of Internet adoption and use. The reason is probably that the high expense of using Internet, embarrass the students in lower socioeconomic status to better use of the Internet. To provide free or low-price computer products, it’s conducive for students to overcome the economic costs while enhancing the efficiency of Internet.

(2) To provide the education of using Internet effectively, it involves two aspects: firstly, educate students’ knowledge of the Internet use, such as searching for study materials, identifying misconduct uses of Internet and harmful information. In addition, necessary hardware and software knowledge should also be taught to students to enhance the facility of Internet; secondly, increase in students’ confidence and positive attitudes on
using the Internet. As there have been reports on students’ inappropriate use of Internet from the media, it has been difficult to cultivate students’ confidence and positive attitudes towards the aspects of Internet. Therefore, the university should provide relevant courses and seminars to overcome this difficulty while enhancing the facility of Internet for the students. According to the front study conclusion, enhancing Internet facility for the students will promote the use of Internet for study or work purposes. On the other hand, educating students will allow them to slowly adapt the appropriate use of Internet.

(3) Internet has become an essential tool for students in order to obtain relevant information for work and study as well as an efficient communication for social interactions. Therefore, it will provide effective resources for both teachers and students while achieving a solid basis in building socialist in the current society as the aspects of Internet grows stronger.

Inevitably, this research contains some limitation, including the sample not being selected randomly enough. Therefore, the sample was able to test the hypothesis but could not deduct to the whole. In order to overcome this limitation, future research should adopt an enhanced random sample while acquiring a relatively larger sample to increase reliability and validity of the research results.

REFERENCES


Diasporic Chinese Newspapers
Not for Diasporic Chinese?
A Case Study on Sing Tao Daily Australian Edition

Jack Kang Jie Liu

The Chinese diasporic newspapers are globally distributed, and are a special view in global media arena. This paper attempts to explore the role of diasporic Chinese newspapers by an example Sing Tao Daily Australian edition (ST). The case studies results show that ST played the information, bridging and integration roles, but did not achieve the vital role: local surveillance role. Published since 1856, Australian Chinese newspapers are a significant research topic. However, rare reference focuses on them. This paper examines what role ST plays by the four salient case studies: Wei Liao killing (a Chinese female student was raped and dropped from the balcony, 2008); Beijing Olympic Games (2008); Australian election (2007); exploitation of two Chinese workers (their employer took their annual salaries, 2007). Employing media role theories, this paper examines these reports by “information”, “integration”, “bridging” and “local surveillance” roles. The research results show 320 and 99 pieces of news in cases 2 and 3, which suggests that ST played the information role, and achieved the bridging (case 2) and integration roles (case 3). However, all news only describes the events and processes, and none reports the Australian Chinese people. Similar, all reports in cases 1 and 4 are simple descriptive news. No comment, exclusive or in-depth article was published. Overall, the daily did not publish insightful or analytical report and reveal the in-depth situations of Australian Chinese in all cases, so it played a limited “local surveillance role”.

Jack Kang Jie Liu is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Sydney who is currently working at the University of New South Wales (jack.liu@unsw.edu.au).
which is vital to diasporic Chinese people. Similarly, a comparison also found that the Chinese diasporic newspapers in the US and Europe lacked this role, which would affect their development in a competitive media environment.

**Keywords:** global communication, Australian Chinese newspapers, diasporic media, media role, surveillance

I “**Chinese Mental Food**”

1.1 “The Ignored Chinese Food”

Since the early 18th century, the Chinese have been scattered worldwide. In recent decades, increasingly Chinese people go abroad by different reasons, especially to North America, Europe and Australia. This causes the dissemination of Chinese food, which can be seen in many countries.

As a result of the Chinese diaspora, Chinese “mental food” can also be seen worldwide, which is the diasporic Chinese newspapers. While people in different continents taste “physical Chinese food”, the popular “Chinese mental food” [diasporic Chinese newspapers] receives little notice, including the notice of Chinese researchers.

At the global media arena, the Chinese diasporic newspapers are a special view. Figures from the Fifth Global Chinese Media Forum (Shanghai, 2009) show that more than 120 diasporic Chinese newspapers attended the forum. These include 40 from the US, each of 20 from Canada and Australia. The other Chinese diasporic newspapers came from 35 countries in South America, Europe, Africa and Asia. The quantity of the Chinese diasporic newspapers would be more than most other diasporic newspapers.

However, a search into 32 databases shows that there is a paucity of research on the Chinese diasporic newspapers. There is a lack of books specific in the Chinese diasporic [overseas] newspapers in both Chinese and English languages. Very few papers focus on this topic in Chinese. In terms of English papers [book chapters], there is some research in the US, including Yang (2008), Zhou (2006, 2002), Lin (2004), and Xu (2002). So and Lee (1995) also examine Canadian Chinese newspapers. But recently, rare relevant research emerges.

Reviewing the limited research on Chinese diasporic newspapers, scholars might generate a few puzzles: “what content do these newspapers publish? What role do they play in the diasporic Chinese communities? What are the characteristics among them?” This paper attempts to explore these puzzles by an example: the Chinese diasporic newspapers in Australia.
1.2. Chinese Diasporic Newspapers in Australia

“The Chinese in Australia, global diaspora in microfilm” (Sinclair, et al., 2001, p34). The Chinese people are one of the oldest diasporic groups in Australia, dated back to the earliest 18th century. In more than two centuries, the Chinese have made much contribution to Australia, and have experienced much hardship in Australia such as the White Australia Policy. Currently, the Chinese language speakers become the second largest language group only after the English speakers, according to the 2006 Australian Bureau of Statistics. However, many Chinese still encounter different hardships in Australia, such as unemployment, cultural shock, isolation and deliberate discrimination.

Australian Chinese newspapers are the products produced by diasporic Australian Chinese people. These newspapers can claim a number of “firsts”. The earliest bilingual (English and Chinese) newspaper worldwide, Chinese Advertiser, appeared in Ballarat (a town near Melbourne) in 1856 (Wang & Ryder, 1999). The Chinese newspapers had occupied the first position in Australian diasporic press arena in the 1940s. However, because of the White Australia Policy and decreasing Chinese people in Australia, Chinese newspapers ceased publication between 1957 and 1982. Until 1982, Australian Chinese newspapers have revived and experienced a prosperous period to present. Currently, there are 27 Chinese newspapers in Australia, occupying the largest proportion in Australian diasporic press market. In the global media arena, Australian Chinese newspapers take up the second position in the overseas Chinese newspapers market (Liu, 2010).

In terms of Australian Chinese newspapers, Sing Tao Daily Australian edition (ST) is special. After the “blank” from 1957 to 1981, Sing Tao Media Group launched its Australian edition in 1982. This heralded a new era of Australian Chinese newspapers. After that, contemporary Chinese newspapers have constantly appeared in Australia (Liu, 2010).

Sing Tao Media Group is an international Chinese media group whose headquarter is located in Hong Kong. Established since 1938, ST Media Group has had a long history in Hong Kong, and it had a close relationship with the Chinese National Party. However, some Chinese Communist Party members infiltrated the paper office. On Oct 1 1949, ST headlined for the establishment of the People’s Republic China. When Guangzhou was occupied by the People Liberation Army on Oct 10 1949, the paper published a piece of long news titled “Guangzhou dawn!” (Xie, Zhu & Yue, 2010). In 2004, Sing Tao Media Group was sold to the Group to Mr. Charles Ho. Mr. Ho is the “king” of tobacco industry in Hong Kong, and is one of the members of the National Political Consultative Congress of China. ST has many contacts with CCP, although it is a “liberal newspaper”. Currently, ST group has established six branches worldwide, including in Australia.

ST Australian edition has experienced a stable development from 1982 to the present. The newspaper office locates in the downtown of Sydney. There are more than 50 staff members in this newspaper, including approximately 20 editing staff. There are only a few
professional journalists. These editing staff members are basically from Hong Kong or mainland China. Some have had more than one decade experience, while the others only started to work in the media industry in recent years.

While maintaining the traditional kinship with Hong Kong, ST Australian edition has established a relationship with mainland China. For example, some large Chinese companies advertise in the daily, and this daily can also obtain invitations when Chinese high-profile members visit Australia. Since 2006, ST has published 36 pages in a weekday edition, including news, advertisements and entertainment. In terms of this content, the news section occupies more than 20%. In this case, this paper pays special attention to the news section in the daily.

II RESEARCH QUESTIONS, THEORIES AND METHOD

2.1 Research Framework

A reference search shows that there is a paucity of the research on Australian Chinese newspapers. Except for Liu (2010), 32 databases only found five pieces of scholarly work, four of which only address these newspapers before 1957. The last paper theoretically discusses the relations between Chinese newspapers and communities in the history and present in Australia, but did not provide details on contemporary newspapers (Sun, et al., 2011).

Because of limited research on this topic, this paper has to establish a research framework including research questions, theories and methodology. First, what are the fundamental questions for this paper? In relation to the “puzzles” in section 1, three questions would be crucial: “what content do Australian Chinese newspapers publish? What role do these newspapers play in Australian Chinese people? What characteristics do these newspapers show among the other diasporic Chinese newspapers?” This paper intends to explore these questions by an example, Sing Tao Daily Australian edition (ST).

Theoretical discussions on media content and role are abundant. A few scholars consider that media content and role can not be separated, and media content is one the best indicators for media role. Shoemaker and Reese (1996, p27) contend: “Media content is the basis of media impact...It is, for the most part, open and accessible for study - the most obvious part of the mass communication process - unlike the behind-the-scenes decisions made by producers, writers, and editors and the behaviors of media consumers.” These two scholars further explain the relationships between media content and role: “Communications content is of interest not only in its own right, but also as an indicator of many other underlying forces” (ibid., p27). Based on Shoemaker and Reese’s viewpoints, media content is a “mirror” reflecting media roles (“underlying forces”), and is one of the most suitable and
essential indicators for media role.

Because there are some differences between diasporic media and mainstream media (Georgiou, 2005), this paper should choose a suitable theoretical framework. Since the early 20th century, scholars have expressed various viewpoints on the role of diasporic media. In terms of these scholars, Stamm’s framework is systematic. Stamm (1985) defines a few “gaps” and “roles” for minorities [diasporic communities] and their newspapers. He proposes that minorities would encounter “information, bridging and integration gaps” in the mainstream society. Initially, Stamm suggests that minorities/diasporic people would encounter an “information gap” in a mainstream society, as they have different information need for their living and work. Hence, their newspapers should play a role in providing information for them. Subsequently, because diasporic people have many contacts with their homelands, they do need homeland information, their newspapers resemble a “bridge” and provide homeland messages for them. Finally, surviving in a “new land”, diasporic people need to learn some “rules” of this society and integrate into the society. Therefore, their newspapers should play the “information, bridging and integration roles” for them. Because Stamm’s opinion is systematic, this paper will obtain and discuss his framework in the following section.

However, Stamm omits an important role - media surveillance role, which Lasswell (1969) and many other scholars (e.g. Wilson & Gutierrez, 1985) regard as a vital role for media. Overall, these four roles (information, bridging, integration, and surveillance roles) can cover most functions that a diasporic newspaper achieves (except for entertainment and advertising). As a result, this paper will review the theoretical discussions and the media practices on these four media roles as follows.

2.2 Four Media Roles in Diasporic Newspaper Background

(1) Information Role

The information role is one of the most fundamental roles for diasporic newspapers. After examining the US community newspapers, Stamm (1985) regards the information role as crucial in community media. “If you are considering a move to a different locale, your initial tie to the place might be through reading issues of the local newspapers (Stamm, 1985, p21).” Similarly, Husbands holds a same attitude: “minority media are both ‘for’ and ‘by’ minorities, perform a crucial function for ethno-cultural minorities, who experience a great need of information about their native country and their country of settlement” (Husbands, 1998, p29).

Likewise, Kim (1985) observes that Korean community in Australia. Korean migrants have different information needs in a host country that the mainstream media can not provide, but their local Korean newspapers offer this message for them. In addition, examining Russian and Arabic newspapers in Israel, the researchers found: “The minority
media cater to the immediate needs for information and surveillance of the specific group of migrants, especially in the early transition period of settling down” (Adoni, Caspi & Cohen, 2006, p21). Similarly, Ogan describes the Turkish ethnic media in Holland as “a companion”, offering specific information for Turkish migrants (Ogan, 2001).

In the US, Zhou, Chen and Cai (2006) show a same example. A 60-year-old US Chinese man who is very familiar with current issues, and he acknowledged that it is the contribution of the Chinese language newspapers. Liu summarizes that the first function of the Philadelphia Chinese newspapers is “distributing information” (Liu, 2010, p256). Consequently, the information role is a fundamental role for diasporic media.

(2) Bridging Role
Since they appeared, diasporic media have been given the function linking diasporic people with their homeland. Since the early 20th century, many scholars have discussed the bridging role in diasporic media. Park (1922) observes a multitude of news from their hometowns in the US diasporic press. This includes the homeland news in the German, Italian and French newspapers in the US. Reviewing the European diasporic newspapers in the US, Martin summarizes: “What role does the ethnic press play in the life of European ethnic groups today? Similar to its position a century ago, it is concerned with maintaining the cultural ties with the immigrant’s country of origin…… The ethnic press, in a way, is a bridge between the past [hometown] and the future [host country]” (Martin, 1980, p240).

Some editors in Australian diasporic newspapers hold the same idea. Four of six Chinese newspaper editors consider that the second goal of their newspapers is “to inform/educate readers about homeland events” (Pe-Pua, Morrissey & Mitchell, 1994, p97). The researchers also found that “the sample of newspapers analyzed has served more to fill the gap in homeland topics not covered by the English press” (ibid., p97).

Likewise, Zhou and Cai (2002, p437) observe this role in the US Chinese press: “It [US Chinese newspapers] also does the usual thing — keeping immigrants in close contact with the homeland, thus easing the psychological and emotional problems of being a foreigner. New migrants are concerned with what goes on in the original homeland as well as in the US society, how homeland politics and economy affect their families and friends who are left behind, and how events or policies developed in the homeland”.

As Stamm (1985) states: diasporic/community press can be a transport, linking the “geographic boundaries” between the community members and their homelands. The above examples suggest that the bridging role is an identical role for diasporic newspapers.

(3) Integration Role
More than a century ago, Robert Park (1922) has observed the integration role in the diasporic press. Afterwards, “the thinking of Park was later formulated in what we will call the ‘community integration’ hypothesis of Morris Janowitz” (Stamm, 1985, p4). Janowitz
views the (diasporic) community newspapers as a tool that helps the individuals to integrate into their residential community. This includes: “(1) adjustment to institution and facilities; (2) democratizing prestige; (3) defining rights and privileges of local community (versus) the metropolitan community; (4) extension of personal and social contacts” (Janowitz, 1952, p73).

Later, the researchers in different countries also point out the integration role of ethnic/diasporic newspapers. After studying Germany newspapers in the US, Carl Witte (1957) concludes that these media played a part in integrating the German migrants into US society. In Australia, Gilson and Zubrzycki examine more than 70 diasporic newspapers in 28 languages from the mid 19th century to the 1960s. One of the findings is that: “[diasporic press] provides a most valuable instrument of cultural, social, political and economic integration” (Gilson & Zubrzycki, 1965, p164).

Currently, the integration function is still overt in both Australian and the US diasporic media. In Australia, four Chinese newspaper editors including one from Sing Tao consider: the most important goal of the newspapers is the integration role — “to inform/educate readers about Australia” (Pe-Pua, Morrissey & Mitchell, 1994). In the US, Xu examines the front pages of The China Press west coast edition by content analysis, and summarizes that “there were more assimilation-fostering content [integration] than culture-preserving content on the first page of the regional section” (Xu, 2002, p5).

Based on the above discussions, the integration role has been one of the most noticeable roles of the diasporic media since a century ago, and a number of scholars have found and discussed this role by theoretical and practical aspects. As Cormack (2007, p55) writes: “minority media can meld people into a sense of a large community”.

(4) Local surveillance role

Surveillance role has been regarded as one of the most important roles in mass media including diasporic newspapers from the 1960s to present. Initially, Harold Lasswell regards the surveillance function as a vital role for media. He clearly states the first function of media: “Surveillance of the environment, disclosing threats and opportunities affecting the value position of the community and of the component parts within it” (Lasswell, 1969, p118).

Lasswell’s opinion on media surveillance has had an extensive impact. After the 1980s, some scholars still agree with him. Wilson and Gutierrez (1985, p38) consider that “the role of news transmission is to reflect the realities of societal well-being by alerting it to dangers within and without and by providing an agenda of issues for consideration”. Similarly, Wright (1986, p38) states: “Mass media provide warning about imminent threats and dangers in the world.”

After studying the Chinese newspapers in Philadelphia, Liu summarizes five roles. Three of these five roles are relevant to the surveillance on local community and people:
Kang Liu  

Diasporic Chinese Newspapers Not for Diasporic Chinese?

“warning the community”, “empowering the people”, and “functioning as a forum for individual opinions [of Chinese people]” (Liu, 2010, p256).

Consequently, this paper coins the term “local surveillance role”, which refers that Australian Chinese newspapers should detect and disclose the real and in-depth stories of Australian Chinese people, especially their unfavorable situations, rather than only transmit simple information to the audience.

After reviewing the above theoretical discussions, this section will provide some media practices on the local surveillance role. A Spanish language newspaper in US can serve as a positive example. *Que Pasa* is “an extremely successful Spanish-language newspaper” (Lauterer, 2006, p330) in the Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill area of North Carolina. This paper states: “Our corporate culture is based on the belief that devotion to serving our community will lead to solvency. Our commitment is to content, so every one is an eye and ear…we need to be able to breathe and sweat with the community we serve” (ibid., p330). The newspaper does not simply transmit the local problems in their reports. “We must also try to understand the questions and have the answers for what is coming next” (ibid., p331).

Nevertheless, opposite to the above cases, some diasporic newspapers play a limited local surveillance roles. Tenezakis (1983) reviews Arabic and Greek newspapers in Australia, revealing that the coverage given to migrants’ community welfare in Australia is extremely poor. This means that these newspapers did not perform a powerful local surveillance role.

Similarly, Lin’s research shows that the Chinese newspapers in California rarely focused on the local Chinese and played a limited local surveillance role. Lin (2004) observes the limited reports on the local Chinese in these newspapers. This paucity exists in three levels: regional, county, and neighborhood news. As a result, Lin (2004) questions: can the Chinese papers offer more stories about the local Chinese in California?

Australian Chinese newspapers show a similarity with the above examples. None of Australian Chinese press spoke for the Chinese when the White Australia policy was being formulated (Poon, 1995; Fitzgerald, 1996). Pe-Pua, Morrissey and Mitchell (1994) survey six editors from *Sing Tao Daily, Australian Chinese Daily, Daily Chinese Herald, Tide, Brisbane Community News*, and *United Chinese Times*. Only one editor from *Daily Chinese Herald* selected the item: “to express the community’s concerns and views”.

Overall, the above section examined the typical four role played by diasporic newspapers. Actually, media role closely links with media ownership. As Fortunato (2005) investigates, media ownership provides deliberate and overt impacts on media content. In other words, both mainstream and diasporic media are controlled by their owners. So, what role media play depends on their owners and media orientations.
2.3 Research Method

This paper chooses case study method to explore the above media role in ST. Hancock and Algozzine (2007) consider case study is a useful method for investigating media role. They propose a few processes for case study. Researchers carefully review and select “appropriate examples” that can represent the whole research objectives, and they ascertain these examples, and attempt to reveal the general trends and characteristics (Hancock & Algozzine, 2007).

Based on their opinion, two standards for selecting cases are as follows. 1, these events should have extensive impacts on the Australian Chinese society; 2, these events should be influential in both the Australian society and the international community. Then this research can discern what particular information ST provides to the local Chinese, and what role ST plays in relation to Australia and the homeland.

Then, the researcher examined ST between 2000 and 2009, and the result suggests that a number of significant events occurred between 2007 and 2008, which can become suitable examples to ascertain the newspaper role. Consequently, this paper selected the period between 2007 and 2008 as research example. After a further review on the main news pages (2007-2008), and a comparison with The Sydney Morning Herald (SMH) and The Daily Telegraph (DT), this paper eventually chose four significant cases as follows: The Wei Liao killing; The 2008 Olympic Games; The 2007 Australian election; The exploitation of two skilled workers. This paper will closely examine the reports on these four cases and how they reflect the media role in next sections.

III FOUR CASE STUDIES

Case Study 1 (2008): The Wei Liao killing

This case study examines the content and role in the Wei Liao killing case. A review on ST between October 2008 and April 2009 found 12 pieces of news reporting this case, as a table below shows. These reports provide detailed information on the event, but there is a lack of analytical, exclusive or in-depth article. This suggests that the daily only played the information role, while lacked the local surveillance role.

Table 1 shows that ST provided abundant content on this case from the beginning to the end in detail. However, an analysis suggests that the daily did not concern about Australian Chinese in two aspects. The first aspect is the limitation of language and mood. The headline on October 30 is: “Four people suffered from ‘naked-pig’ sexual attack”. “Naked-pig (      )” is a Cantonese slang and means naked, which is used in informal and funning scenarios. Therefore, this slang used here does not respect and compassion the
victims. In addition, the mood in these reports can be more dynamic. The mood in all news is neutral. But actually, this event was a young countrywoman that underwent unbearable humiliation and died in a strange land. Therefore, the language style in some articles could be stronger, including a condemnation on the murderer.

The second aspect is a lack of insightful articles on the security issue of the Australian Chinese people. Table 1 shows no analytical, exclusive or conclusive reports in the daily until April 2009. Actually, a few similar tragedies took place before. For example, in November 2007, Jiao Dan, a female Chinese student, was raped and strangled to death in Perth at night. Jing, a PhD candidate, encountered a robbery at night in Sydney in December.

Table 1 The reports on case 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Articles</th>
<th>Words</th>
<th>Locations</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oct 27</td>
<td>A pair of lovers fell down from balcony and one died.</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>middle page 1</td>
<td>Photo: the balcony that Wei fell down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 28</td>
<td>The Chinese and Korean lover dropped from the balcony</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>headline page 1</td>
<td>2 photos: the balcony, Wei’s flatmate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 29</td>
<td>Much feedback on this tragedy</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>middle page 1</td>
<td>5 photos: Wei (2), the balcony, flowers on the spot, her classmates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 30</td>
<td>1, Four students suffered from “naked-pig” sexual attack 1 hour 2, Wei was enthusiastic about living</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>headline middle-right page 1</td>
<td>3 photos: the murderer (2), Wei and her boyfriend (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 31</td>
<td>The murderer was accused of 21 charges</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>headline page 1</td>
<td>2 photos: the parents, and the murderer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 3</td>
<td>Wei’s mother attempted to apply for compensation</td>
<td>980</td>
<td>headline page 1</td>
<td>1 photo, Wei’s parents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 4</td>
<td>The mother hoped to establish a foundation to alert overseas students in Australia</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>middle page 1</td>
<td>No photo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 5</td>
<td>Wei called “000” three times before</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>down right page 1</td>
<td>No photo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 6</td>
<td>The funeral will be held</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>middle page 2</td>
<td>No photo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 7</td>
<td>Wei said Australia is safe</td>
<td>1,120</td>
<td>headline page 1</td>
<td>1 photo: Wei’s parents in funeral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 8</td>
<td>More than one thousand people farewell Wei</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>headline page 1</td>
<td>3 photos: Wei’s classmates, parents and the funeral</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2006. After four years of diligent studies, Jing was going to graduate. However, he died in this attack. In 2007, four gangsters bashed Dr. Cao without any reason at a Melbourne train station, two murderers trampled on Cao’s head and caused his death.

Because a number of these events had occurred before, ST should not simply report the Wei Liao case, but reveal their insightful stories on this issue. In other words, ST should fulfill a strong local surveillance role. For example, the daily can summarize the reasons and characteristics of these cases, and provide some recommendations to the Australian Chinese people. This is to prevent the similar tragedy happens again. These recommendations can comprise different aspects for female students and night workers. ST can also organize a reader discussion in the newspaper, summarizing readers’ opinions to improve the security awareness of Australian Chinese people. Finally, the daily can publish some editorial, declaiming the legal rights of Australian Chinese people. However, all of these analytical reports and recommendations were not seen. Finally, a comparison was conducted between ST and SMH/DT, and all news content on this event in ST can be found in the other two dailies.

In relation to the theoretical discussions in Section 2, Lasswell (1969) proposes that the media should surveil the society and inform “dangers” to their passengers (community members). Alia (2005) also comments that diasporic/ethnic media should reveal the hardships of their community and provide practicable message for their community members. Contradictive to these scholars, ST did not publish in-depth, exclusive and analytical articles on this tragedy for the Australian Chinese, which suggests that the daily did not play the local surveillance role and only fulfilled the information role by publishing 12 articles on this event.

Case Study 2 (2008): The 2008 Olympic Games

A review on the issues in August 2008 found 419 articles on the Olympic Games, shown in Table 2 below. An analysis on these reports shows that ST provided abundant information on this event, and achieved the information and bridging roles. But limited content on Australian Chinese suggests a weak local surveillance role in the daily.

Table 2 demonstrates ST published three types of articles: news, features, and comments. While general news reports daily events, features describe significant events such as the opening/closing ceremonies, Michael Phelps winning eight gold medals. When the Chinese “Flyman” Liu Xiang withdrew from the Games, the daily published four features by different angles. Comments basically focus on the specific games. For example, a comment criticizes the mainland Chinese football team, because of their awful performance. Unlike The Epoch Times, no negative reports were published on the Games in ST. In other words, all articles in ST are the positive or neutral reports.

Although the daily offered plentiful Olympic news, Table 2 shows that 319 reports in
these 320 articles are not closely related to the Australian Chinese people. Two disadvantages can be found in these reports. The first disadvantage is a lack of reports on Australian Chinese athletes. An excellent Chinese Australian athlete, Melissa Wu, a diving talent, won a silver medal on 12 August. She was a student of a prestigious mainland Chinese coach. Wu can be a successful example for Australian Chinese people. But ST only published a piece of brief news on her without any detailed information. In addition, did the other Australian Chinese athletes participate in the Games? The daily did not cover this.

The second disadvantage is that the daily did not publish exclusive or insightful article linking the Australian Chinese with the Games. For example, did Australian Chinese feel proud of or ignore these Games? How did Australian Chinese people view the Games? All these reports can not be found in the daily. Additionally, there was no editorial in the daily, pointing out the meaning of the Olympic Games to China or Australian Chinese people. The above two disadvantages are contradicted to some scholars’ opinions. For instance, Lauterer (2006) coins an expression “ruthless local” for his book title, and emphasizes that local community press should play a role in revealing the stories of their community members. The limited reports on the local Chinese suggest that ST did not fulfill their media role on localness.

On the other hand, Table 2 shows 253 reports on the Chinese athletes. Why did this
daily provide much homeland news rather than the news reporting Australian Chinese people? This is related to the newspaper ownership. Fortunato (2005) points out that ownership is one of most crucial factors providing significant or deliberate impacts on media content. Because of the Hong Kong Handover, Hong Kong has been under the control by China since the Hong Kong handover. This provides deliberate impacts on the Hong Kong media groups including their branches. Therefore, Hong Kong media, including there branches, have to be “obedient” under this control (Fung, 2003). In addition, because the group owner’s background (Mr. Ho is one of the members of the National Political Consultative Congress of China), ST has to create some positive images on China. Especially, the Olympic Games were a large event for the country. In this case, the daily had to publish a number of Olympic news (positive and neutral news).

In summary, the 320 articles offered diverse and plentiful messages of the Olympic Games, which show the information role in the daily. The reports on the homeland are remarkably more than on Australia, and the Australian Chinese can know what occurred in China by these reports. This is the bridging role, connecting diasporic people with their country (Martin, 1980). However, the scarcity of news on Australian Chinese people suggests the limited local surveillance role in the daily.

**Case Study 3 (2007): The Reports on the 2007 Australian Election**

This case study explores the reports of the 2007 Australian election in three aspects: content, political inclination and role. An analysis on these reports suggests three characteristics as follows. The daily provided abundant information on this event, and some reports deliberately support the Labor Party. However, there is no article linking Australian Chinese people with the election.

Table 3 shows that ST offered plentiful and diverse reports on the Australian election, and 99 reports appeared in the different styles. A review on the content suggests two kinds of articles in these reports: general news and significant event reports. While general news is responsible for the party leaders’ activities, significant event reports cover the large or important events. For instance, the daily allocated a headline for the congresses of the Liberal and Labor Parties in the election final stage.

The report quantity and “editing language” demonstrate a “political inclination” of the daily. Regarding report quantity, Table 3 shows only four pieces of negative reportage on the Labor Party, but 13 negative reports on the Liberal Party. There are 10 positive reports on the Labor Party but only two on the Liberal Party. Regarding “editing language”, ST published four headlines for the Labor Party in the most crucial period (18 - 23 November). The large red headline on 17/18 November was “John Howard spent millions of money but still failed in the election promotion” This half-page news is obviously negative on the Liberal Party. The large red headlines continued: November 19: “The election goes to the
final stage, and the news poll appreciates Kevin Rudd’s; November 21: “60% voters believe Labor can win”; November 22: “Labor can fasten Australian development”. The quantity and content of these reports indicate that the daily deliberately supported the Labor Party, and promoted the party to the Australian Chinese people.

However, Table 3, especially ACP column, shows that none article covers the Australian Chinese people. For instance, which party did more Chinese prefer? What were the differences between young and old Chinese migrants in voting? What benefits would Australian Chinese obtain if the Labor or Liberal Party won? None of the news was interviewed and investigated. As well, no comment or editorial discusses the politic position of contemporary Chinese in the Australian society. Finally, a comparison was conducted between ST and SMH/DT, and all electoral reports in ST can be found in the other two dailies.

In here, a further question is: why the daily provided such high amount election news? This is related to the newspaper’s orientation and benefits. First, the ST editor confirms that the most important goal of the daily is the integration role - “to inform/educate readers about
Australia” (Pe-Pua, et al., 1994). Because of their target, the daily published a number of Australian news and intended to help the Australian Chinese people to melt into the mainstream society. Especially, the Australian election is a fundamental Australian political and social system, which provides significant impacts on the Australian society. Therefore, ST published considerable electoral reports.

Furthermore, the political inclination in these reports shows that the daily intended to “integrate into” the Australian political arena. Adoni et al., (2006) discuss the importance of political involvement of diasporic media. To survive in a new land, diasporic media should obtain assistance from governments, including policy and financial assistance. Therefore, they deliberately support a political party. Franklin, Court and Cushion (2006) observe the British community newspapers played a role in the British election, they all published articles providing overt or deliberate support to their parties. ST shows a similarity with the above examples.

Overall, the daily published 99 articles on the 2007 Australian election, which indicates the information role. These reports promote the election, a fundamental Australian social system, to the Australian Chinese people, which suggests an integration role. Nevertheless, the daily did not publish any report linking Australian Chinese people with the election, which suggests a limited local surveillance role.

Case Study 4 (2007): The Exploitation of Two Chinese Skilled Workers

This case study investigates how ST reported the exploitation of two Chinese skilled workers. An examination on the issues between September 2007 and March 2008 found seven reports on this event, as the table below shows. An analysis suggests that the daily played the information role in this event. However, it paid limited attention to the Chinese skilled workers in Australia, which indicates the inadequate local surveillance role.

ST reported this case in details. The first news covers that the salaries of the two Chinese skilled workers, Gong and Wang, were taken by their employer Frank Huang. They had no living expense and faced the expatriation by the Department of Immigration; so they asked for help on “accommodation, salary, and visas” (news on September 15/16). Subsequently, their visas were cancelled by the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (September 18). But these two workers joined in the petition of Australian Workers’ Union in Canberra, and obtained the “bridging visas” and the support from the Workers Union, waiting for the final result of court (September 20). The news on October 28 reveals that the court investigated this event. The final news on December 18 reports that the case was settled out of the court. But the daily did not disclose the final result. In addition, Table 4 shows no editorial, comment or recommendation in this case. Finally, a comparison was conducted between ST and SMH/DT, and all reports on this event in ST were seen in the other two dailies.
An analysis found a disadvantage on these reports is that the daily should have paid more attention to the local Australian Chinese including these skilled workers. Increasingly Chinese workers are employed in Australia. Unlike skilled migrants and overseas students, many skilled workers have not mastered fluent English. Therefore, they encounter more difficulties and cultural shocks in Australia, and do not know how to protect themselves by law. For example, on October 31, 2006, ST had reported that a Melbourne publishing company did not pay four Chinese workers’ outstanding salaries A$94,000.

To some degree, the Chinese skilled workers in Australia may be similar to the Chinese migrant workers in Chinese cities. In China, most migrant workers also encounter a number of difficulties in cities. Some mainland Chinese newspapers have established a column for “migrant workers”. The columns in the newspapers disclose their hardships and unfair treatments. When the difficulties of these workers are reported by these newspapers, these papers also obtain more audience. If ST could have established a column for these skilled workers, their unfavorable situations could have been unveiled in public, and they might know and avoid this issue. Therefore, ST may take into account in this way.

In summary, ST published seven articles on this case and revealed that the Chinese encounter illegal treatment in Australia. This is the information role. However, all news simply covered the processes. Wilson and Gutierrez (1985, p146) consider that “the role of news transmission is to reflect the realities of societal well-being by alerting it to dangers
within and without and by providing an agenda of issues for consideration”. Opposite to these two scholars, the daily paid insufficient attention to reveal the “dangers” to the skilled workers, which suggests a limited local surveillance role.

**IV FROM ST TO THE OTHER DIASPORIC CHINESE NEWSPAPERS**

**4.1 Limited Local Surveillance Role in ST**

Answering the first two research questions, the four case studies suggest that ST played three roles. The plentiful content on these four events shows the information role. The daily provided much messages on the 2007 Australian election, a fundamental Australian political system, to the Australian Chinese. This is the integration role. The daily also published considerable reports on the 2008 Olympic Games, connecting the diasporic Chinese audience with their homeland, which is the bridging role.

However, except for a piece of short news on Melissa Wu, no article reports the Chinese in Australia in case 2 and case 3. Most importantly, no editorial, comment, insightful, analytical article or recommendation was published in all cases. Therefore, the daily did not achieve local surveillance role.

In relation to the theoretical discussions in section 2, the research results match Stamm’s framework and some scholars’ discussions on these three roles. In other words, ST “filled” in the three gaps (information, bridging and integration gaps proposed by Stamm, 1985) and played these three roles. However, the research results can not sustain the other scholars’ opinions on the local surveillance role, including Lasswell (1969), Wilson and Gutierrez (1985) and Wright (1986). In addition, the limited local surveillance role seems to become a common deficiency for the Chinese newspapers in Australia (Fitzgerald, 1996; Poon, 1995; Pe-Pua, Morrissey and Mitchell (1994).

In here, a question should be briefly reviewed: why this daily emphasized bridging and integration roles but neglected the local surveillance role? As Fortunato (2005) investigates, newspapers work for their owners’ benefits and orientations. ST has a close relationship with China, so it published considerable homeland news. In other words, it is the influence from homeland political economy on their overseas Chinese newspapers. Because of its integration orientation, the daily published considerable electoral reports and promoted the Labor Party. This is also because the daily has to be “involved into” the Australian Chinese political arena for their survival.

Although ST played the three roles, the local surveillance role is most important to Australian Chinese people and communities, and the daily itself. A further analysis on media competition recommends Australian Chinese newspapers to enforce this role.

The information and bridging functions can be substituted by the Internet in some
situations, because Australian Chinese people can easily obtain the homeland news online. The integration role can also be substituted by the English media in some situations. The 2006 figures of ABS (Australian Bureau of Statistic) show that a large proportion of Australian Chinese people have mastered the basic English, so they can use the English language media. However, the Australian Chinese people do hope that their newspapers can perform the local surveillance role. First, many audiences hope that they can be respected and reported (Abercrombie & Longhurst, 1998; Mcquail, 1997). Especially, as the case studies show, many Australian Chinese people encounter the hardships such as employment and security problems. They do anticipate that their own media can publish their in-depth stories and offer assistance.

On the other hand, the English language media is unlikely to frequently report the stories of Australian Chinese people and communities, because these media focus on the mainstream community. Although some Australian Chinese people can express their hardships online, the Internet may have the credibility problems. However, the newspaper journalists can investigate and summary these events and publish in-depth reports. Therefore, Australian Chinese newspapers are the most suitable media channel to perform the local surveillance role, which is also the advantage that newspapers compete with the other media.

4.2. Limited Local Surveillance Role in the Other Chinese Diasporic Newspapers

The Chinese diasporic newspapers are very diverse in different areas, and it is impossible to conclude a “formula” for them. However, this paper attempts to answer the third research question by the comparisons among ST and the other Chinese diasporic newspapers. The results show a commonalty of these newspapers: they published insufficient news on the local Chinese people and played a limited local surveillance role. These include the Chinese newspapers in Australia, the US and Europe.

The first comparison is among the Chinese newspapers in Australia. A scrutiny was conducted on Australian Chinese Daily, Daily Chinese Herald, Epoch Times and Sing Tao Daily (2006-2008) by survey, content analysis, and case study. These four dailies are major Chinese dailies in Australia. The examinations suggest that they published insufficient news reporting the Chinese in Australia, and did not set up content category for them. Furthermore, most reports are negative without in-depth analysis. This shows a weak local surveillance is the same predominant flaw of major Australian Chinese newspapers (Liu, 2012).

The second comparison is among the Chinese newspapers in North America and Europe. Similar to the Australian four Chinese dailies, the US Chinese newspapers have been criticized for having rarely reported on the local Chinese in the US since the 1970s (McCue, 1975; Chen, 1992). Currently, Lin’s research can become an example.

Lin looked into the US Californian Chinese newspapers, and found that they rarely
focused on the local Chinese and played a limited local surveillance role, as the table below (Lin, 2004, p116) shows the paucity of regional, county, and neighborhood news (emphasized by Italic style) on the US Chinese. As a result, Lin (2004) questions the local surveillance role in these newspapers, and she suggests: can the Chinese papers offer more stories about the local Chinese in California? (See Table 2-1)

Similarly, Nyiri and Saveliev also found the content homogenization of the diasporic Chinese newspapers: “these papers share much of their content with each other and with publications……resulting in a standardization of content, style, and layout” (Nyiri & Saveliev, 2002, p306).

In the 2007 and 2009 Global Chinese Media Forum, a number of participants also revealed that many contemporary Chinese overseas newspapers paid insufficient attention to the local Chinese people, and that the content in different newspapers was similar. The US and European Chinese newspapers can serve as the examples, as they mainly translated the articles from the local media and their Chinese media partners, but the reports on the local Chinese were scarce.

In conclusion, the research results indicate that the paper title (Diasporic Chinese newspapers not for diasporic Chinese) is not completely sustainable, because at least ST, as well as the other diasporic Chinese newspapers, provide information to the overseas Chinese people, and played the information, bridging or integration role.

However, a combination of all the above research results and comparisons shows: insufficient reports on the diasporic Chinese and weak local surveillance role are a predominant disadvantage of many Chinese diasporic newspapers. As discussed in section 2, the diasporic Chinese people do need their media to disclose their hardships and unfavorable situations. Therefore, strengthen the local surveillance role, concentrate on local Chinese communities and reveal in-depth stories of the diasporic Chinese, would be the best
method of these newspapers to attract readers and obtain their support.

On the other hand, the “Scripps Newspapers Chain” in the US history could be a lesson for the diasporic Chinese newspapers. Because of the lack of local content, “Scripps Newspapers Empire” eventually vanished (Adams & Baldasty, 2001). Chinese diasporic newspapers also confront the challenge of the other media channels especially the Internet. Provided that Australian Chinese newspapers continue to neglect this role, it is likely that they would lose the competition with the Internet and the mainstream media.

REFERENCES


TRANSNATIONAL NEWS MEDIA ROLE IN BUILDING CONSENSUS ABOUT COMMUNITIES

Vanessa de Macedo Higgins Joyce

The increased spread and adoption of transnational news media as source of information of worldwide events can influence people’s perception of important issues and communities. In Europe, people used transnational media for news about the attacks of September 11 in the US, and this impacted how they perceived and felt about the Muslim community. This study focused on how transnational news media reduced differences among opposing demographic subgroups in Europe in how they perceived the Muslim community following the events of 9-11, conducting a second level, agenda-setting analysis. It found support for increased consensus on how people perceived that community for those using transnational television, especially between men and women, but found weaker support for the influence of transnational press. Differences arise within the comparison of the 15 EU countries and the specific demographic analyzed.

Keywords: transnationalism, consensus building, agenda setting, news media, Europe

On September 11, 2001, terrorists launched a major attack on American soil, hijacking airplanes which subsequently stroked The World Trade Center, the Pentagon and rural Pennsylvania. Across the Atlantic, in Europe, people closely followed the developing events through the lenses of the news media. They accessed national and transnational news media for information about the attacks and its consequences for their countries and

Vanessa de Macedo Higgins Joyce is an assistant professor of journalism in the Meadows School of the Arts at Southern Methodist University (vhigginsjoyce@smu.edu).
themselves. This study explores the influences that transnational news media reporting about 9-11 had on European population. In particular, it focuses on the consensus building function of agenda setting, on how transnational television and press built a dialogue among European Union individuals with different demographic characteristics. It focuses on how these news media brought opposing demographic groups closer together in how they thought about the Muslim and Arab communities in the aftermath of 9-11.

Agenda-setting theory has demonstrated that media often have powerful effects in what people know and think about, and how they think about it. This study conducts a second level agenda-setting analysis of the presentation of information about terrorism as it related to the events of 9-11. It analyzes the consensus formed, as a consequence of agenda setting, within European Union population as they accessed information about the events in America and its consequences in Europe.

Most agenda-setting studies, and media studies in general, restrict their analysis of the flow of media influence to a local or national level. They analyze the influence of city, state or national media on that population’s thoughts, feelings and actions. Some studies within the international communication arena have compared media effects cross-nationally, although the locus of the analysis is still primarily nation-bound. They analyze the effects of media from one country on that country’s population, and compare it to media effects of a second country on that second country’s population. Although these level of analyses are important and yield essential contributions to the understanding of communication effects, they overlook an emerging source of influence, that of transnational media.

This study expands on previous agenda-setting studies by conducting an analysis of the consensus building function of media produced outside the national boundaries of the country (transnational media). Recent technological advancements, coupled with political and economical circumstances, increased people’s access to communication and news media across national boundaries. There is a need for a deeper understanding of where media influences are originating from, locally, nationally and transnationally.

Communication studies tackling transnationalism have usually analyzed the influence of media in a micro-level analysis, many of those concerned with the diasporic audience (King & Wood, 2001; Bailey, Georgiou & Harindranath, 2007). This study expands on previous literature by conducting a macro, survey-based, analysis of a general population exposed to transnational media.

**Consensus Building Function of Mass Media As a Consequence of Agenda Setting**

Harold Lasswell (1960) described the basic functions of the communication process performed by mass media as surveillance of the environment, transmission of social heritage...
and correlation of societal groups in responding to the environment. Within this last function, correlation, mass media potentially function to aid mobilization and prevent threats to social stability by connecting different groups of society in response to the environment, or more properly a pseudo-environment. The news media then, by presenting a limited set of issues and a particular representation of these issues, function to provide agreement on important issues and a general perception of how to understand those issues. These presentations by the news media provide a common ground on which divergent groups of society may deliberate and discuss (Shaw & Martin, 1992; McCombs, 1997).

The concept of consensus is used in this present study to describe general agreement on specific issues and attributes of those issues. This study does not argue that consensus would be achieved at all times, nor that it is completely universal. Nor does it argue that people would have the same reasoning for achieving such consensus or that this building of consensus would result in people having the same solutions for how these issues should be acted upon. It is a thesis of this study, though, that the news media can function as a bridge between different segments of society to provide common ground for deliberation on the issues of the time.

Consensus building is explained under the scope of agenda-setting theory, as one of its consequences. Agenda setting at its first-level states that the news media’s presentation of the news, in its given importance, emphasis and salience will influence the public’s opinion of the prominence of those issues (McCombs, 2004). Through the selection and emphasis on certain issues, while de-emphasizing others, the news media present to the public a hierarchy of importance of issues of the time, which is then transferred to the public’s perception that those are, indeed, the issues of importance of the day. The news media’s agenda of issues sets the public’s agenda of issues. First level agenda setting can be summarized by Bernard Cohen’s much cited statement that the press “may not be successful in telling its readers what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about” (Cohen, 1963, p. 13).

Demographics are generally applied in media studies and social science studies in general, to highlight differences in a social phenomenon. Studies of the consensus building consequence of agenda setting assume that these diverse demographic groups in society are different and look for circumstances, such as news media use, when these differences are reduced. The differences in attitudes and opinions between diverse groups diminish as these individuals increase their news media exposure, which in turns increases agreement between agendas (McCombs, 2004). Men and women, for example, may hold diverse views about a particular issue but, as they increase their television use, these differences diminish and they are brought closer into consensus.

Consensus building consequence of agenda setting is similar to Mainstreaming effect, associated with Gerbner’s Cultivation Theory (Gerbner, 1998), in its emphasis on how media can bring opinions of opposing segments of society closer together, diminishing differences;
the correlation function of mass media. There are, however, some important conceptual differences between consensus building as a consequence of agenda setting and mainstreaming effect of cultivation. Mainstreaming states that heavy users and light users of television are drawn closer into middle of the road (or moderate) opinions, despite of other socio-demographic characteristics (Gerbner et al, 1984; Jeffres, Atking & Neuendorf, 2001). Consensus building consequence of agenda setting states that the correlation of the hierarchy of importance of issues and attribute of these issues increases between opposing socio-demographic with the use of news media (McCombs, 2004), regardless if this correlation is a moderate or extreme opinion. The process of measuring mainstreaming (den Bulck, 2003) is also different in nature than of consensus building.

Shaw and Martin (1992) found that the very use of the news media could build consensus among the opposing demographic groups, enhancing agreement about important public issues and reducing the gap within segments of society. This was the first study conducted on this specific consequence of agenda setting, consensus building. Using data from a statewide survey and content analysis data from newspapers in North Carolina, they found that as individuals increased their newspaper reading, the level of agreement on the important issues of the day increased within gender, race and age (Shaw & Martin, 1992). Ching-Yi Chiang (1995) replicated Shaw and Martin’s original study on consensus building. Chiang expanded the concept to an international setting with a study of Taiwan’s 1992 legislative election. The study generally found that increased exposure to news media leads to an increased consensus on the most important issues perceived within each social group (Chiang, 1995).

Esteban López-Escobar, Juan Pablo Llamas and Maxwell McCombs conducted a third study on agenda setting and community consensus building in Spain (1998). The first phase of this study explored consensus building of prioritized social issues within the first level of agenda setting. The second phase of this study expanded the research to consensus within the second level of agenda setting. Second level agenda setting, also known as attribute agenda setting, deals with the transference of salience of an object’s attributes from the media agenda to the public’s agenda. For the two phases of this study, the authors used survey data from Spain’s parliamentary elections and an analysis of local newspaper and television coverage of the issues and their attributes. Overall, their study found that increased exposure to the news media corresponded to an increased consensus among the different demographic groups of the public agenda of issues and the public agenda of the candidates’ attributes (López-Escobar et al., 1998).

A variation of Bernard Cohen’s statement cited earlier may be the best way to describe the second level of agenda setting: the media may not be very successful in telling us what to think, but they are very successful in telling us what to think about (first level of agenda setting) and how to think about it (second level of agenda setting) (McCombs, 2004). Each issue, or object, presented by the news media has several attributes, or “characteristics and
properties that fill out the picture of each object” (McCombs, 2004, p. 70). When the news media present an object, certain attributes, properties or traits of that object are emphasized and others de-emphasized. The media’s selection and presentation of an object’s attributes are thus transferred to the public’s agenda and affects how the public thinks about or feels about the object. At the second level, the consensus building consequence of agenda setting suggests an important function of the news media in creating common ground for the deliberation about the characteristics of issues and objects, aiding mobilization on what aspects of an issue needs consideration. These can be social, cultural or political in nature.

This study focuses strictly on consensus building at the second level of agenda setting. It focuses on building consensus on the attributes of the Muslim community, within the context of the events of 9-11, framed as the terrorist attacks on US soil. It is an extensive replication of Shaw and Martin’s (1992) original study, with 51 tests of the hypothesis. It is also an expansion of the literature, with the inclusion of a transnational media effects. This study focuses on the attributes of a community, the Muslim community, and their transference from transnational media agenda to the agenda of an audience in the European Union. Specifically, it looks at how, through the use of transnational news media, divergent groups within each of the 15 European Union countries came together in consensus on how they thought about and felt about the Muslim and Arab community as they related to the events of 9-11. Understanding how the news media, specifically transnational news media, might be bringing opposing segments of society closer together in how they feel about a specific community in relation to a terrorist attack can have important social and political consequences.

López-Escobar et al. assessed both the substantive and affective dimensions of second level agenda setting in their study of consensus building, finding greater support for the affective dimension (López-Escobar et al., 1998). McCombs has stated that media effects might differ when attributes are explored within the different dimensions: substantive and affective (2004). The substantive dimension reflects distinct characteristics of an object (issue, person or community), such as ideology or personality; the affective dimension reflects the emotional response in relation to the object (issue, person or community), such as positive or negative response. This study focuses thus on the affective dimension of the second level of agenda setting, in how the European Union community felt about the Muslim and Arab communities in relation to the events of 9-11.

This study assumes that issues related to the terrorist attacks of 9-11 on US soil and terrorism in general were ranked high on the European Union audience’s agenda. A study from the European Commission, conducted between October and November 2001 provides grounds for such assumption. They found that EU’s population demonstrated that there was a growth of fear about terrorism of 10 percentage points after 9-11 in comparison to the previous year, and that their safety was a priority to be addressed (Eurobarometer, 2001).
EFFECTS OF TRANSNATIONAL NEWS FLOW

Ideas, images, social imagery and communities flow across different levels of localities. These movements occur through media dissemination across and within geographical and geo-cultural spaces. This flow is not unidirectional; it is often multi-directional, counter-directional and hybrid. However, media productions and messages are sent and received at the local, national, regional and transnational levels. If we understand that the media influence our thoughts, feelings and actions it is also necessary to understand that these influences may be originating from multiple levels of localities.

With recent technological and political developments, access to print and television originating at multiple localities is becoming easier and cheaper. Within the European Union, the locus of this analysis, cross-border transmission and reception of TV broadcasting is a relatively new phenomenon. It wasn’t until the 1980s that the transmission expanded from public service channels to commercial stations and from terrestrial broadcasters to cable and satellite (Dahlgren, 2000). In 1989, the EU’s Television Directive signed a treaty ensuring access to television broadcasting across national boundaries and impeding restrictions “against the reception and retransmission of programs from other member states” (Schlesinger, 1993, p. 17). Indeed, the availability of television produced and often transmitted from outside the nation-state boundaries is increasing in volume and importance in Europe. With the European Union’s diverse population and increased population of migrants, its audiences now have access to local, national, and transnational programs that are aimed at clusters of cultural-linguistic populations, geo-cultural regions and others.

Chalaby has differentiated between four types of transnational channels in Europe: ethnic channels, multi-territory operations, pan-European channels and networks (Chalaby, 2005a). These transnational television broadcasts differ in intent, content, audience, relation with local issues and culture, and in their business models. The result is a much more complex arena of television transmission and reception. European Union television is still local and nationally centered to a great extent, but is also being increasingly transmitted and received outside the boundaries of the nation-state. It is important to state that audiences often prefer domestic programs (Buonanno, 2008), and these types of programs will continue to exist. Straubhaar indicated that, although there is a preference for television that is culturally proximate, “most members of society are also interested in some amount of diversity and difference as well” (Straubhaar, 2007, p. 27). The amount of programming that originates from across national borders is growing.

Audiences for transnational media also vary in intent and characteristics. Many of the communication studies dealing with transnational media focus their efforts in the understanding of the use of transnational media by diasporic populations (King & Wood, 2001; Bailey, Georgiou & Harindranath, 2007). But audiences other than diasporic
populations are also accessing transnational media. Other audiences for transnational media have been identified as “international and multicultural” (Chalaby, 2005a, p. 164) and “corporate elites” (Straubhaar, 2007, p. 27).

The transnational media audience is diverse in its reasoning for using such media, and the combination of media originating from different levels of localities it uses. Audiences in general are diverse in terms of the combination of media from different levels of localities that they choose, be it local, regional, national or transnational media. Each of these media localities may be affecting this individual, in how he sees himself, in how he sees the other, in what he thinks about, and in how he thinks about issues and attributes of those issues. Although all these various levels of media locality may influence people’s perception of issues and communities, this current study is mainly concerned with transnational media use. It focuses on the effects of using media originating beyond the nation-state on people’s perceptions and feelings about a specific community.

Researchers in the interdisciplinary area of transnationalism have tried to explain processes taking place in a nation but transcending national boundaries, as well as its causes and effects (Smith & Guarnizo, 1998). The flows of these transnational practices have increased in unprecedented ways in the late 20th century and early 21st century. Transnationalism has been explained, within the social science realm, as the “multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of nation-states” (Vertovec, 1999, p. 447). Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt (1999) linked the concept of transnationalism to “occupations and activities that require regular and sustained social contacts over time across national borders for their implementation” (p. 219). Within their understanding, transnationalism should be organized within economic, political and socio-cultural arenas (Portes et al., 1999). This current study focuses more on the socio-cultural arena of transnationalism, specifically the news media and its effects.

Smith (2005) has defined the study of transnationalism as a discipline that seeks to “analyze the social organization and consequences of the complex interconnectivity of cross-border networks in multiple fields of social practice,” (p. 235). Communication studies tackling transnationalism have usually analyzed the influence of media in a micro-level analysis. A large body of communication scholars has been concerned with a particular use of transnational media, that of diasporic populations or migrant population and how they negotiate their identities, ties and adaptation with the multi-locational media use (Castles, 2000; King & Wood, 2001; Robins & Aksoy, 2005; Bailey et al., 2007). Other communication scholars studied the paradigm shift of this increased interconnectiveness and reach of transnational media, how they relate to other levels of media use and how they relate to its audience’s identity (Sinclair, 2004; Chalaby, 2005a; Chalaby 2005b; Straubhaar, 2007).

This current study seeks to expand on previous literature by conducting a macro, survey-based analysis, with the understanding that the use of transnational media is not restricted to diasporic or to migrant populations. As Bailey and Georgiou (2007) have stated,
“transnational bonds no longer have to be cemented by migration or by exclusive territorial claims” (p.13). As people have increasing ties and interests in culture and, indeed, media, originating from across their national boundaries, it is necessary to broaden the analysis of transnational media use to a general population. This study focuses on how different people use transnational media and how that use affects them.

The argument of this study is that the use of news media from different countries can be understood as a transnational practice. The very use of transnational media, through its flows of images and ideas, has the potential to bring together a community. The increased availability of transnational media within national spaces may be building a transterritorial consensus of issues and attributes among people of different countries or diverse demographics within those countries, and altering our perception of where influences on public opinion might be coming from.

Europe has an increasingly large Muslim community and many countries face internal challenges of segregation, integration and xenophobia. Considering the diverse composition and social inclusion of Muslim communities in European Union nations, as well nation’s different political and economic relations with Muslim communities outside of their nations, media from different countries may have presented attributes of the Muslim community, as they related to the events of 9-11, with different perspectives. It is also possible that these different presentations of this community had different effects on how people perceived and felt about the Muslim population in Europe.

Thus, based on previous studies of consensus building (Shaw & Martin, 1992; Chiang, 1995) and focusing on consensus building as a consequence of second level agenda setting (López-Escobar et al., 1998), I propose to expand on the literature by testing the following hypothesis on the influence of transnational news media in building consensus about the attributes of a community, the Muslim community. This hypothesis focuses on the use of transnational media by audiences in each of the 15 European Union countries in building consensus among its diverse segments of societies.

H1: As different demographic subgroups increase their exposure to transnational news media (television and press) it is more likely that they increase their correlation on the attributes related to a community (the Muslim and Arab communities).

Individuals who have access to different transnational media may choose to access these different transnational media for different purposes, and at different times. Understanding that different media use might have different effects on its audiences, the following research question is asked:
RQ 1: Are there differences in influence among the different transnational media (television and press) on consensus building among demographic subgroups at the second level of agenda setting?

**Methodology**

This study employed a secondary data analysis to test the hypothesis and address the research question. The data originated from Flash Eurobarometer 114, a topical telephone-based survey requested by the European Commission for the External Relations section of the Directorate General of the European Union and conducted by EOS Gallup Europe. The study was done in the aftermath of the attacks of September 11th 2001 and probed European Union population on issues related to the attacks in the United States (Flash Eurobarometer, 2001). The researchers surveyed populations of each of the 15 EU member countries at that time.

Calculations of consensus for this study are based on the public opinion data, comparing agreement on attributes of a community between those who reported use of the specific news media and those who reported not using the specific media. This allows the analysis to assess agreement between demographic subgroups, the core relationship modeled in the three previous studies on consensus building (Shaw & Martin, 1992; Chiang, 1995; López-Escobar et al., 1998).

A total of 14,986 interviews were conducted between November 13 and 23 of 2001 in the 15 countries, a sample of approximately 1,000 interviews per country. Three main groups of variables are necessary for the hypotheses and research questions of this study: a set of dichotomized demographics; media exposure; and public opinion.

This study replicates the choice of gender, age and education as the demographics for this analysis. The demographic variable gender was measured as “male” or “female.” For the demographic variable age, respondent’s reported age was collapsed a posteriori into “younger” and “older” subgroups. “Younger” respondents reported their age as being between 15 through 42 years old and “Older” respondents reported their age as being between 43 and 98 years old. For education, respondents were asked to state their age when they finished their full time education, which was dichotomized a posteriori into “lower” and “higher” subgroups. The operational definition of “lower” education group is those who reported having finished their full time education between “never having gone to full time school” and “being up to 18 years-old when they finished full time education.” The operational definition of “higher” education is those reporting “being 19 years-old and older when they finished full time education.”

Transnational media exposure is measured through a bivariate question that asked the respondents about their use of various media for information on the events in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the United State in the aftermath of 9-11 and their impact in Europe.
Respondents were asked to state, from a presented list, which media they used and deemed reliable. This closed-ended question asked the respondents about their use of ten different sources of information. Of those sources, this study is concerned with two specific sources of information, transnational press and transnational television, being analyzed within each of the 15 European Union member countries. The operational definition of transnational media exposure is the use of press news and television from countries other than where the respondent resides. Overall, 20% of the respondents stated they used transnational press news and 37% stated they used transnational television news.

The third set of variables is opinion salience. Survey participants were asked to state their opinions about the attributes of the Muslim and Arab community, as a consequence of the 9-11 attacks. Respondents were asked to express their agreement for each of five statements on a four-point scale. The values “totally agree” and “agree” were collapsed to determine an aggregated agreement. The combined agreement is used in this analysis in the rank order of the hierarchy of importance of these statements, or the importance of each of the attributes of a community. The specific survey question being used in the analysis to measure salience of the attributes of a community and the total percentage of agreement are indicated in Table 1.

Agreement between each of the demographic subgroups on the attribute agendas was measured using Spearman’s rho rank-order correlation. Throughout the analysis, the pattern of correlations among those demographic subgroups on the attributes is compared between those stating they used the specific media and those that stated they did not. Within each of the analysis tables, for those countries that follow the hypothesized pattern of increased correlation with the media use, these countries cells are represented by a highlighted cell. Those countries that present a much higher correlation among the demographic subgroups that stated they used the specific media are marked by asterisks.

This study conducted a cross-national comparison between the 15 European Union countries analyzed, and the role of transnational media use in creating consensus among otherwise disparate demographic subgroups within those countries.

**Findings: Transnational Media and Consensus on Community Attributes**

The hypothesis of this study stated that as diverse groups within each of the European Union countries were exposed to news media originating from countries other than the ones they live in (transnational media) they would be brought closer into a consensus about the attributes related to the Muslim and Arab communities in the aftermath of the events of 9-11. The hypothesis was supported by 44% of the 79 correlations for both transnational media in the 15 countries which followed the expected pattern of increased consensus among the
The research question asked in this study probed if the different transnational media had different effect of consensus building on attributes of a community. This analysis found stronger support in consensus building on attributes of a community for those stating they used transnational television news about the aftermath of 9-11. With all three demographics combined (education, gender and age), 54% of the 41 calculated correlations increased consensus with transnational television use. For those using the transnational press for news about the aftermath of 9-11, weaker support was found, and only 34% of the 38 calculated correlations supported the hypothesis with the use of transnational press.

Concentrating on the demographics, two of the demographics presented similar support for the hypothesis, namely education and gender, where a total of 48% of the calculations presented an increased consensus on these demographics on the attributes of the Muslim and Arab communities with the use of transnational media. With age as the demographic, as slightly weaker support for hypothesis was found, where a total of 38% of the calculations presented an increased consensus on this demographic on attribute of the Muslim and Arab community with the use of transnational media.

Although with combined transnational media use increased agreement on the attributes of the Muslim and Arab communities were quite evenly distributed, especially between education and gender, a little less so for age, some differences do arise by countries. In the following segment, I will present the degree of convergence on the agenda of attributes related to a community with the use of each of the transnational media.

### Transnational Television

A closer look at the degree of convergence on the agenda of attributes of the Muslim and Arab communities among men and women with exposure to transnational TV shows that...
over one-half of the countries followed the expected pattern of increased consensus. Table 2 presents the distribution of correlations among men and women with the use of transnational TV.

Some 60% of the countries presented a higher correlation between men and women indicating they used transnational TV news for information about the aftermath of 9-11, namely Belgium, Germany, Greece, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and the UK. Of the countries following the expected pattern of increase, four indicated quite a steep increase of consensus among men and women.

In Italy and in the UK, the correlations between men and women on attributes of a community went from moderate correlations for those stating they did not use transnational television news (both with a correlation of .68) to a very high correlation for those stating they used transnational television news (both with a correlation of .98).

With education as the demographic, more than half of the calculated countries followed the expected pattern of increased convergence on the agenda of attributes of a community with the use of transnational television news. Table 3 presents the distribution of correlations among the education demographic on the attributes of a community with the use of transnational television.

With the use of transnational television, 55% of the countries demonstrated the expected pattern of higher correlation among lower and higher education population on
attributes of the Muslim and Arab communities, namely Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and the UK.

In the Netherlands and in the UK, correlations between lower and higher education population on attributes of a community were moderate for those indicating they did not use transnational TV (.50 and .60, respectively), and .70 and .90, respectively for those indicating they used transnational TV news.

With age as the demographic, little less than half of the countries followed the expected pattern of increased convergence on the agenda of attributes with the use of transnational television news. Table 4 presents the distribution of correlations among the age demographic subgroups on the attributes a community with the use of transnational TV.

Forty-seven percent of the countries presented an increased consensus among younger and older population subgroups on attributes of the Muslim and Arab communities with the use of transnational TV news, namely Germany, France, Ireland, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal and the UK. From the seven countries indicating and increased correlation among younger and older population with the media use, two presented quite a steep increase.

In the UK, correlations among younger and older population subgroups on attributes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>No Transnational TV Use</th>
<th>Transnational TV Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany*</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy*</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxemburg*</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK*</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Countries</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Attributes of a community = Q8 A through Q8E (Combined agreement), Gender = D1, Transnational Television Use/Not Transnational Television Use (recoded) = Q5F
Highlighted cells indicated accordance to expected pattern of increased consensus with media use
*Indicates a high increase of consensus from the group who did not use the media to the group that did use the media.
of a community were .60 for those who stated they did not use transnational TV and were .98 for those who stated they used transnational TV.

A comparison between the three demographic subgroups indicated that gender was the subgroup more likely to be brought closer together in consensus on the affective dimension of attributes of the Muslim and Arab communities with the use of transnational television news, where 60% of the countries indicated an increased correlation among men and women on the affective dimension with the use of transnational TV news. Education was the second demographic group most likely to be brought closer together in consensus on the affective dimension with the use of transnational television news, with 55% of the countries indicating an increased correlation among lower and higher education populations with the use of the media. With age as the demographic, 47% of the countries indicated an increased correlation among younger and older populations with transnational TV use. The countries that consistently showed increased consensus on attributes of a community on all three demographics with the use of transnational television news were Germany, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and the UK.
A closer look at the degree of convergence on the agenda of attributes of a community among men and women with exposure to transnational press indicates that 36% of the countries followed the expected pattern of increased consensus with the use of transnational press for information on the aftermath of 9-11. Table 5 presents the distribution of correlations among men and women on the attributes a community with the use of transnational press.

Some 36% of the calculated countries indicated an increased consensus among men and women on attributes of the Muslim and Arab communities with the use of transnational press, namely Germany, France, Italy, Portugal and the UK.

In the UK, men and women who indicated they did not use transnational press news presented a correlation of .60 on attributes of a community, while those who indicated they used transnational press news presented a much higher correlation (.88). In Germany and in Italy, men and women who said they did not use transnational press presented a correlation of .70 and those who said they used transnational press presented a correlation of 1.00 and .90, respectively.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>NO Transnational TV Use</th>
<th>Transnational TV Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France*</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK*</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Countries</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Attributes of a community = Q8A through Q8E (Combined agreement), Age (recoded dichotomized) = D2, Transnational Television Use/ Not Transnational Television Use (recoded) = Q5F
Highlighted cells indicated accordance to expected pattern of increased consensus with media use
*indicates a high increase of consensus from the group who did not use the media to the group that did use the media

**Transnational Press**

A closer look at the degree of convergence on the agenda of attributes of a community among men and women with exposure to transnational press indicates that 36% of the countries followed the expected pattern of increased consensus with the use of transnational press for information on the aftermath of 9-11. Table 5 presents the distribution of correlations among men and women on the attributes a community with the use of transnational press.

Some 36% of the calculated countries indicated an increased consensus among men and women on attributes of the Muslim and Arab communities with the use of transnational press, namely Germany, France, Italy, Portugal and the UK.

In the UK, men and women who indicated they did not use transnational press news presented a correlation of .60 on attributes of a community, while those who indicated they used transnational press news presented a much higher correlation (.88). In Germany and in Italy, men and women who said they did not use transnational press presented a correlation of .70 and those who said they used transnational press presented a correlation of 1.00 and .90, respectively.
Table 5: Degree of convergence on the agenda of attributes of a community among men and women by transnational press exposure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>NO Transnational Press Use</th>
<th>Transnational Press Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany*</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy*</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxemburg</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK*</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Countries Combined</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Attributes of a community= Q8A through Q8E (Combined agreement), Gender = D1, Transnational Press Use/ No Transnational Press Use (recoded) = Q5B
Highlighted cells indicated accordance to expected pattern of increased consensus with media use
*Indicates a high increase of consensus from the group who did not use the media to the group that did use the media
+ Indicates the country could not be calculated due to small bases

With education as the demographic, almost half of the countries increased consensus on the agenda of attributes of a community with the use of transnational press news. Table 6 presents the distribution of correlations among the education subgroups on the attributes a community with the use of transnational press.

Forty percent of the 10 calculated countries demonstrated the expected pattern of higher correlation among lower and higher education population on attributes of the Muslim and Arab communities with the use of transnational press news, namely Belgium, France, Ireland and the UK.

In France, the correlation among lower and higher education population on attributes of a community was .60 for those who stated they did not use the transnational press news but, for those stating they used transnational press news, the correlation was .83. In Belgium, the correlation among lower and higher education populations on attributes of a community was .70 for those stating they did not use the transnational press and .90 for those stating they did use the transnational press for information on the aftermath of 9-11.

With age as the demographic, a little over one-fourth of the countries followed the expected pattern of increased convergence on the agenda of attributes of the Muslim and Arab communities with the use of the transnational press news. Table 7 presents the
distribution of correlations among the age subgroups on the attributes of a community with the use of transnational press.

Twenty-nine percent of the 14 countries indicated a higher correlation among younger and older population subgroups on attributes of the Muslim and Arab communities with the use of transnational press news, namely France, Ireland, Italy and Luxemburg. In France and in Italy, younger and older population subgroups indicating they did not use transnational press news presented a correlation of .70 in both countries, while those indicating they used transnational press news indicated a much higher correlation (.98 and 1.00, respectively).

A comparison between the three demographic subgroups indicated that education was the subgroup more likely to be brought closer together in consensus on the affective dimension of attributes of Muslim and Arab communities with the use of transnational press news. In 40% of the countries lower and higher education population subgroups presented a higher correlation on attributes of a community with the use of the transnational press. Gender was the second demographic group most likely to be brought closer together in consensus on the affective dimension with the use of transnational press news, with 36% of the countries indicating an increased correlation among men and women. With age, 29% of the countries presented an increased correlation among younger and older populations with

### Table 6: Degree of convergence on the agenda of attributes of a community among lower and higher education population by transnational press exposure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>NO Transnational Press Use</th>
<th>Transnational Press Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium*</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France*</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxemburg</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Countries Combined</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Attributes of a community= Q8 A through Q8E (Combined agreement). Education (recoded dichotomized) = D3. Transnational Press Use/Not Transnational Press Use (recoded) = Q5B
Highlighted cells indicate accordance to expected pattern of increased consensus with media use
*Indicates a high increase of consensus from the group who did not use the media to the group that did use the media
- Indicates the country could not be calculated due to small bases

France was the only country that consistently presented increased consensus on attributes of a community on all three demographic subgroups tested with the use of transnational television news.

A closer look at the countries which had their opposing demographic subgroups brought closer together in consensus on attributes of the Muslim and Arab communities with the use of transnational media present interesting patterns. Table 8 indicates this distribution.

France and the UK were more likely to have their opposing demographic groups be brought closer together in consensus on the attributes of a community with the use of transnational media news, closely followed by Ireland, Italy and Luxemburg. Denmark, Spain, Austria, Finland and Sweden were the least likely countries to have their opposing demographic groups to be brought closer together in consensus on the attributes a community with the use of transnational media news.

The research question indicated that, overall, transnational television was more successful at bringing opposing demographic subgroups closer together in consensus on the attributes of the Muslim and Arab communities. However, when the magnitude of the increase was assessed, transnational press indicated a higher average increase of consensus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>NO Transnational Press Use</th>
<th>Transnational Press Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France*</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy*</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxemburg</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Countries Combined</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Attributes of a community = Q8A through Q8E (Combined agreement), Age (recoded dichotomized) = D3, Transnational Press Use/ Not Transnational Press Use (recoded) = Q5B

Highlighted cells indicated accordance to expected pattern of increased consensus with media use

* Indicates a high increase of consensus from the group who did not use the media to the group that did use the media

- Indicates the country could not be calculated due to small bases.

The table above provides a comprehensive view of how transnational news media contributed to building consensus on community attributes among different demographic groups. The data highlights the effectiveness of transnational media in bridging divides, particularly in countries like France, the UK, Ireland, Italy, and Luxemburg, while other countries like Denmark, Spain, Austria, Finland, and Sweden showed less success. This suggests that while transnational television has a role in consensus building, its impact varies significantly across different nations.
among gender and age subgroups, when compared to transnational television. It is also important to note that all of these average increases are quite high. For education, both transnational press and transnational television had a similar average increase of consensus. Table 9 indicates the average increase of correlation from those who stated they did not use the transnational media and those who stated they did use each transnational media.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Transnational television</th>
<th>Transnational press</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Edu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxemburg</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>O</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

0 means followed the expected increase of consensus
Blank means does not follow the expected increase of consensus
X means missing data, not able to calculate
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

Focusing on the correlation of society function of mass communication identified by Harold Lasswell (1960), Shaw and Martin (1992) developed and tested a research design grounded in agenda-setting theory whose central proposition is that the agendas of demographically diverse groups in society will come into closer agreement with increased exposure to the news media.

This study is an extensive and systematic replication of Shaw and Martin’s original consensus building research as well as the previous studies in Taiwan and Spain, with 51 replications. It is also an expansion of the theory to include the study of transnational news media’s influence on public opinion. This study tests Shaw and Martin’s proposition on consensus in 15 Western European countries, examining three demographic group’s (gender, age and education) use of two different transnational news media (television and press) on attributes of a community. This series of tests elaborates in detail Lasswell’s identification of the consensus role of the media.

This study has found support in the hypothesis that the increased use of transnational news media in general corresponded in increased consensus among demographic subgroups on attributes of a community, with such support presented by 44% of all 79 calculated correlations. This study identified that in general, transnational television, in comparison to transnational press, is more likely to be associated with increased agreement on public agenda of attributes for a major topic, where more than half of all of the calculations demonstrated the increased agreement. Transnational press presented, however, a higher average increase of consensus, specially between gender and age subgroups. The study also showed, however, that both transnational television and transnational press presented quite high average increase of correlation on attributes of a community among the three demographic subgroups.

Straubhaar (2007) stated that television, specifically national television broadcasts, is a dominant framework for cultural forums. The topic of this study, the attacks of 9-11 in the United States and their repercussions among European Union populations, were very unique in terms of its television broadcasting in Europe. Perhaps the nature of television, highly visual and easily transmitting the emotions of those experiencing the events, helps explain the greater influence of television here, compared to press. Many television stations throughout the European Union nations rescheduled their programs and such images were repeatedly presented. The particular tragic images and ideas presented by television, national and transnational, had a stronger influence in the European Union population in building consensus than the press and radio.

This research is the first study to draw upon the literature on transnational news media for agenda-setting research in general and examination of the Shaw and Martin model in
particular. This is an important theoretical addition.

Agenda-setting theory, at first and second level, have a well documented finding that as individuals increase their exposure to the news media they also increase the correspondence between their agenda and the media’s agenda (McCombs, 2004). In other words, the higher the individual’s news media’s exposure is, the greater the agenda-setting effect is. Studies on consensus building consequence of agenda setting also draw on that concept, stating that with increased exposure to the news media, opposing demographic subgroups are drawn closer together in their agreement of the important issues and the attributes of those issues. This is especially true when comparing those who are exposed to the news media and those who are not exposed to the news media. In other words, opposing demographic subgroups increase their correlation on the salience of issues and attributes as they increase their news media exposure. This is not to say that news media alone caused the increased consensus, as causality was not directly established by the Shaw and Martin original consensus building study (1992). It is to say, however, that increased consensus among demographic subgroups is strongly correlated, in many cases, with the use of news media.

Conducting a secondary data-analysis provided many benefits, but a few limitations as well. Aside from an indication on whether the survey participants had accessed transnational television and transnational press for information on the aftermath of 9-11, there was no further information on the specific media accessed. It would be interesting to have further survey based studies on transnational media indicating either what the specific medium accessed is or at least its nationality.

Technological advancements and globalization have enhanced the interconnectedness
of people, ideas and products across national boundaries. Communication has also increased within and across national boundaries. News media have surpassed national boundaries, purposively or not, and this impacts audiences receiving them. It is essential to look at the effects that transnational media have on the population. This study looked at transnational news media’s potential to bridging a dialogue about a community among groups who might otherwise not have common grounds for it. Further studies should look at the potential for identity formation through the use of transnational media, a transnational identity. Yes, borders still matter, but the influence of transnational institutions most likely is increasing within national boundaries.

REFERENCES


The demise of the Soviet Union spurred changes to both the media environment and journalism education in Russia, but the evolution of academic programs from the Soviet model still faces challenges. This article combines historical research and interviews with three Russian journalism educators to explore the sources of change and the sources of resistance to change in the context of more than ninety years of Russian press history.

**Keywords:** Russian journalism, journalism education, post-Soviet press, resistance to change

“Change” and “transition” are used often to describe the political and economic processes that have unfolded in Russia since the era of Communist Party General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika in the mid-1980s. Russian media have played an active role in that change by opening the public sphere to marginalized voices and by allowing mobilization of political constituencies. Journalists in established and new media outlets have helped diverse audiences comprehend new opportunities and build new post-Soviet identities.

This article focuses on the dynamics of change in Russian journalism academic programs. We seek to examine the degree of departure from the Soviet model of journalism education that lasted from the early 1920s until the end of the 1980s. We aim to discover the
sources of change and the sources of resistance to change. Overall, by combining historical research with structured interviews with Russian journalism academics and a review of journalism programs’ websites, we present contemporary trends in the evolution of media education in Russia.

It is always challenging to theorize or even to understand change. After the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, “transitology” evolved as a dominant paradigm of research in International Studies. Along the way, however, this conceptual framework drew criticism for ignoring cultural differences among these countries in an attempt to comparatively analyze long-term transformative trends and to impose a universalistic epistemology on studies of societal change.

To overcome the shortcomings of this transitology approach, some scholars have explored the deeply rooted cultural traits of individual countries in transition. By embracing a historical approach, they trace the “genealogy” of institutions and cultural norms, revealing mechanisms of both change and resistance to change.

Our analysis is conducted from the standpoint of that same epistemology of change, which is sensitive to context, continuity and cultural specificity. It also recognizes the decisive role social actors play in initiating or preventing change. To that end, we trace the development of journalism education as it influenced press practices in the Soviet Union and Russia through three eras: the final part of czarist rule to the Russian Revolution and Civil War (1917 to 1921); the era of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1922-1991); and the period from the breakup of the USSR in 1991 to now.

There is limited research about journalism education in Russia, especially during the early communist and Stalinist years. Thus we use the history of the press and journalism during these periods to suggest the impact of communist-era journalism education on the Soviet press and, consequently, on Soviet society.

The analysis is based on interviews with university journalism educators, Russian and Western studies of post-Soviet media, and the authors’ personal knowledge of Russian journalism and media education. Using that data, we map major evolutionary changes in the field while examining the sources of resistance to change.

The university was one of the most respected institutions in the Soviet Union. Amid the profound political and economic changes of the last twenty-five years, established faculties of journalism at Russian state universities have largely been shielded from transformative political and ideological pressures. Yet, as our analysis demonstrates, while withstanding the chaotic post-Soviet experiments with power, these academic communities have experienced strong pressure to change in response to the needs of a market-driven mass media industry, a pluralistic public sphere, and ethnically and politically diverse national audiences.
A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF JOURNALISM EVOLUTION IN RUSSIA

Although this study focuses on post-1991 changes in Russian press and journalism education, it is impossible to separate the contemporary press from its long experience as an active agent of the Soviet system and from its pre-1917 roots.

The history of censorship in Russia dates to the 16th century, when the government began restricting documents of the Orthodox Church, as Artutunyan (2009) notes. From then through the Revolution of 1917, the degree of press freedom varied from czarist reign to czarist reign, culminating in “a short-lived outburst of near-total press freedom” that lasted little more than a month in 1905 (p. 63).

The pre-revolutionary commercial press system deviated from Western models but was democratic in its own way. Esin (2000) notes that 18th century Russian newspapers were more ideological and less commercial than those in Europe. McReynolds’ study of pre-revolutionary newspapers (1991, pp. 6-9) found that they widely supported equal rights, extension of civil rights, and the public’s role in political decision-making. She added that even newspapers obviously loyal to the czar inherently subverted the continuation of absolutism by advocating greater citizen empowerment and individual rights. At the same time, the style of journalism was modernized with more concise writing and reporting. This brief period of Russian journalism was brought to an abrupt end by the revolution, but elements of the style are evident in today’s media, which—while democratizing—have not adopted wholesale Western press conventions.

“While Bolshevik propaganda demonized the czar’s secret police for its censoring function, the first thing the Bolsheviks did when they came to power was monopolize the press”, as Artutunyan observes (2009, p. 65). Although controls tightened dramatically after the Revolution, some journalists found ways to express self-determination in their writing and reporting. Journalism educators and even some party officials recognized that dogmatic adherence to authority produced lap-dog journalists who tended to be incompetent at their craft and apt to produce embarrassingly ineffective and counter-productive propaganda that the public scoffed at. Journalists were not wholly compliant, nor was central authority as monolithic and effectively constraining of the press as is generally assumed. In fact, journalists and educators demonstrated elements of independent thinking and practices even during the most repressive days under Josef Stalin in the late 1930s.

Russian journalists with nationalistic beliefs were probably more resistant to—or at least less compliant with—press controls emanating from Moscow than their non-Russian counterparts, thus sowing seeds for press reforms that came with liberalization under Gorbachev in the 1980s and the subsequent collapse of the USSR.
MEDIA DYNAMICS IN POST-SOVET RUSSIA

For journalism to thrive, a vibrant public sphere is needed, and the democratic principles of openness, transparency, and multi-party system must be maintained. As Zassoursky (2004) explains, “A freed-up (but still controlled) press was in essence the only reliable ally Gorbachev possessed in this struggle with conservative forces in the party apparatus” (p. 4). After performing its propagandist function in the USSR, the press embraced its newly acquired role of a political ally or opponent inscribed in the “fourth estate” ideology. For a brief time when political power shifted from Gorbachev to future President Boris Yeltsin, there was the perception that the media—especially television with its growing popularity and diversified programming—were the Russian “powerhouse”.

With the advent of a market economy, however, the media’s inherited economic dependence on government subsidies became unsustainable. That prompted Androunas to note: “Now that the system has collapsed, the media are trying to perpetuate their existence, but nothing is working for them. They are simply a part of the old system, and they are doomed to disappear along with it. They will survive just as long as the post-communist governments consider it necessary to keep them alive with injections of cash” (quoted in Zassoursky 2004, p. 18).

The myths of the “fourth estate” and “independent press” were particularly compromised over the past ten years when, with tightened state control over the media under the pretext of terrorism threats and national security, journalism’s previously high prestige declined. In addition, the opening of new information channels such as the Internet and blogs empowered audience members. A parallel online “public sphere” now competes for audience attention and time and allows citizen “journalists” to provide a multitude of viewpoints and information sources.

Developments in the media system in the last decade are particularly important because they constitute a primary source of external pressure on university journalism departments to adapt and reform. The latest developments include the emerging Internet counterculture, a decreased and sporadic public interest in politics, and the evolving role of journalists from “extremely important” to “almost completely instrumental” and to “defined in professional terms”. Although the decline of professional journalism in Russia is less pronounced than in Western democracies, journalism departments have already turned to meeting demands for communication professionals in public relations, advertising, speechwriting, and graphic design, among other journalism-related fields. With the shifting societal role of journalists—from shaping the “new Soviet person” to being the “fourth estate” to selling audiences to advertisers—and with the further decline and fracturing of national media audiences, what constitutes a “media professional” becomes a paramount challenge to the academic collective.
SOVIET JOURNALISTS AS AGENTS OF SOCIAL INTERVENTION

With the end of the USSR, Russia began the difficult process of radically re-configuring its national identity. A significant challenge was modifying or dismantling Soviet structures, including state-owned and controlled mass media and literary publishing houses. Central planners built these institutions after the Bolshevik Revolution and the subsequent civil war; they were designed to serve as agents of ideological consensus, censorship, and propaganda.

In what Shafer and Freedman (2007) describe as “agents of social intervention”, journalists were actors who helped establish and sustain the world’s largest multiethnic federation for almost seventy-five years. The mass media were fully integrated into the Soviet system, serving as agents for socialist experimentation, including collectivization of industry and agriculture, and dissemination and popularization of worker literature and art. They were also critical to gaining popular support for “five-year” and other centralized economic planning. The press served as an instrument to gain public support for confronting German aggression and eventual victory in World War II. Later, it supported Cold War engagement with the West. Party leaders recognized journalists as intellectual workers and agents critical to social and economic changes essential to central planning. For this reason, their training as party members and state workers was guided by principles radically different from the more Western-oriented pre-revolutionary journalism education model.

The press was charged with the positive functions of encouraging unification of disparate cultures, reducing religious conflicts, and averting religion-based terrorism within the USSR. Journalists had to develop cross-cultural knowledge and sensibilities to promote a kind of homogenization of citizens whose demographics reflected profoundly diverse language, religious, ethnic, and cultural backgrounds. The result was that the Soviet Union generally succeeded in instilling a sense of national identity across its vast territory. Yet, as this article discusses later, it is unusual to find a positive analysis of the Soviet press within Western media scholarship because of the Cold War’s impact.

Many journalists were party elites and, as such, well-rewarded with perks such as automobiles, superior housing, summer homes (dachas), and—to a limited extent—travel abroad. Political dissent was unusual among journalists who were subject to overwhelming party control (Androunas 1993). Kulikova and Ilbraeva (2001) describe the situation before 1991: “Available was a broad hierarchical network of print media, from the central level to the lowest one, which unified journalists of the Soviet breed, who were capable of serving the party and were not accustomed to professional freedom. There existed a multi-decade tradition in the relations between the media and government, where the government communicated with the media in a monologue-style” (p. 20).

Through their education, training, and integration on editorial staffs, journalists were
less iconoclastic than writers for other forms of mass media, Hopkins (1970) says. They usually attained and retained their positions because they proved to be reliable spokespeople for the bureaucracy. Like journalists everywhere, they engaged in self-censorship out of self-interest. Hopkins adds that this does not imply that the Soviet press was monolithic or incapable of change (p. 127); journalists under any press system find ways to defy or negotiate with authority without risking retribution. As state workers, however, Soviet-era journalists had much less opportunity to engage in the kind of adversarial critique and criticism associated with the Western “watchdog” journalistic tradition of a privately owned press.

**EVOLUTION OF JOURNALISM EDUCATION IN RUSSIA**

For Soviet-era journalists, education, selection, and promotion were directed at contributing to a uniform, manageable, and obedient mass media system. Journalism education officially minimized class and ethnic origins while promoting an activist and interventionist approach to using the press as a tool to nurture a sense of identity and nationhood.

Soviet journalism education began as early as 1918 in the communist regime. The first Soviet “school of journalism” opened that year with lectures by workers from Rosta, the Russian Telegraphic Agency; however, it had “no significant impact because it closed only weeks after it opened” (Mueller 1998, p. 156). The prestigious flagship, the Moscow Institute of Journalism, or GIZh, was founded in 1921, but was hampered by what the rector called “the extremely low level of general and political educational preparation” of new students (Ibid, p. 857). Given the inherent conflict between professional standards for fact-based reporting and party demands for Marxism-Leninism purity, GIZh struggled with “accepting ideologically sound students and admitting competent ones” (Shafer and Freedman 2007, p. 19). In 1923, it was reorganized into a college offering a three-year course. Also in the early 1920s, Moscow State University began training students in editing, publishing, and literary criticism, graduating about 420 young journalists during the 1920s. Throughout the USSR, journalism programs developed with curricula that included a concentration on Marxist-Leninist theory and socialist ideology, on developing an efficient press system to build a socialist society, on reforming the economy, and on educating the new socialist person.

Hopkins (1970) notes that after the Revolution and increasingly after the civil war, courses and lectures were “short on journalism and long on politics”. He cites a 1924 Communist Party resolution, where it was established as an essential goal that “party organizations give the most serious attention to party-political education of press workers”. He continues: “The ideal accordingly was the politically partisan journalist who thought in
unison with the party; in short, a skilled public relations man. To this must be added Russia’s traditional association of literature and popular press. Both literary monthlies and “thick journals”, and newspapers published quality essays and fiction (p. 81).

Nevertheless, Altschull (1995) asserts that the Marxist-Leninist theoretical underpinnings of journalism education and practice were less pervasive than Westerners think:

Journalism schools throughout the Soviet Union made a point of teaching ‘Marxist journalism’. Whatever that phrase meant, the idea that ‘Marxist journalism’ began with Marx was a central element of Soviet press doctrine. Yet this is not a valid idea; it is folklore that was politically useful in the Soviet Union just as the folklore of an adversary press is politically useful in the United States. In truth, Marx is as difficult to pin down as Jefferson, who can be found on all sides of the issue of press freedom at different periods of his life (p. 196).

Despite generally rigid controls, journalists and educators had a legal basis for advocating some degree of press freedom. They could cite the 1936 and 1977 Soviet constitutions as guaranteeing freedom of speech, the press, and assembly, meetings, street processions, and demonstrations. While acknowledging that such provisions were usually not implemented and were often ignored, Lendvai (1981, p.19) asserts that the 1977 constitution, drafted under General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, was less hypocritical because it more explicitly limited press freedoms, declaring them contingent upon acting “in accordance with the interest of the people and in order to strengthen and develop the socialist system…in accordance with the aims of building communism”.

**CRITIQUE OF WESTERN RESEARCH ABOUT SOVIET MEDIA**

Some Western media and political science scholars researched the Soviet media during the Cold War but produced few publications about academic journalism education. Krasnoboka (2010) observes, “Despite the crucial role played in the domestic and international affairs of the Soviet Union, international analysis of the Soviet media system was limited” (p. 318).

Arguably, the isolation of the Eastern bloc countries—rationalized by Western propaganda, fear, and suspicion—was a major factor in the lack of such systematic analysis. However, we assert that intellectual activity in the USSR during the Cold War was interpreted by using a one-and-the-same conceptual framework. In fact, ideologizing any
aspect of social life fits the primary definition of Cold War, along with competition in military matters and economic development. Entrenched ideological beliefs about totalitarian control over the academia prevented Western scholars from readily examining the broader historical and cultural context in which university journalism education developed in Russia.

Only in the 1980s with the arrival of glasnost, which weakened that isolation and expanded research access for foreigners, did Western scholarship focused on Soviet media expand. A number of those early studies dealt directly with journalism education, training, and professionalism. (Remington 1985; Schillinger 1988; Haddix 1990). Related studies followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union (Wu et al. 1996; Mueller 1998).

Before further addressing this lacuna in research, we look more closely at the conceptual heritage of Western research. For five decades after World War II, the West discussed Soviet media by applying the normative ideal of a “free press” in a society of individualistic agents. As a result, a grim picture emerged of a media system controlled by the party from above. It was a system in which the journalists, universally, were required to follow the party’s line and where only heavily censored content reached the audience. This portrait characterized the media as lacking integrity of their own (Schramm 1956), being totally under the party’s control, and acting according to Lenin’s formula of the socialist press (Friedrich and Brzezinski 1956; Haddix 1990; Remington 1988; Mickiewicz 2000), or supplementing the party’s pyramidal structure and thus being a political institution of its own (Buzek 1964; Dzirkals et al. 1982; Inkles 1950). The inevitable conclusion was that the media created a distorted picture of the world by substituting propaganda for its primary informative function. In general, it was deduced that tight control on content generated audience mistrust (Friedrich and Brzezinski 1956).

The conceptual frameworks rested on common epistemological and ideological foundations. They were concurrent with the dominant “transmission of information” model (Shannon and Weaver 1949) in Western media studies, which provided researchers with a suitable conceptual construct for the highly centralized Soviet media system. Yet they prevented researchers from understanding the intricate interaction of audiences with the media and the media’s real effects while working on the “new Soviet person” creation project (Wolfe 2005).

Diversification of media research after the 1970s and growing interest in audience reception and media effects, have led to re-examination of Soviet media. In that process, some scholars adopted theoretical assumptions from critical and cultural studies. By illuminating the agency of the mass media, they opened a new dimension for analysis. While still operating within the “free press” doctrine, they recognized the diversity of periodicals in the USSR and acknowledged certain creative freedoms in the journalistic field. That re-
examination evolved from a limited focus on self-censorship (Dzirkals et al. 1982) and “esoteric communication” (Rush 1959; Griffith 1970; Dzirkals et al. 1982) to realization that the media were assigned some governing-society role.

Wolfe (2005), for instance, asserts that the press performed a “tutelary function” in society, “exploring from the earliest years just after the revolution to the Gorbachev era the problem of what it was to live a socialist life, to be a socialist person” (p. 2). Indeed, being a true “socialist person” meant being ready to sacrifice oneself for the ideals of a classless society, a quality at the top of the normative scale of East European-style socialism. Installing those ideals in readers and, thus, contributing to homogenization of the nationwide audience, explains the central place of journalists and mass media in society. It also explains the prestige and allure that the profession possessed in the U.S.S.R. and the importance of university programs for hatching successive generations of professionals reared with the Marxist-Leninist ideals.

The next section discusses the value of such a methodological choice in relation to the transitology approach in international studies.

FROM TRANSITOLoGY TO CONTEXT-SENSITIVE APPROACHES

The domino effect of falling communist regimes in Eastern Europe surprised many Western political scientists. Consequently, there was an urgent need to analyze and theorize the rapidly evolving political dynamics in the “new democracies”. Scholars responded by hastily producing publications, clumsily applying existing theoretical constructs to the new phenomena, and establishing “think tanks” that offered expertise to governments and political parties.

Under those urgent circumstances, transitology became the dominant theoretical framework in international studies for analyzing and understanding East European regime changes. Developed in the context of comparative studies of democratization in Latin American and Southern Europe, it thrived on assumptions that allowed for simplification of analyses of several variables. In addition, it provided a framework for a predictable path-dependency despite the messy realities of post-communist economic and political changes. Overall, this dominant approach reinforced a universalistic belief in a progressive, one-directional social development towards capitalism (as the economic system) and Western-type democracy (as its political ideal).

One factor prompting scholars to search for new ways to approach post-communist transitions was the decisively different paths of socio-economic and political development

---

1 O'Donnell and Schmitter developed the original conceptualizations of transition studies in 1986. Their book *Transitions from authoritarian rule: Tentative conclusions about uncertain democracies* provided useful insights about the dynamics and actors in transitional periods based on comparative analysis among Latin American and South European countries.
observable in individual East European countries. Another factor was the inefficient results of transitology research in the face of the twenty-year-long unsatisfactory evolution toward democratic regimes in some of those countries. The search for new theoretical approaches was facilitated by the influx of scholars born and educated in Eastern Europe. They possessed first-hand experience with transformative realities there and could conduct field research in national languages. On this basis, a new generation of regime democratization scholars proposed a number of ontologically-oriented theoretical approaches (see, for instance, Gelman 2008; Kitschelt 1999; Tokes 2000).

The field of post-Soviet studies is maturing with increased complexity that includes a context-sensitive path-dependency approach and a focus on continuities and discontinuities substitute for close-ended transitology analysis.

This study assumes a context-specific methodological direction when we assert that the journalism education system in Russia has been directly impacted by the transformative impulses in the last twenty five years. This has materialized in the opening of new programs, strengthening of their relationships with industries, and gradual restructuring of the curricula.

**JOURNALISM EDUCATION IN FLUX**

To be sure, changes in journalism education did not magically begin when the Soviet Union imploded. At Moscow State University, for example, glasnost proved a catalyst to redesign the academic program in light of the new national policy of openness. However, based on conversations with its journalism dean, Schillinger (1988) observed, “The approach of journalism educators to the incorporation of glasnost onto their programs is reactive rather than proactive, literal rather than expansive…. In short, journalism educators are paying attention more to the rhetoric of democratization than to its spirit”. She found that approach unsurprising, given “journalism’s traditional uncritical linkage to the state” (p. 52).

Current economic realities in Russia exert strong pressure on university programs to change and find new sources of financing. This trend was pronounced as early as the beginning of the 1990s. As Jones (1994) notes, “Late in 1993, the financial difficulties of the central government led state officials to propose that local governments pay for higher education and that payment by the state would occur only for the education of specialists that were ‘needed’ instead of on the basis of enrollment numbers” (p. 11). Another funding source was selling services to industries.

Among new challenges for the higher education system in the post-Soviet era are “finding ways to generate income instead of relying on the state to fully support journalism programs, thus preparing students for dramatically altered employment opportunities (including that of unemployment); and ensuring that graduates are prepared for careers in which they will have to retrain constantly” (p. 14). That explains efforts by journalism
programs to be sensitive to student demand and to meet international standards of performance quality, especially UNESCO’s (Balzer 1994, p. 40).

The first, and arguably most noticeable, development is the proliferation of programs since the fall of the Soviet Union. In the Soviet central planning economy, the state restricted free university education to the most talented young people and to the privileged. Although the number of programs grew for more than 60 years\(^3\), there were only 27 university journalism departments in Russia by 1992. In the 1990s, however, an unprecedented number of state university departments in journalism and media were created, and numerous private “institutes”, “academies”, and “schools” of media education opened.

Due to the highly dynamic nature of those developments, there is a perception that the changes took place largely outside the academy. To shed light on the inner logic of this trend, we interviewed three journalism educators by e-mail about changes they experienced and about the sources of change and of resistance to change. They are Elena Vartanova, dean and chair in Media Theory and Economics, Faculty of Journalism at Moscow State University; Irina Demina, head of the Department of Journalism at Baikal State University of Economics and Law in Irkutsk; and Tatiana Jakovleva-Nelson, head of the TV and Radio Journalism Department at the Humanitarian Institute of TV and Radio Broadcasting in Moscow. They agree that significant changes in the academic sector convey optimism and pride, while others reflect the same types of structural, cultural, and economic difficulties encountered by other impulses for change during the last twenty years.

Among the positive developments in journalism education are:

- Proliferation of programs and specializations: Along with the traditional journalism orientation, new programs began in public relations, advertising, media studies, and graphic design, among others;
- Modernization of instructional technology: Using computers in “smart” classrooms and teaching students to use the latest audio-visual equipment;
- Creation of digital production units to teach media production skills;
- Strengthened relationships with communication industries and professionals: Inviting media professionals as guest lecturers or part-time instructors, thus benefiting from the traditionally strong relations with journalism practice of news media outlets;
- Hiring more young teachers and researchers;
- Making journalism and media departments function more transparently: Creating and maintaining faculty and departmental websites with daily updates, contact information, English-language versions, and sections for comments, opinions, and history, among other activities.

\(^3\)Russia’s best-known faculty of journalism, Moscow State University, was established in 1952. However, the first formal school of journalism opened at Belorussian State University several years earlier (Daniloff 1994, p. 222).
“Internationalizing” journalism and media education: Organizing and hosting international conferences and participating in academic conferences abroad.

Such developments reflect attempts by academic communities to respond to perceived external pressures and demands. However, deep structural and philosophical sentiments exist within those faculties. Some professors have welcomed the de-ideologizing of the curricula, the strengthening of the theoretical components, and the renewed emphasis on teaching practical reporting and editing skills. However, others regarded the concept of objective reporting as alien (Gross 1999) and have resisted drastic departures from sixty-year-old traditions.

Based on a review of the websites of several journalism programs and the structured interviews with the leaders of three such programs, we further discuss some of the most noticeable positive developments in Russian journalism education, as well as the main structural, cultural, and economic sources of the resistance to change.

**Sources of Change and Resistance**

Any attempt to summarize the factors of change risks simplifying the complex reality of shifting practices, policies, and mentalities in the Russian academy today. Nonetheless, our analysis of internal and external factors that impede the pace of the journalism education reform suggests areas for future research and underscores the importance of asking the leading research questions, namely “how deep is the change?”

1) Academics

In most cases, senior professors represent first-generation graduates of programs created in the early 1960s. They are the second generation of professorial cohorts who entered full-time teaching positions in the late 1970s, usually after a successful career in print, radio, or TV journalism. Today, they make up the professorial body that approves or rejects initiatives and directions for change. Most are associated with theoretical constructs, books, publications, and leadership positions in Brezhnev’s era of intellectual stagnation. Understandably, many of these teachers prefer to preserve the status quo in the academy. Reflecting on this phenomenon, Vartanova stated in an interview on March 19, 2010, “We can rapidly change professional courses, but it is much more difficult to change basic courses. There, the older generation holds leading positions. Moreover, the previous school of teaching journalism, which persisted after the dissolving of the Soviet Union, is still in leading position”. She notes as well that resistance does not stem simply from an inability to depart from the “old norm”, but also because “there is a rather large number of experienced professors, who have difficulty understanding the current technological
development. As they themselves, perhaps, are not very good with the new technologies, they perceive the enhanced attention to teaching about new technologies as a departure from the foundational principles [of education]. Yet, we understand that teaching about those subjects is essential”.

The practice of hiring young scholars still lags. One reason, according to Jakovleva-Nelson in an interview on April 14, 2010, is that “young professional journalists do not go to teach at institutes and universities because they are paid very little in comparison with salaries in the radio and TV stations”.

2) Traditions and Norms

The notion of the role of Russian “intelligentsia” serving the people continues in the academy. That normative view was reinforced ideologically during Soviet times and still affects faculties of journalism and their self-imposed mission and model of journalists.

In the past, the party and government charged journalists with a mission to “install Communist values in the people”. Accordingly, journalism departments taught a standardized curriculum with such courses as “Scientific basis of propaganda”, “Development of the Communist Party and Soviet State”, and “Lenin’s Doctrine of the Press and Modern Journalism Theory”. Today, although the ideologically charged courses are long gone, the self-imposed mission of “producing” journalists who are broadly educated in social sciences and humanities still informs the curricula. A glimpse at courses offered at several journalism faculties shows a continuing emphasis on history-oriented courses, for instance. They range in scope from the history of Russian and foreign journalism to the history of radio and of television, and, most recently, of public relations. Moreover, courses in history of Russian and foreign literature and history of the world’s culture and literature are often included.

Many Western scholars have noticed the traditional orientation of Russian journalism towards literature, beginning with journalism education. Indeed, Vartanova stated, “We can certainly speak of a Russian model of journalism education, namely a literature-centric one. In Russia, journalism has traditionally been perceived as a text-production profession. The intimate link between Russian journalism education and literature is defined by [the understanding] that Russian journalism has, aside from its reporting tradition, an analytical tradition, and a ‘publicist’ tradition, which are linked to a certain conceptualization of normative and ethical issues”.

---

5 Russian university education traditions are closely linked to the West European humanistic model of the “erudite”. Thus taking pride in comprehensive journalism programs that require five full years of study, it reinforces the traditionally sought European identity by the Russian intelligentsia.
In principle, a clear division between theoretical and practical courses is maintained, and it is considered a “brand” achievement by state universities. The regionally distributed faculties of journalism are seen as providing high-quality education, which guarantees a competitive edge in the labor market. According to Jakovleva-Nelson, recently established faculties of journalism at state universities in Moscow try to copy the “maximum theory” model espoused by Moscow State University’s Faculty of Journalism: “That’s a model of classic journalism education, which is accepted as a standard in Russia”.

At another level, the persistence of the “universalist” model of journalism education can be explained by considering its epistemological foundations. University education is constructed as the eclipse of an individual’s life, which provides a high-quality start in a profession that will sustain the individual until retirement. The period of stable state-guaranteed employment is over, but parents, who still influence their children’s views on career choices and professional life, see the university as the only path to professional success and as the only secure investment of time and money.

3) Structural Factors Impeding Change

The demand for professionals is the driving force for reforming and innovating programs. Across the country, faculties launched specializations in public relations, advertisement, and graphic design, and that is where change is experienced the most. Moreover, as pressure increases to find additional sources of financing, journalism programs compete for students on the basis of meeting their demands and expectations for acquiring marketable media-production skills. That is the case at the private Humanitarian Institute of TV and Radio Broadcasting, for instance, where students have transferred from the Moscow State University because “they are not happy with the too-much theory and almost nonexistent practice that is offered there”, Jakovleva-Nelson said.

To meet increasing industry demand, universities are responding by creating state-of-the-art media studios, computer labs, and other advanced facilities. Thus digital technology becomes a primary motivator for change. Jakovleva-Nelson noted, for instance, that the private institution where she teaches has “capabilities comparable to those of a small TV or radio station”. Nonetheless, faculties of journalism remain largely enmeshed in horizontal and vertical webs of dependencies that prevent them from speeding up the transformative process.

The best known of those webs of dependencies is the notoriously tight governmental control over the media and state universities. Although intra-university elections replaced the Soviet practice of deciding on cadre-policy issues from above, the authoritative style of

---

1) Historically, most journalism programs were established at faculties of philology, largely in the early 1960s under the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Education order of August 2, 1960. The growth of enrollment allowed the creation of separate faculties of journalism in the 1980s.
university governance persists. Thus, in March 2010, St. Petersburg State University fired its journalism dean for openly criticizing the university rector’s allegedly authoritarian leadership style (Stolyarova 2010).

Curriculum changes at most institutions need Ministry of Education approval, although a few universities have more curricular autonomy than others. In an interview on March 21, 2010, Demina said, “In Russia, all professional education, including journalism, complies with the state standards of education”. Applied in the name of sustaining high educational standards, this principle bureaucratizes the change process and limits academic freedom to innovate and experiment.

Nevertheless, journalism departments often creatively bring regional- or university-specific content in their programs. That has permitted Demina’s department of journalism, for example, to offer a major in economic journalism for students who want to work as media managers or in media marketing.

In tandem with state control comes a high level of inter-university centralized governance of journalism programs. In that respect, journalism and mass media programs are coordinated by the Moscow State University Faculty of Journalism. Vartanova explained that as the country’s oldest and the largest one, the university hosts the Russian Learning and Instructional Association in Journalism, which approves regional universities’ journalism curricula and develops journalism education strategy and prospective directions. As the flagship of the field, Moscow State’s Faculty of Journalism experiments with new programs and has the country’s largest number of journalism and media programs and specializations.

**Conclusion**

We conclude by observing that political and economic transition has generated significant pressures on journalism education. In addition, the fast-paced changes in the country’s political and regulatory environment intensify the sense of uncertainty and reinforce attitudes of resistance to change. That is true among working professionals as well, not just journalism educators. Lowery and Erzikova (2010) label the contemporary Russian media environment as “murky”, adding that journalists “have had at least two legitimate frames of reference by which to guide news processes and decisions” in recent years: “Western enlightenment principles, suggesting that society, politics, and economics are naturally pluralistic, competitive, and oriented toward individuality, and…a traditional obeisance to authority and conformity, and a tendency to view the external world as mostly threatening” (p. 3-4).

It is no surprise to find parallel contradictions within academe. The senior professorial cadre in journalism programs is largely seen as guarding established and cherished traditions,
and thus reluctant to veer sharply from those traditions, regardless of market demands made by students, industry, and professionals. As the journalism educators we interviewed make clear, academic leaders remain immersed in centralized government decision-making concerning curriculum. In that respect, they follow directions and adopt standards imposed from above.

There are limitations to expecting that curricular changes will dramatically change the way journalism is practiced in Russia. In part, that is because only half of professional journalists have degrees in the field, and many media outlets seek employees with academic credentials in other disciplines. Also, post-Soviet surveys of professional journalists (Wu et al. 1996; Svitich and Shiraeva 1997; Lowery and Erikova 2010) found attitudes that suggest barriers to institutional change.

Nonetheless, as this article suggests, journalism education in Russia possesses certain resources that allow challenges to old attitudes and practices while embracing the risks of transformation. The new generation of scholars and professors entering the academy are technology-savvy, open to change, and ready to participate in the process of “internationalizing” journalism education. In addition, academic programs’ financial and intellectual prosperity depend on satisfying the needs and expectations of students and media industries. There is a sober realization that the role of the university itself has shifted in the direction of a market economy. As one interviewee notes that journalism education today is service.

Regardless of impediments to change, program administrators do express visions for the future. At Moscow State University, for example, Vartanova spoke of the need to move toward “convergence journalism” that brings together previously separate areas of print and broadcast. She also insists on paying “more attention to the development of active audiences in the process of fragmentation of society, due to the digitalization, which leads to the creation of completely new media systems”. At Baikal State University, Demina spoke of deepening economics and multimedia technology specializations. Jakovleva-Nelson predicted that change will be easier for private institutions, such as her Humanitarian Institute of TV and Radio Broadcasting, because the academic leaders own them. Although the government must accredit her program, “every year directions change, and the professors are assigned new courses to teach”. Yet Jakovleva-Nelson sounded cautious: On one hand, she predicts that “the Western model of journalism education will soon come to Russia”. Yet on the other hand, “some updates are needed, but not constantly and not in such a large number”.

One can anticipate that the future of Russian journalism education will move toward constant adaptation to shifting social priorities and centers of power. Meanwhile, it is approaching a milestone in its transition toward a Western model of education. As of 2011, students enrolled in four-year bachelor’s programs and universities received more freedom in devising their curricula. As our interviews show, the content and level of training
journalists must meet those of Western European higher education as Russia enters the global education process.

REFERENCES


CULTURE AND INTERNATIONAL FLOW OF MOVIES: PROXIMITY, DISCOUNT OR GLOBALIZATION?

YEJIN HONG AND TSAN-KUO CHANG

The purpose of this study is to determine how and why the international flow of cultural products appears the way it does and what may influence the direction of the flow. Through a comparative investigation of consumption patterns of American movies in the United States, South Korea and the United Kingdom, this study tested competing hypotheses derived from the perspectives of globalization, cultural proximity, and cultural discount. When taken individually, the results supported cultural proximity between the United States and the United Kingdom, but not cultural discount between the United States and South Korea or between the United Kingdom and South Korea. A better explanation for the flow and consumption of American films in South Korea and the United Kingdom appears to be the theory of globalization.

Keywords: international movie flow, globalization, cultural proximity, cultural discount, Hollywood film

As part of the international flow of cultural products, American movies have not only entertained audiences worldwide, but also brought in a huge amount of revenue for the Hollywood studios. In 2008, the theatrical market in the United States generated a total box office of $9.79 billion. Compared with $1.13 billion in 1956 and $2.97 billion in 1981, the revenue of U.S. film industry has increased drastically over the past several decades (MPAA

Yejin Hong is a Ph.D. candidate in the School of Journalism and Mass Communication at the University of Minnesota-Twin Cities (hong0163@umn.edu). Tsan-Kuo Chang is a professor in the Department of Media and Communication at the City University of Hong Kong (tkchang@cityu.edu.hk). Please send correspondence to Ms. Hong at the above address. An earlier version of the paper was presented at the 2008 convention of the Association of Education for Journalism and Mass Communication. The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewer and the editor for their useful comments and suggestions.
The growth of American film revenues does not just take place in the domestic market; it also registers a significant expansion in the international market. This is especially remarkable when the U.S. mass media were considered to be in decline, as Tunstall (2008, p. 5) argued, because “most people around the world prefer most of the time to be entertained and informed by people from their own culture and nation.” In fact, the domination of U.S. movies overseas has risen steadily since the 1980s and cut across countries of all shapes and sizes, with diverse cultural background and audience tastes. By the early 21st century, American film export revenues reached $11 billion, occupying half of the world theatrical film market (Miller et al., 2005). More recently, in 2008, American films export reached $18.3 billion, sharing approximately 40 percent of the worldwide box office (MPAA, 2008). With a global box office of nearly $2.0 billion by January 2010 (BusinessWeek, January 31, 2010), the recent success of the blockbuster movie Avatar is indicative of the international appeal of U.S. movies.

The persistent predominance of American films abroad has raised serious theoretical and practical implications for the cultural contacts between the United States and other countries at the international level. The purpose of this study is to determine how and why the international flow of cultural products appears the way it does and what may explain the direction of flow and the configuration of consumption patterns of American cultural products abroad. More specifically, through a comparative analysis of the box offices of American films in South Korea and the United Kingdom, it seeks to test competing theoretical explanations that tackle the structure and processes of cross national flow of cultural products.

Although American films have spread across various foreign markets, not all markets are created equal. Scott (2002) reported that the overall revenue of European films in 1997 was only half of the U.S. figure, but twice that of Asia and four times larger than that of Latin America. In 1999, almost 65 percent of U.S. films were exported to Western Europe, followed by 17.4 percent to Asia and the Pacific, 13 percent to Latin America and 2.3 percent to the Middle East and Africa (Scott, 2002). Even though the film production sector in U.K. has been fairly healthy and the number of films produced and average budgets have been rising (Miller et al., 2001), Hollywood movies continued to dominate the U.K. film market.

Because of the similar cultural background, it is arguably natural that U.S. films would mostly flow to U.K. and prevail in the British market. But it does not necessarily explain why U.S. films also flourish in non-Western societies, such as South Korea. According to the Korean Film Industry Statistics (2008), the proportion of U.S. films in the Korean market was 50.6 % in 2000 and slightly higher in 2001 (52.2%). During the recent eight-year period from 2001 to 2008, 44 percent of the Korean film market has been on average controlled by Hollywood movies (Korean Film Industry Statistics, 2008) even though the Korean film
industry has recently begun to grow and the domestic film market share has increased.

Such preponderance of Hollywood movies around the world has been attributed largely to ‘the unequaled ability of American multinational media corporations to disseminate the products of Hollywood across the globe and their ability to make big budget films that appeal powerfully to popular taste in many different cultures’ (Scott, 2004: 54). In an article titled ‘Earth to Hollywood: You Win,’ the Variety, a trade magazine for the movie industry, estimated that U.S. films earned 90 percent of the global box office (cited in Wasser, 2001). The prevalence of U.S. movies symbolizes the influence and power of American and Western culture in the world. This global cultural diffusion has led to the accusation of cultural imperialism, especially among the developing countries (McPhail, 2002; Wasser, 2001).

Exposure to movies is largely a matter of cultural taste (Marvasti, 2000), which means the capability of local audience to choose and consume what they would like to watch. Cultural factors have been found to be more important to explain the local difference of U.S. movie consumption than other variables (Chon, 2003; Yang, 2003). An increase over time in the proportion of national programs within a country’s prime time television broadcasts supports such an explanation (Straubhaar, et al., 2003). In terms of consumption of foreign cultural products, such as television programs or movies, the inclination toward regional blocks can be better understood through the concepts of either cultural proximity or cultural discount, or both. The theses of cultural discount and cultural proximity on the flow of cultural products are competing perspectives. They provide the epistemological departure point for the present study.

Through a comparative investigation of consumption patterns of Hollywood movies in the United States, South Korea and the United Kingdom, this study proposes to test competing hypotheses derived from the ideas of cultural proximity and cultural discount. Specifically, in the context of globalization, it seeks to determine the extent to which the consumptions of Hollywood movies could be explained by the cultural distance between countries. In other words, in the international flow of cultural products, which of the three competing explanations—proximity, discount or globalization—fits the facts better?

**INTERNATIONAL FLOW OF CULTURAL PRODUCTS**

The flow of cultural products across national borders has been well documented in the literature since the 1960s. The epistemological approach has been either descriptive or theoretical or both. In terms of new knowledge or acute insights, the descriptive approach usually has little significant to offer, other than charting the patterns and trends of the transborder flow (e.g., Varis, 1974; 1984) at a particular point in time, which are often dated once the data are published. Although not always supported by empirical evidence, the
theoretical approach is more illuminating and interesting as it focuses on pinpointing the determinants of the flows of news, advertising, entertainment, and data across national borders as well as identifying the effects or consequences of such flows. Over the past decades, various perspectives have been advanced to dissect the impacts of international flow of cultural products on countries at the receiving end, particularly those of developing and underdeveloped nations.

For example, emphasizing the dissemination of U.S. television programs and the popularity of U.S. films in other countries, the thesis of cultural imperialism has been one of the dominant frameworks that seek to unravel the cultural power and influences of Americanization (e.g., Schiller, 1976). As an overarching theory that supposes to encompass the entire process of flow of cultural products from production to dissemination to consumption, cultural imperialism subscribes to the firm belief that a few advanced countries in Western Europe and North America with the capability and resources to produce and distribute cultural products have monopolized the global media landscape. Theorists of cultural imperialism hold that the strong exporting of media content, such as Hollywood movies and TV programming, is driven by commercial interests and the corporate determination to dominate the world’s media market. In the process, Western cultures move beyond their original boundaries and, as a consequence, inflate their sphere of commercial influences (e.g., Wu & Chan, 2007).

Because audiences are conceived as active consumers and producers of meaning in the context of their own culture, reception theory does not regard audiences as cultural dopes or naïve receivers (Hall, 1981; Liebes & Katz, 1990). Since audiences cannot be easily duped, they actively select programs to watch and prefer to digest media content that is consistent with their national, cultural, ethnic, and racial characteristics (Crane, 2002). In exposure to foreign programs and the subsequent consumption, local audiences therefore tend to keenly seek out programs that fit their tastes and interpret them within the boundaries of local culture (Ang, 1985). Conceptually, reception theory hence undermines the validity of the thesis of cultural imperialism. It also suggests why the multiple-flow model has increasingly been well received in the literature.

The multiple flows of cultural products across countries and the centrality of active audiences not only weaken the claim of a monopolized international media market, but also enable countries to build their regional blocks within common parameters (Oh, 2006). It means that local consumption of cultural products is not necessarily dictated by the unilateral logic of Western capitalism and its market, but rather many regional blocks exist independently and create markets of tastes to cater to the diverse audiences (Oh, 2006). In Latin America, for example, Telenovela best illustrates the regionalization of TV programs although it has gradually become global itself in recent years. In East Asian countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan, American TV programs have since the 1990s decreased in both the total number and the proportion in prime time while the proportion of regional
programs has increased (Oh, 2006).

The emergence of regional programs and the preference of local receptions of domestic cultural products over the foreign ones suggest that the perspectives of cultural discount and cultural proximity in the international flow deserve close scholarly attention. Similar to cultural imperialism, both perspectives are rooted in the conceptual framework that the flow of cultural products is a matter of diffusion across national borders. What distinguishes among the three perspectives is their theoretical locus and the position of audiences relative to that of producers in the processes of flows. Contrary to the proponents of cultural imperialism, cross-cultural scholars and researchers who propose regional blocks of cultural products and local receptions as central to a better understanding of international flow turn their attention to such crucial questions as to what factors facilitate local taste and consumption and how local audiences perceive foreign products (e.g., Lee, 2001). Underlying their conceptualization is the realization that cultural difference and similarity across countries play an important role that shapes the relationship between foreign products and local consumption (Park, 2002). In a similar cultural setting, the flow of products is supposed to be easier because of shared cultural experience and expectation. The opposite should be true when the cultural context is different due to incompatible values or tastes, hence a discount of the values of products from overseas.

Cultural Discount

Cultural discount, as coined by Hoskins & Mirus (1988), refers to the loss of attractiveness or usefulness when cultural products are marketed to consumers whose cultural experience is alien. In other words, ‘a particular program rooted in one culture, and then attractive in that environment, will have a diminished appeal elsewhere as viewers find it difficult to identify with the style, values, beliefs, institutions and behavioral patterns of the material in question’ (Hoskins & Mirus, 1988: 500). This is particularly so when imported cultural products are not likely to portray or embrace the domestic way of life. Coupled with the language issue, the problem of content discount arises when cultural products move from country to country (Hoskins, McFayen, & Finn, 1997).

In addition to the local way of life, cultural experience and language, the phenomenon of cultural discount is also germane to the genres of TV programs or movies. If some genres are more culturally sensitive, they are less understood in a foreign, not domestic context and more likely to suffer from the effect of cultural discount. According to Chapman (1987), the transnational flow of TV programs mostly falls into the category of entertainment and drama. As such, they face the challenges of cultural discount across national borders. Lee (2006b) also studied the relationship between movie genres and the degree of their cultural discount. He found that some genres encountered greater cultural discount than other genres. Those genres that imply particular cultural history and political situation of the host country, such
as comedy and historical drama, were significantly discounted, whereas other genres that could be appreciated through common sense, like romantic drama, were not.

Although cultural discount entails a universal phenomenon, the amount of discount is nevertheless not necessarily standardized. If the size of cultural discount is the same for all countries, cultural discount alone does not need to be considered as a factor when the import and export of movies between countries are involved. Given the fact that, with the largest domestic film market, the global domination of U.S. cultural products around the world could be reasonably expected (Hoskins & Mirus, 1988), the same degree of cultural discount in countries would be a constant and hence has no bearing on the flow of movies. However, as a result of national idiosyncrasies and audiences’ differing tastes, cultural discount tends to vary from country to country. Accordingly, U.S. media corporations have more or less consciously attempted to reduce the discount rate of their cultural products in other countries by universalizing the content in some way (Lee, 2006a; Chan, 2002).

In the international flow of cultural products, the effect of cultural discount cannot be underestimated, not only because it encompasses local consumers’ responses to difference and familiarity toward foreign products, but also because it directly affects their choice and preference of those products (e.g., Hofstede, 1997). If cultural discount is valid, it has theoretical and practical implications for the flow of cultural products across national borders. Practically, when a U.S. movie is shrouded with a high degree of cultural specificity, it inevitably will suffer from a cultural discount in foreign markets no matter how highly popular the movie is in the domestic market. Theoretically, the impact of cultural discount implies a lack of cross-cultural predictability in the flow of products. As Lee (2006b: 885-886) put it, the lack of cross-cultural predictability refers to ‘the situation when the most successful media products in the domestic market are not necessarily the most successful in foreign markets.’

As a theoretical explanation for the international flow of cultural products, cultural discount takes place only when the cultural settings are different between countries. It does not necessarily deny or negate the fact that cultural products do move from country to country. In fact, cultural discount could only explain part of the story about the flow of cultural products around the world: cultural products are not likely to migrate to countries where they may encounter audience resistance due to the incompatibility of values, tastes or norms. Another part of the story touches on what may happen to the flow of cultural products when cultures are similar or close to each other. Cultural proximity as a thesis complements cultural discount.

**Cultural Proximity**

As a key concept in international communication research, proximity, whether geographical, psychological or cultural, has been examined as one of the determinants in the
flow and coverage of news across national borders (e.g., Chang, Shoemaker & Brendlinger, 1987). Over the past decades, studies have shown that in spite of global commercialization of cultural products and homogenization of media content, different parts of the world interact in various ways that reflect cultural differences and similarities between countries. For example, according to Straubhaar (1998), the geo-cultural market is established on the basis of cultural proximity, instead of homogeneous global culture or fractured individual culture. The proximity of cultures means that in the transnational flow of cultural products, local audiences are most likely to appreciate and consume TV programs or movies that closely resemble the domestic culture. They may treat those TV programs or movies like their own.

As a multi-dimensional concept, cultural proximity is determined by a variety of factors, not simply by the origin (e.g., nationality) of the product. These factors include cultural values, local identity, shared experience, and common language. Even if their languages are different, when audiences in different countries share certain cultural norms and values (e.g., Confucianism or individualism), cultural proximity might be formed between countries (Iwabuchi, 2001). How local audiences identify themselves in international communication also increases their sense of cultural proximity (La Pastina & Straubhaar, 2005). At the local level, identity is shaped not only by the relatively coherent and powerful nationhood and the use of same language (Anderson, 1983), but also by the shared experience constructed culturally and historically. Identity does not exist in a vacuum, but is embedded in people’s everyday practices. As audiences go about their daily lives in a specific place and at a specific time, they are attached one way or another to the locale, thus forming a particular sense of local identity that is experienced through time and confined within common cultural territories. As La Pastina & Straubhaar (2005: 277) indicated, ‘local audiences share intertwined histories and overlapping cultural characteristics as well as the same or similar languages.’ The intertwined histories might involve colonial legacies, independent movements, political and social protests against foreign influences, and challenges of domestic economic developments. To the extent that similarities could be determined, cultural blocks, whether local or regional, would emerge.

Language is also an important factor that molds a market’s choices of foreign cultural products, especially movies and TV programs. Although translation or dubbing may be employed for the benefits of local audiences, the presence of a foreign language is a clear indication that a movie or TV program is not primarily produced for the consumption of native viewers. The cultural distance places a psychological barrier between the product and the audiences. It has been found that local audiences are customarily more receptive to media content transmitted in the same or an understandable language; they are more resistant to that with an unfamiliar tongue, even when the content is dubbed or subtitled (Fu, 2006). Moreover, language implies linguistic ties that reflect cultural affinity or historical heritage between countries. A linguistic tie can therefore mediate the barrier of audience reception.
Research on the flows of Latin American television programs suggests that regional trade and consumption of programs enable countries to replace the supply of cultural imports from the United States with other alternatives (Straubhaar & Viscasillas, 1991). As Straubhaar and Viscasillas (1991) documented, even if a country’s domestic market size is small and the country does not enjoy cultural proximity at the regional level, it might still substitute its own programs for what has typically been imported from the United States or other countries in the Western world. Similar practices have been observed in Asian countries (Park, 2002). In East Asia, there has been a growing interpenetration of TV programs in the region, although the United States has long been an important influence in the inflow of foreign programs (Thussu, 2000). The popularity of Korean television dramas in China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, for example, has been analyzed within the thesis of cultural proximity (You & Lee, 2001; Heo, 2000). Previous studies indicate cultural proximity as an important factor in the reception of foreign cultural products. Part of the reasons is that shared linguistic and historical experiences tend to create some sort of commonalities that lead to a sense of closeness or proximity among the audiences toward the cultural products (Straubhaar, 1998).

As is evident, in the international flow of cultural products, the two concepts—cultural proximity and cultural discount—are closely related to each other. They represent opposite theoretical explanations for the direction and volume of the flow of cultural products between countries. While proximity may increase the value of any cultural product, cultural discount diminishes it. Take two movies produced in different countries. Under the thesis of cultural proximity, a movie that is made in the local language and carries familiar cultural messages will be more highly valued by local audiences. On the contrary, a foreign movie that is immersed in the original culture will likely see its value diminished in the trade of films between countries of different cultural settings, as predicted by the cultural discount thesis. Because affective responses generally determine the pattern of cultural preferences in different countries (Park, 2002), cultural proximity should strongly affect local audience’s consumption of foreign cultural products while cultural discount undermines it.

Using the flows of movies among the United States, South Korea and the United Kingdom as an example, the conceptual relationship between cultural proximity and cultural discount can be best illustrated in Figure 1. However, as part of the larger theoretical framework, cultural proximity and cultural discount do not address the compelling issues first raised by the theory of cultural imperialism and more recently by the theory of globalization: the persistent prevalence of American cultural products around the world and their effects on the consumptions by local audiences. As a thesis, globalization implies a tendency of homogenization of cultural values and practices.
Globalization

The theoretical shift from cultural/media imperialism to globalization in international communication research is particularly evident in the context of global flow of Chinese film and TV (Curtin, 2007; Mackay, 2004). ‘[U]nlike theories of media imperialism that emphasize the self-conscious extension of centralized power,’ as Curtin (2007: 9) argued, ‘globalization theories suggest that the world’s increasingly interconnected media environments is the outcome of messy and complicated interactions across space.’ Given the recent theoretical development, the framework in Figure 1 incorporates the idea of globalization as an overarching explanation for the international flow of cultural products between countries.

As shown in Figure 1, three pairs of correlation of box offices between the United States, United Kingdom and South Korea could be interpreted in different ways, depending on the theoretical perspectives involved. If the thesis of cultural discount is valid, the consumption of American movies in South Korea should bear no relationship with the consumption pattern in the U.S. domestic market and vice versa. To be more specific, a blockbuster movie in the United States suggests it has values or taste preferences unique to the American culture or society, which makes it commonly shared or accepted among the domestic audience. As such, a U.S. blockbuster movie should not be expected to become a hit by evoking similar responses or cultural tastes in South Korea, given that Korean cultural values are largely different from those of the United States. Instead, local audiences
in South Korea should find the movie less appealing due to its diminished cultural values and relevance.

The same reasoning of cultural discount should also be applicable to the relationship between South Korea and the United Kingdom. In many respects, from the political to the cultural dimensions, the two countries differ from each other significantly while the United Kingdom is regarded as culturally more proximate to the United States (e.g., Hofstede, 2003). Audiences in both countries could be reasonably assumed to prefer certain types of cultural products that cater to their own unique tastes, experiences and expectations.

Between the United States and United Kingdom, however, the consumption patterns of cultural products should be highly similar, considering that the two countries share the same language, cultural heritage and historical experiences. Because cultural proximity shapes audiences’ affective preferences or tastes for cultural products, a blockbuster movie in the United States is likely to be well-received in the United Kingdom, whose audiences may find cultural resonance or familiarity in the same film. Although cultural proximity and cultural discount may lead local audiences in the United Kingdom and South Korea to consume U.S. movies in different ways, they cannot explain the fact that American films might be consumed heavily in both countries. A competing theoretical explanation for such a phenomenon is globalization in that local audiences in the United Kingdom and South Korea share a universal taste or preference for American movies. Figure 1 proposes this rival perspective on the condition that the three sets of relationship among the three countries all turn out to be positive and strong. In the model, globalization entails a globalized taste, a globalized consumption of cultural products, and a globalized audience around the world.

Against the backdrop of the theoretical framework outlined in Figure 1, this study proposed to test the following three competing hypotheses to determine which fits the facts better:

**Cultural Discount:**

$H_1$: There will be a negative and weak correlation between the box offices of the same U.S. movies in the United States and South Korea.

**Cultural Proximity:**

$H_2$: There will be a positive and strong correlation between the box offices of the same U.S. movies in the United States and United Kingdom.

**Globalization:**

$H_3$: There will be positive and strong correlations between the box offices of the same U.S. movies among the United States, United Kingdom, and South Korea.
In this study, various sources were used to gather the necessary data to test the three hypotheses. The unit of analysis is a movie itself, regardless of its length or content. As indicators of the consumption and popularity of U.S. movies in the domestic and foreign markets, the yearly movie box office data collected either by ticket revenues or by audience admissions were scrutinized. Such data are also assumed to indicate local audiences’ tastes and preferences for cultural products in their own market. In order to determine the effects of cultural proximity and cultural discount as well as how U.S. movies might be consumed in domestic and foreign markets, this study selected the same U.S. movies that were also available in the United Kingdom and South Korea and compared the box offices in the three countries.

First, from 1994 to 2008, the top 100 U.S. movies in each year were collected from the Box Office Mojo (www.boxofficemojo.com). Box Office Mojo provides U.S. domestic box office, international box office, and movie information. Among the top 100 U.S. movies, only those available in the United Kingdom and South Korea were included for analysis.

Second, during the same study period, the Korean Film Industry Statistics published by the Korean Ministry of Culture and Tourism was used to derive the box office data for the U.S. movies in the country. The original statistics included the number of movie goers as the box office data, not the actual ticket sales. For each movie, this study converted the number of movie goers to the ticket sales in Korean currency by multiplying the number of movie goers with the yearly average of ticket price in a particular year. The new number was then converted to U.S. dollars by using the yearly currency exchange rate between the two countries.

Third, the U.K. box office data came from the British Film Council (www.bfi.uk), the European Audio Visual Observatory (www.obs.coe.int/db/index.html) and the Internet Movie Database (www.imdb.com). The Internet Movie Database includes a great amount of global box office for each movie covered.

During the 15-year study period, a total of 891 U.S. movies were available in all three countries, with an average of 59 movies per year. For each movie, the box office data in the United States, United Kingdom and South Korea were analyzed using the ticket sales data. It should be noted that because the Korean Film Council did not collect the national data before 2002, the box office data in Korea were based on the data in Seoul, the capital of South Korea. Whether the consumption pattern of movies in Seoul represented that of the whole country remains an open question, however. Given that the residents in Seoul typically embody what is Korean at the national level, the lack of a larger data set does not necessarily pose a threat to the validity of tests of the three hypotheses.
As discussed earlier, the purpose of this study is to determine the flow and consumptions of U.S. movies in the United Kingdom and South Korea. How U.S. movies might be consumed in the domestic and foreign markets could be measured by their popularity among the American and foreign audiences. One indicator of such popularity is the top movie at the box office in each country. Table 1 reports the top U.S. movie in each year from 1994 to 2008, as they were ranked by the ticket sales in the three countries. Because the United States was the country of origin, those films were used as the baseline to determine how the same movies might be consumed in the United Kingdom and South Korea.


As is evident, in most cases the top movies in United States were also highly ranked in the United Kingdom, such as *Toy Story*, *Independence Day*, *Titanic*, *Star Wars: The Phantom Menace*, *Harry Potter and the Sorcerers Stone*, *The Lord of the Rings: The Return of the King*, *Shrek 2*, and *Pirates of the Caribbean: Dead Man’s Chest*. After removing the domestically produced films (one in 1994 and one in 2000) in the United Kingdom from the rankings, the pattern remains very much unchanged in that the U.S. films still dominated the British market. To a great extent, this lends a strong support to the theoretical claim of cultural proximity between the two countries.

The opposite is true for the Korean market. Compared to the blockbusters in the U.S. domestic market, only two movies—*Independence Day* and *Titanic*—appeared on the top of Korean box office. All other 13 top U.S. movies were ranked behind domestic Korean films or other American movies (Table 2), suggesting different tastes and consumption preferences among the Korean local audiences. This configuration certainly is an indication of cultural discount. The most telling example of the effect of cultural discount is probably the movie *How the Grinch Stole Christmas*, which was the top movie in the United States in 2000, but was ranked 82nd in South Korea. Presumably, the film resonated highly among the American movie goers, but did not register the same kind of cultural fondness among the Korean audiences. When the Korean films were eliminated from the rankings, the number of top U.S. movies in Korea increased only from two to four, further suggesting a preference for the domestic films or other American movies. Significantly, since 1999, except for 2002,
the top movies in Korea were domestic, indicating audiences' preference for locally produced products.

Table 1 compared only the top movies ranked in the three countries. Although the patterns appear to support the effects of both cultural proximity and cultural discount on the
flows of American films into the United Kingdom and South Korea, the comparison was based on a data set of 15 movies only. The analysis does not reflect the fact that during the past 15 years, hundreds of U.S. movies had been shown in both British and Korean markets. Using the Korean box office data, Table 3 examines how the top 100 movies in the United States were consumed each year in South Korea during the study period. From 1994 to 2008, the proportion of top 100 U.S. movies that were also ranked among the top 100 films in South Korea remained mostly around or above 50 percent, indicating a consistent pattern of consumption. When all ranked movies in South Korea were considered, as shown in Table 3, in most cases, nearly two-thirds of the top 100 U.S. movies were ranked in the Korean market, suggesting the popularity of American movies among Korean audiences. In recent years, however, the proportion of the top 100 U.S. movies that were ranked among all movies in the Korean market has declined significantly since 2003. This finding lends support to the observation that domestic films may be gaining more audiences in South Korea.

To determine the consumption patterns among moviegoers in the United States, United Kingdom and South Korea, the study further takes into account how each movie might be received by the audiences in the three markets. Using each movie as the unit of analysis, Figure 2 shows the correlation coefficients among box office data in the United States,
United Kingdom and South Korea. The results were used to test the three hypotheses. In terms of the impact of cultural discount, the first hypothesis proposed that there would be a negative and weak correlation between the box offices of the same U.S. movies in the United States and Korea. This was not the case. In fact, during the study period, among the 891 movies analyzed, the correlation between the box offices in the United States and South Korea was .514 (p < .01), indicating a strong positive relationship between the consumption of the same movies in the two countries.

A further test of the cultural discount thesis could be determined by looking at the

Table 3: Consumption of Top 100 U.S. Movies in South Korea, 1994-2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Among Top 100 Movies*</th>
<th>Among All Ranked Movies+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>68/441 (15.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>64/372 (17.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>66/367 (18.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>72/331 (21.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>70/287 (24.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>77/275 (28.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>83/331 (25.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>75/280 (26.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>74/274 (27.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>83/240 (34.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>81/268 (30.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>72/301 (24.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>54/345 (15.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>75/393 (19.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>60/379 (21.5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Entries indicate the number of top 100 movies in the U.S. box office that also appear in the top 100 movies in South Korea. For example, among the top 100 U.S. movies in 1994, 48 of them ranked in the top 100 Korean box office. The entry could be read as the proportion of U.S. movies in the top 100 movies in the Korean market.

+ The first entry denotes the number of top 100 movies in the U.S. box office among all ranked movies in the Korean box office. For instance, in 1994, out of the top 100 U.S. movies, 68 of them were ranked in the Korean box office. The second entry indicates the number of movies ranked in the Korean box office. Some U.S. movies had different opening year in South Korea. About 20 to 30 U.S. movies each year play in South Korea one or two years later than in the United States. For instance, *The River Wild* was released in the United States in 1994 and was ranked 29th in the American box office in that year. In South Korea, however, this film was released in 1995 and its rank was 114 among all movies in the Korean market. Because the top 100 U.S. movies were based on the U.S. box office data, for comparison purpose, the delayed U.S. movies were included among the movies shown in South Korea in the year they were released in the United States, instead of the year of its release in South Korea. In other words, *The River Wild* was included among the 68 movies in 1994, rather than in 1995.
consumption pattern of U.S. movies between South Korea and the United Kingdom. The original correlation between the two countries was .526 (p < .01), a magnitude lower than that of the U.S.-U.K. relationship, but still a strong one. Because of the diffusion of the same U.S. films into both U.K. and Korea, the overall correlation between the two countries could be attributed to the overlap. After removing the joint effect of the U.S. box office data, the partial correlation between the U.K. and Korea dropped to .320 (p < .01), showing a significant amount of the relationship is dependent on the shared relations with the United States. Notwithstanding, the partial correlation is still positive and substantial. These results obviously did not support the cultural discount hypothesis. For the effect of cultural proximity, the second hypothesis suggested that there would be a positive and strong correlation between the box offices of the same U.S. movies in the United States and the United Kingdom. There was indeed a strong positive correlation (r = .788, p < .01) between the box offices of the two countries, thus supporting the hypothesis. Such a high correlation provides an interesting empirical footnote to a recent observation by *The Economist* (March 29, 2008: 73, emphasis added) that many Britons ‘travelling in America find it more familiar than one would expect just from speaking the same language and bathing from birth in Hollywood’s offerings.’

If the results are any guide of the consumption of American movies in the two countries, a comparison of the two sets of correlations may help shed light on the seemingly different patterns. The juxtaposition appears to indicate that American films are consumed more in a culturally similar country (the United Kingdom) than in a culturally dissimilar nation (South Korea), hence suggesting a cultural discount from one place to another. Because the correlation dropped from a high level between the United States and the United Kingdom (.788) to a relatively low one between U.S. and South Korea (.514), intuitively, it may be argued that the effect of cultural discount indeed took place. Such interpretation, however, implies a causal relationship—the effect of culture on movie consumption—that could not be inferred from correlation alone.

In addition to the theoretical perspectives of cultural discount and cultural proximity, the theory of globalization provides a competing explanation for the global flow of cultural products. To test this hypothesis, this study proposed that there would be positive and strong correlations between box offices of the same U.S. movies among the United States, United Kingdom and South Korea. As discussed earlier, a theoretical and statistical condition was set to accept globalization as a feasible explanation only when the three sets of relationship showed strong and positive correlations. The rationale was straightforward: if the effect of cultural discount was not supported by the evidence, an alternative explanation must be found to account for the similar tastes and consumption patterns of American films in both South Korea and the United Kingdom. The data in Figure 2 clearly show a consistent positive relationship across the three countries, suggesting a globalizing impact of U.S. movies among local audiences from country to country.
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

Previous studies examined the consumption of foreign cultural products either in terms of cultural discount or cultural proximity in one setting or between two countries only (e.g., Lee, 2006a & 2006b). Although such design might be able to provide statistical evidence to support the effect of cultural proximity or cultural discount, it is inadequate to determine the validity of respective theoretical explanations without comparing the theories involved. As Kuhn (1970: 147, emphasis in original) compellingly argued, it makes little sense to ask ‘whether or how well an individual theory fits the facts,’ but it ‘makes a great deal of sense to ask which of two actual and competing theories fits the facts better.’ Following Kuhn’s notion, Chang (2010) called such comparison as “paradigm testing” in international communication research. Although not a definitive test, the present study compared the three theoretical explanations that have been advanced in the literature to determine which one fits the flow and consumption of cultural products across national borders better.

With three sets of data, this study examined the effects of cultural discount, cultural proximity and globalization on the flows of American films into South Korea and the United Kingdom between 1994 and 2008. If the thesis was taken individually, the results supported cultural proximity between the United States and the United Kingdom, but not cultural discount between the United States and South Korea or between the United Kingdom and South Korea. Misleading conclusion may therefore be drawn from the empirical evidence to suggest that similarity between cultures play an important role in determining the flow and

* Entries are correlation coefficients between two countries.
+ The entry for the relationship between South Korea and U.K. is a partial correlation, controlling for the U.S. box office data (N=889). The original correlation coefficient between the South Korea and U.K. is .526. All correlations are significant at p < .01.
consumption of cultural products simply because the thesis fits the fact. But the explanation leaves much to be desired. Conceptually, cultural proximity and cultural discount should be mirror images of the same theoretical formulation: in the flow of cultural products between countries, the former suggests a positive relationship while the latter a negative one. They should be taken collectively or in pairs, as Kuhn (1970) pointed out, not individually. Both perspectives at least have to fit the facts. When one fails, the other cannot stand alone as a viable theoretical explanation.

The flow of movies can be considered as a form of diffusion. When diffusion occurs, it is obvious that the U.S. films in both U.K. and Korea are a result of borrowing because of cross-cultural interactions. As such, the Galton’s problem raises a competing explanation for the relationship between U.K. and Korea in that American films in the two countries represent ‘duplicate copies of the same original’ (Scheuch, 1990: 28). In other words, external factors (diffusion), not internal factors (local tastes), may explain why audiences in the two countries prefer certain movies in their own market. This is not the case, however. After removing the joint effect, the consumption of U.S. movies in the United Kingdom and South Korea still shows a robust relationship, hence demonstrating the local audiences’ similar tastes or preferences.

Although the evidence is limited, a better explanation for the consumption patterns of American films in South Korea and the United Kingdom appears to be the theory of globalization. The fact that Hollywood movies have long dominated the world market raises serious theoretical and practical implications. As theorists of cultural/media imperialism have argued, the global flows of U.S. cultural products might have damaging effects on other countries by creating a singular, Americanized culture at the expense of local cultures. Such arguments, however, fail to acknowledge the autonomy and choices of local audiences in their preferences mediated by the cultures of their own nation-states (Tunstall, 2008) as well as ‘the complex dynamics of cultural interaction and exchange’ between countries (Curtin, 2007: 7).

In connection to the globalization of Chinese film and TV (Curtin, 2007), if the findings of this study are any indication, they suggest that the consumptions of American films in South Korea and the United Kingdom do not necessarily mean Americanization, but rather a form of globalization. Will the acceptance, and thus the flow, of American media products, particularly films, around the world be tempered in the future as countries in Asia (e.g., India) and elsewhere (e.g., Middle East) keep developing their own cultural industries to challenge their U.S. counterparts? Tunstall’s (2008) extensive survey of the global media landscape suggests yes. In the case of South Korea, as its film industry continues to grow and expand beyond its own domestic market, it is likely that the correlations between U.S. movie rankings and Korea’s rankings may decline over time. The primacy of local tastes for indigenous cultural products may undercut the theory of media globalization.

Although the findings challenge existing beliefs of international communication flow
of cultural products, this study has some limitations. The unit of analysis is the movie itself. Correlation of movie consumptions between two countries does not necessarily mean cultural causation. Also, not all U.S. movies are created equal. There are other elements that may affect how each movie is consumed in the domestic and foreign markets, including cultural references and preferences embedded in the content. The import and export of American movies around the world, and hence their potential consumptions in foreign countries, are also influenced by a number of factors, such as budget, well-known actor/actress, genres, awards, advertising, and marketing. Previous studies have identified genres (e.g., comedy, drama and action) as an important factor that affects cross-cultural predictability of movies between countries. Because this study treated each movie as an equal unit in the analysis, the within-movie differences and their possible impacts on the flow and consumption were unexamined.

Because South Korea has a screen quota policy that determines the proportion of foreign movies that can be imported, the Korean box office data for the U.S. films reflect only those that were made available through the quota system. Moreover, the debates over the screen quota and demonstrations against certain U.S. movies in Korea might cue the local audiences to choose some particular U.S. films to watch. Part of audiences’ tastes and preferences in Korea, thus, might be a function of the regulatory policy. Although this study examined the consumption patterns of films in the United States, South Korea and United Kingdom from 1994 to 2008, it cannot demonstrate whether the relationship has changed over time. Since the early 1990s the Korean economy and industry, including the film industry, have progressed significantly and the audiences’ experience with Western cultural products has also increased, there is reason to believe that the consumption patterns of domestic and foreign films would change over time. That requires a different unit of analysis, a longer study period and an extended data set.

REFERENCES


Motion Picture Association of America (2000) *Structure of National Film Markets*.


*The Economist* (2008, March 27) ‘Britain and America are more divided than is widely assumed’.


